Open Recommendations

Work with ARC and the SBA to resolve the reporting discrepancy of $10,000 for non-ARC matching costs.

The OIG recommends that the Executive Director for Operations establish a process to verify that all telework agreements are submitted and reviewed to maintain oversight and data integrity.

The OIG recommends that the Executive Director for Operations conduct periodic reconciliations between the telework agreements and the NRC’s payroll system to ensure the accuracy and completeness of employees’ telework statuses.

The OIG recommends that the Executive Director for Operations implement and document validation procedures to ensure submitted telework agreements are complete and records are maintained in compliance with NRC procedures.

The OIG recommends that the Executive Director for Operations require all official duty station changes resulting from telework to be supported by an approved agreement and ensure all relevant documentation is retained within the telework records.

The OIG recommends that the Executive Director for Operations implement a process to track the completion of corrective actions for discrepancies and ensure any unresolved issues are properly addressed.

The OIG recommends that the Executive Director for Operations implement a tracking system to monitor telework agreements nearing expiration, ensuring that necessary updates, such as changes to official duty stations, are made promptly and in accordance with established procedures.

The OIG recommends that the Executive Director for Operations develop procedures to mitigate the risk of inaccurate locality pay resulting from employees not reporting to their official duty station as required by the terms of their telework agreements.

Incorporate all business-essential processes and related interfaces, as defined by product owners, during validation sessions, user acceptance testing, or equivalent procedures to accurately present system capability.

Enhance the test plan to incorporate a more robust, risk-based testing process that incorporates user-testing requirements for functional and nonfunctional business-essential processes related to interfaces.

Develop a process to confirm with affected administrative offices whether they are aware of needed changes to test environments and that they have sufficiently executed them before interface test events.

Develop a method to evaluate whether test deficiencies necessitate changes to the deployment schedule to ensure deficiencies are properly addressed before wave go-live and implement these changes.

The Overton Brooks VA Medical Center Director reviews and monitors compliance with Veterans Health Administration health professions trainee onboarding requirements, and takes action as indicated.

The Overton Brooks VA Medical Center Director makes certain that oversight of the intensive care unit physician credentialing and privileging process is completed prior to physicians being scheduled and providing patient care, and monitors compliance.

The Overton Brooks VA Medical Center Director ensures root cause analyses are completed according to Veterans Health Administration policy including team composition, root cause analysis process steps, and timeliness.

The Under Secretary for Health evaluates the additional root cause analysis concurrence step used within Veterans Health Administration medical centers to ensure alignment with National Center for Patient Safety guidance, and takes action as indicated.

In our August and September 2024 alerts, we recommended that the Chief, Business Continuity Operations Officer, should ensure that the identified primary and spare pad-paks that have expired are replaced immediately.

In our August and September 2024 alerts, we recommended that the Chief, Business Continuity Operations Officer, should ensure that where TIGTA identified missing spare pad-paks, they are replaced.

In our August and September 2024 alerts, we recommended that the Chief, Business Continuity Operations Officer, should ensure that where TIGTA did not conduct an inspection, an immediate assessment is conducted on AEDs across the IRS AED program to identify and replace AED pad-paks expired or missing.

The Chief, Business Continuity Operations Officer, should ensure that appropriate signage identifying the location of mounted AEDs is provided.

In our September 2024 alert, we recommended that the Chief, Business Continuity Operations Officer, should ensure that where TIGTA did not conduct an inspection, an immediate assessment is conducted of AED wall cabinets across the IRS AED program to identify and mount AEDs within an approved cabinet and comply with proper placement guidelines, as appropriate.

In our August 2024 alert, we recommended that the Chief, Business Continuity Operations Officer, should ensure that where TIGTA did not conduct an inspection, an immediate assessment is conducted of AEDs across the IRS AED program to identify, repair, or replace AEDs that are nonoperational.

In our September 2024 alert, we recommended that the Chief, Business Continuity Operations Officer, should ensure that an immediate assessment is conducted to ensure that AED trainer models are not distributed, mounted, and available for use in the event of an emergency. If any AED trainer models exist, they should be immediately removed and stored away from AED cabinets and signage to avoid confusion.

The Chief, Business Continuity Operations Officer, should ensure that AED site coordinators complete their monthly maintenance inspections as required.

In our September 2024 alert, we recommended that the Chief, Business Continuity Operations Officer, should determine whether AEDs have been implemented at these IRS PODs. If so, provide documentation that supports AEDs have been provided at these PODs, e.g., serial numbers and locations of AEDs.