Federal Reports

HUD established procedures in the Lead Safe Housing Rule in 1999 to eliminate lead-based paint hazards, as far as practicable, in public housing. However, it did not have a plan to manage lead-based paint and lead-based paint hazards in public housing. Additionally, HUD generally did not monitor whether public housing agencies had implemented lead-based paint hazard reduction and documented the activities at their public housing developments. These weaknesses occurred because HUD relied on public housing agencies to implement their own methods to achieve lead-safe housing, which should have included implementing lead-based paint hazard reduction. Further, instead of monitoring public housing agencies for compliance with the lead-based paint hazard reduction procedures in the Lead Safe Housing Rule, HUD relied on public housing agencies’ annual certifications of compliance. Without a plan to manage lead-based paint and lead-based paint hazards in public housing and ensure that public housing agencies implemented lead-based paint hazard reduction, HUD lacked assurance that (1) families with children under 6 years of age residing in public housing were not exposed to lead-based paint hazards and, thus, protected from lead exposure and (2) its procedures for eliminating lead-based paint hazards in public housing were effective.We recommend that the General Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing require the Real Estate Assessment Center in coordination with the Office of Field Operations to (1) develop a plan to manage lead-based paint and lead-based paint hazards in public housing, (2) determine whether public housing agencies identified as having lead-based paint in their housing developments maintain and implement a plan for controlling lead-based paint, and (3) assess the lead-based paint hazard reduction activities performed at 19 developments associated with 18 public housing agencies reviewed that did not implement interim controls or adequately document that lead-based paint had been abated or treated with interim controls. If those reduction activities did not fully abate the lead-based paint, HUD should ensure that the public housing agencies implement interim controls and ongoing maintenance and reevaluation programs.

An Amtrak Maintainer based in Newark, New Jersey, and a Trainer based in Sunnyside, New York, were terminated after their disciplinary hearings on October 4, 2022. The two former employees conspired with another employee, Keith Kovaleski, to sell misbranded and unapproved new drugs. The Maintainer violated company policies by ordering misbranded and/or unapproved new drugs from Kovaleski’s company, All American Peptide (AAP), and by accepting shipments of these products on behalf of Kovaleski. The Trainer violated company policies by regularly ordering misbranded and/or unapproved new drugs from AAP and reselling them to the public. Kovaleski, an Assistant Foreman based in New York, is currently awaiting sentencing after pleading guilty on March 21, 2022, to selling misbranded and unapproved new drugs. The two former employees are ineligible for rehire.

Every Postal Service-owned vehicle is assigned a Voyager Fleet card (Voyager card) to pay for its commercially purchased fuel, oil, and routine maintenance. Vehicles certified for unleaded gasoline are required to be fueled with unleaded regular or gasohol. A fuel consisting of a blend usually of 10 percent ethanol and 90 percent gasoline. Vehicles can be fueled with gasohol when the price per gallon is equal to or less than the price of unleaded regular gasoline.Controls over fuel purchases and PINs are crucial in maintaining the integrity of the program to control costs. Postal Service policy provides guidance over the assignment, use, and monitoring of PINs and reconciliation of Voyager card transactions.

The Office of the Inspector General conducted a review of Kingston Fossil Plant (KIF) organization to identify factors that could impact KIF’s organizational effectiveness. During our evaluation, plant personnel informed us that interactions with management and between coworkers were generally positive, although behavioral concerns regarding one individual were identified. In addition, plant personnel expressed concerns regarding (1) condition of assets, (2) staffing challenges, and (3) communication related to the future of KIF.

An Amtrak employee based in Albuquerque, New Mexico, was terminated from employment on October 5, 2022, after our investigation found that the employee violated company policies by posting inappropriate and offensive language and images on her publicly available Facebook account that also identified her as a company employee. The former employee admitted to posting the language and images, which she acknowledged could be deemed as offensive and inappropriate by customers and other employees. In addition, the former employee also admitted to accepting a gift from a customer that she stated was valued at $300, also in violation of company policy.

The Geospatial Data Act seeks to foster efficient, government-wide management of geospatial data—information identifying the geographic location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on Earth. As required by the Act, we audited NASA’s collection, production, acquisition, maintenance, distribution, use, and preservation of geospatial data.

Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Federal Labor Relations Authority

In March 2022, we conducted unannounced inspections of six U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) facilities in the Del Rio area of Texas, specifically five U.S. Border Patrol facilities and one Office of Field Operations (OFO) port of entry. Our inspections and subsequent analysis showed that Border Patrol held 1,164 detainees in custody in four facilities longer than specified in the National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS), which generally limit detention in these facilities to 72 hours.

EAC OIG, through the independent public accounting firm of McBride, Lock & Associates, LLC, audited funds received by the State of California under the Help America Vote Act, including state matching funds and interest earned, totaling $216.3 million. This included Election Security, reissued Section 101, reissued Section 251, and Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act grants.

While conducting an ongoing audit of the Philadelphia Housing Authority’s (Authority) management of lead-based paint hazards in its public housing units, we identified a significant gap in HUD’s program requirements related to safe work practices, which we believe requires immediate action by HUD. We identified that the Authority determined a substantial percentage of maintenance and hazard reduction work performed on surfaces with lead-based paint in its public housing units was “de minimis”, or minor. The Authority’s determinations exempted the work from HUD’s rules requiring safe work practices. In some cases, the documentation in the Authority’s maintenance files indicated the work might have been labeled improperly as minor or “de minimis.” However, HUD does not require assisted property owners like public housing agencies (PHAs) to maintain evidence supporting that the work was minor. The lack of a requirement for assisted property owners to maintain such documentation impedes HUD’s ability to conduct meaningful oversight of property owners’ compliance with HUD’s requirements for safe work practices. The lack of a requirement also limits HUD’s and OIG’s ability to verify that the de minimis exemption is being properly applied. While this risk became apparent during our ongoing audit of a PHA, we believe this risk extends beyond HUD’s public housing program to all HUD-assisted programs where the de minimis exemption may apply. We believe HUD should take immediate steps to mitigate the risk that the exemption is being applied too broadly and thereby increasing the potential for residents and maintenance staff to be exposed to lead-based paint hazards.We recommend that HUD require assisted property owners, including PHAs, to maintain evidence to support determinations that maintenance and hazard reduction work that disturbs lead-based paint in target housing are minor such that they can be properly exempted from HUD’s safe work requirements.

The Unified Coordination Group (UCG) struggled to track Afghan evacuees who independently departed U.S. military bases designated as “safe havens.” Specifically, UCG officials had difficulties documenting when independent departures occurred.

As required by the Inspector General Act of 1978 (as amended), this Semiannual Report summarizes the activities of the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General for the preceding 6-month period.

This document discusses EAC OIG’s planned oversight activities for fiscal year 2023.

2022 Fall GPO OIG Semiannual Report to Congress April 1, 2022 - September 30, 2022

This report summarizes work that we initiated and completed during this semiannual period on a number of critical Departmental activities. Over the past 6 months, our office issued 16 products related to our audit, evaluation, and inspection work. These products addressed programs and personnel associated with the United States Census Bureau (Census Bureau), United States Economic Development Administration (EDA), First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet Authority), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and the Department itself. This report also describes our investigative activities addressing programs and personnel associated with the Census Bureau, NOAA, and the Department itself.

10th Quarterly Report to Congress

In this Semiannual Report to Congress (SAR), we discuss accomplishments and activities of OIG from April 1, 2022 through September 30, 2022, as well as its goals and future plans.

We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) efforts to meet the Geospatial Data Act of 2018 (the Act).Our audit objective was to determine whether HUD met the 13 responsibilities stated in the Act with regard to its collection, production, acquisition, maintenance, distribution, use, and preservation of geospatial data. The Act also generally requires covered agencies provide access to geospatial data and metadata to the public and enhance reporting to Congress. The 16 covered agencies, including HUD, remain in the implementation stage of the Act until the Federal Geographic Data Committee establishes formal standard for use in determining compliance with the responsibilities stated in the Act. The Act requires that HUD’s geospatial data be audited at least once every 2 years.HUD met 11 of the 13 responsibilities stated in the Act. However, HUD did not meet 2 of the 13 responsibilities stated in the Act. HUD needs to dedicate resources to fully implement its geospatial program. HUD’s lapse in its contract for services to manage its Geocode Services Center created challenges in meeting the responsibilities stated in the Act. As a result, HUD risks not having accurate and open access to geospatial data available for use by Federal, State, local, and tribal governments; the public; and other interested stakeholders to make decisions.We recommend that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research provide adequate resources for the further development of geocoding services through the reactivation of the lapsed Geocode Service Center contract. In addition, we will reopen recommendation 1A from OIG audit report 2020-LA-0002, issued on September 24, 2020, so that HUD can implement the agreed-upon action to meet the responsibility stated in 43 U.S.C. § 2808(a)(5).

We found the fund’s financial statements, except for accounts receivable and earned revenue, to be fairly presented.

We conducted this review to provide considerations for the EPA to strengthen its corrective action certification process. When the Agency certifies to the completion of corrective actions that have not been completed, it leads to inaccurate data in the Agency’s audit tracking system, limits the OIG’s assurance that the corrective actions reported by the Agency are reliable, and may give the public and Congress the wrong impression regarding the EPA’s progress in addressing OIG recommendations.

We assessed USDA’s compliance with the 13 covered agency responsibilities in subsection 759(a) of the Geospatial Data Act.

This report contains information about recommendations from the OIG's audits, evaluations, reviews, and other reports that the OIG had not closed as of the specified date because it had not determined that the Department of Justice (DOJ) or a non-DOJ federal agency had fully implemented them. The list omits information that DOJ determined to be limited official use or classified, and therefore unsuitable for public release.The status of each recommendation was accurate as of the specified date and is subject to change. Specifically, a recommendation identified as not closed as of the specified date may subsequently have been closed.

Management and performance challenges facing the Commission and briefly assesses management’s progress

We reviewed the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) process for handling complaints, or protests, filed to request review of contracts awarded to businesses that may not have been eligible in size or certification status, as required by the offer terms. The small business protest process was created to allow self-interested offerors to police themselves and prevent awards from going to ineligible businesses. The process was intended to protect the integrity of set-aside awards and of SBA’s small business contracting certification programs.Congress authorized small business set-asides to ensure federal agencies award a fair proportion of goods and service contracts to small businesses in each industry to diversify and strengthen the American economy. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, federal agencies awarded over $154 billion to small businesses. The objectives of this audit were to determine whether SBA had effective controls in place to ensure protest decisions were properly enforced and to monitor the protest process.We found SBA had effective controls in place to ensure protest decisions were properly enforced and used to monitor the protest process. We found that only 4 percent of the small businesses protested in FY 2021 did not update their proper status in their company profile after SBA found they did not qualify for set-aside awards. We also found program officials decided 80 percent of small business protests within the required 15 business days, or within extension dates approved by the contracting officer.We made one recommendation for SBA management to strengthen controls to consistently document and monitor required protest information to ensure decisions are made in a timely manner. SBA Management agreed with the recommendation.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is issuing this management advisory to express concerns regarding the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) decision to end collections on purchased Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans with an outstanding balance of $100,000 or less.In anticipation of a significant number of delinquent PPP loans that lenders will submit for guaranty purchase, we began reviewing SBA’s process for approving PPP guaranty purchases. During our review, we identified concerns with SBA’s decision to end collections on these loans and found that expedited management action is needed to determine whether it is cost effective to pursue collections on these loans. Management attention is needed to ensure effective stewardship of billions of dollars in potential funds owed to taxpayers. Ending collections could incentivize ineligible borrowers to obtain loans valued at $100,000 or less in similar future loan programs. However, continuing to pursue collections will help ensure accountability from delinquent borrowers.We recommend the SBA Administrator stay the April 27, 2022 decision to end collections on purchased PPP loans with an outstanding balance of $100,000 or less until a comprehensive cost benefit analysis is conducted. We recommend the agency explore alternative means of collections for PPP loans with an outstanding balance of $100,000 or less. We also recommend conducting an initial and periodic cost benefit analysis on PPP purchase guarantees with comprehensive estimates to sufficiently assess whether the cost of collecting loans of $100,000 or less is more than the recovery amount and pursue collections based on results of the analysis. Management disagreed with recommendations 1 and 2 and agreed with recommendation 3.

Fiscal Year 2022 Report on the Federal Trade Commission’s Top Management and Performance Challenges

On August 29, 2021, the President designated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the lead Federal agency for Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), a Federal effort to resettle in the United States vulnerable Afghans who were evacuated from Afghanistan after thefall of the Afghan government in the summer of 2021.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not manage Puerto Rico Disaster Case Management Program (PR-DCMP) funds inaccordance with Federal regulations and FEMA program requirements. According to Federal regulations, non-Federal entities must supportaccumulation of costs and provide adequate documentation to support costs charged to a Federal award.

Although the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) processed and obligated funds timely to other Federal agencies (OFA), it did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure OFAs used pandemic funding as required. Specifically, FEMA did not develop detailed cost estimates when initially establishing MAs, validate unliquidated and open obligations throughout the MA lifecycle, and verify cost eligibility against Public Assistance guidance before closing the MA.

Objective: To determine whether the Social Security Administration (SSA) effectively managed the Numident death-alert process.

Objective: To determine whether the Social Security Administration (SSA) complied with its enumeration policies and procedures and had adequate controls over managing evidentiary documents submitted to support Social Security number (SSN) card applications during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Objective: To determine whether the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) overall information security program and practices were effective and consistent with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) requirements, as defined in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 core Inspector General (IG) FISMA reporting metrics.

During our unannounced inspection of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Torrance County Detention Facility (Torrance) in Estancia, NM, we found that Torrance complied with ICE detention standards for detainee grievances and the voluntary work program. We could not assess compliance with segregation standards because no detainees were in segregation at, or near, the time of our visit.

We conducted this review to provide considerations for the EPA to strengthen its corrective action certification process. When the Agency certifies to the completion of corrective actions that have not been completed, it leads to inaccurate data in the Agency’s audit tracking system, limits the OIG’s assurance that the corrective actions reported by the Agency are reliable, and may give the public and Congress the wrong impression regarding the EPA’s progress in addressing OIG recommendations.

We audited three grant agreements the BIE and BIA awarded to the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians between July 2017 and June 2019.

Our objective was to determine whether the Postal Service complied with applicable maximum total compensation provisions of the PAEA and related Postal Service policies and guidelines for CY 2021. We reviewed Postal Service policies, procedures, and guidelines regarding compensation, benefits, and bonuses; payroll, bonus, and award information from Postal Service systems; and employment agreements applicable to the compensation limits for the project scope. We also conducted interviews with Postal Service employees.

Audit of the National Labor Relations Board's Division of Judges

Final Management Letter: Changes to the Internal Review Process for Proposed Rules May Impact the Office of the Advocate for Small Business Capital Formation and the Office of the Investor Advocate

Objective: To determine whether the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) corrective actions in response to our prior audits effectively improved its processing of special payment amount (SPA) overpayments on the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR).

The U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB) federal certification program provides greater access to federal contracting opportunities for women-owned small businesses. The objective of this audit was to determine whether SBA implemented controls to prevent ineligible firms from being certified into the WOSB program.SBA had applicants provide documentation that demonstrates a woman owned and controlled the business in accordance with federal regulations, but SBA did not design a process that ensured analysts thoroughly and promptly reviewed the documentation.Despite requirements that the business be considered small to be eligible for contracts set aside for WOSBs, SBA did not require that firms submit any documentation to ensure the business met federal size regulations. We also determined the agency did not have adequate staffing levels to support the program, nor did it ensure the database used to administer the eligibility reviews could fully support the certification program. And though SBA relies on the program eligibility decisions that third-party certifiers make, SBA could not provide evidence that they effectively monitored third-party certifiers compliance with program regulations.We made six recommendations for SBA to improve its oversight and management of the WOSB certification program. Management partially agreed with recommendations 1 and 6 and disagreed with recommendations 2, 3, 4, and 5. We did not reach resolution on recommendations 1, 2, and 4.

This report presents the results of our follow-up inspection to assess the effectiveness of the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) enhanced internal controls to prevent Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) to ineligible applicants.The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act prohibited the agency from requiring tax return transcripts to prove eligibility. Congress eliminated this restriction 9 months later with the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021. We found SBA did not implement the tax transcript requirement in a timely manner, potentially disbursing COVID-19 EIDLs to ineligible entities. For about 4 months after Congress removed the tax return prohibition, SBA made 133,832 COVID-19 EIDL disbursements, totaling about $8.5 billion without proving applicant eligibility using official tax information. Of that amount, more than $92 million was disbursed to businesses with suspect Taxpayer Identification Numbers.We reviewed 30 of these loans approved before SBA implemented the requirement for tax return transcripts and found that 16 of them, totaling about $1.1 million, should not have been approved. Specifically, we found disbursements to 13 businesses that did not exist on or before January 31, 2020, or had an unknown start date. We also found three businesses that did exist on or before January 31, 2020, but had other red flags, including change of registered agent shortly before the application date, evidence of falsified documents, or evidence the applicant did not own the business.We recommended SBA recover funds disbursed to ineligible applicants identified in our sample and review the remaining COVID-19 EIDL disbursements with suspect tax ID numbers to determine if the business applicant was legitimate and met CARES Act eligibility requirements. SBA agreed with our recommendations and plans to review the 20 loans identified in the report to determine if the applicant business qualifies for assistance under the COVID-19 EIDL eligibility criteria and attempt to recover funds provided to ineligible businesses.

Due to risks associated with adopting unproven or immature technologies, the Office of the Inspector General conducted an evaluation to assess the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) methods for evaluating new technologies. We determined TVA has not established consistent methods for evaluating new technologies. Specifically, we found TVA has not (1) adopted a formal method for evaluating technology readiness or (2) managed technology readiness throughout projects. We also determined TVA has taken limited steps to address previously identified programmatic weaknesses related to Standard Programs and Processes and records management.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in coordination with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and otherFederal and state partners, used the CDC Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) in an effort to identify and address inequities in minority and disadvantaged communities related to the locations of COVID-19 Community Vaccination Centers. Specifically, FEMA’s Civil Rights Advisory Group (CRAG) implemented a methodology that prioritized states based on the CDC SVI. This methodology sought to address differences in coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) care and outcomes within communities of color and other underserved populations.

We audited costs claimed and grant compliance by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department under grants awarded by the FWS.

We audited costs claimed and grant compliance by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department under grants awarded by the FWS.

OIG performed agreed-upon procedures for assessing information reported by USDA’s National Finance Center.

Objective: To determine whether the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) controls ensured work review determinations were accurate and supportable.

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NASA manages two Agency-wide contracts with the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory for robotic space missions and supporting research. In this audit, we examined the Laboratory’s management of its NASA portfolio relative to cost and schedule and NASA’s management of the contracts.

In coordination with the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, we conducted an audit to identify potential fraud schemes that could affect HUD’s pandemic funds. We reviewed the funds appropriated by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act and the American Rescue Plan (ARP) Act for the Tenant-Based Rental Assistance (TBRA), Project-Based Rental Assistance (PBRA), HOME Investment Partnerships, and Public Housing Operating Fund programs to identify the fraud risks and potential fraud schemes that they face while delivering services to the public.Our objective was to develop an inventory of fraud risks that HUD had not previously identified for the funds appropriated by the CARES and ARP Acts for the TBRA, PBRA, HOME, and Operating Fund programs.We identified six overall and three program-specific fraud risk factors that increase the chance of fraud occurring by increasing the incentive, opportunity, and likelihood for an individual considering committing fraud. We used these fraud risk factors, along with the results of brainstorming sessions, interviews, and reviews of audit reports, investigations, and press releases from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of Inspector General (OIG), and other agencies to develop an inventory of 66 potential fraud schemes that HUD had not previously identified. These fraud schemes could be used to misappropriate the CARES and ARP Act funds for the TBRA, PBRA, HOME, and Operating Fund programs, resulting in emergency funds being diverted from intended beneficiaries.We recommend that HUD use the identified fraud risk factors and inventory of potential fraud risk schemes to enhance its fraud risk assessments. Ultimately, this will increase HUD’s ability to safeguard its CARES and ARP Act funds from fraud and ensure that the funds are used for their intended beneficiaries.