Federal Reports

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is issuing this report to show those recommendations from U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports that remained open as of December 31, 2024. As of that date, there were 166 open OIG recommendations. SBA provided updates for certain recommendations prior to the date of this report which may still be under review by OIG. The status of each recommendation is subject to change as we independently review SBA’s ongoing implementation.

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) shared intelligence and engaged with industry stakeholders to enhance passenger rail security and preparedness. Specifically, TSA shared threat information and intelligence products and assessed passenger rail systems to identify security vulnerabilities and mitigate risks. In addition, TSA provided workshops and training to passenger rail system owners and operators to help them better secure their operations.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is commencing the Fiscal Year 2025 AbilityOne Commission Financial Statement Audit. The objective of the audit is to express an opinion on whether the Commission’s financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.

An Amtrak carman based in Miami, Florida, resigned from his position on March 2, 2025, while under investigation. Our investigation found that the former employee violated company policies by leaving work early so he could report to a second job as an airline mechanic at the Miami airport. The former employee is not eligible for rehire.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of Inspector General (OIG) is auditing the use of Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) funds as non-Federal match for the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA)Public Assistance Program.  Our objectives are to determine whether four CDBG-DR grantees made improper payments and whether the Office of Community Planning and Development’s Office of Disaster Recovery (CPD ODR) had sufficient and adequate controls to prevent improper payments.  While performing this work, we identified an issue that was outside the scope of our current work and requires prompt attention from CPD ODR.  The objective of this interim report is to notify CPD ODR officials of the issue so they can take immediate action.

We determined that CPD does not collect accurate, reliable financial and activity data related to activities in which disaster recovery funds were used to satisfy the matching requirement for other Federal, State, or local programs (match activities).  In our ongoing audit, our sample of four disaster recovery grantees either did not report or reported incomplete information related to their match activities.  This condition occurred because CPD recommends but does not require that such information be reported.  Therefore, there is a risk of incomplete or inaccurate reporting of match activity data for the remaining 75 active disaster recovery grantees.  Due to the increased fraud risk that match activities may result in the possible duplication of payments for the same expenses, the collection of this information would be valuable to HUD’s fraud risk management program.  Requiring this data would also assist HUD in advancing its data analytics strategy and could result in the prevention and detection of potential improper payments or fraud in this area.  Additionally, it would provide increased transparency and could improve HUD’s overall grantee oversight.

We are recommending that CPD ODR require active disaster recovery grantees to report in DRGR other sources of funding used for non-Federal match activities.  In addition, CPD ODR needs to develop and implement internal controls to ensure that grantees completely and accurately report non-Federal match activities in DRGR.

We substantiated allegations that management and staff of Panoche Water District conspired to illegally divert water from CA and BOR waterways.

We performed an audit of CMG Mortgage, Inc., to evaluate its quality control (QC) program for originating and underwriting Single Family Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured loans.  We selected CMG for review based on its loan volume and delinquency rate and because its rate of self-reporting loans to HUD when it identified fraud, material misrepresentations, and other material findings that it could not mitigate was below average for more than a 5-year period.

We found that CMG’s QC program for originating and underwriting FHA-insured loans was not sufficient.  Specifically, CMG (1) did not select the proper number of loans for review and maintain complete and accurate data to document its loan selection process; (2) did not always complete key review steps and sometimes missed material deficiencies; and (3) did not adequately mitigate and report loan review findings, which included self-reporting loans to HUD when required.  These issues occurred because CMG had insufficient controls over its QC program and was not always familiar with HUD requirements.  As a result, HUD did not have assurance that CMG’s QC program fully achieved its intended purposes, which include, among other things, protecting the FHA insurance fund and lender from unacceptable risk, guarding against fraud, and ensuring timely and appropriate corrective action.

We recommended that HUD require CMG to (1) update its QC plan and related procedures to align with HUD requirements; (2) demonstrate that its training for staff and management has been updated to reflect changes to its QC plan and related procedures, and to cover the underlying requirements for lender QC programs; (3) review the loans that it had not selected and take appropriate actions when applicable; (4) evaluate its QC files for the loans in which it identified material findings to confirm whether it self-reported to HUD all findings of fraud or material misrepresentation, along with any other material findings that it did not acceptably mitigate.

The Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) Simplification Act made several changes to the FAFSA, including changing the formula for determining student financial assistance need and simplifying the application. The rollout of the redesigned 2024–2025 FAFSA application encountered issues that affected students’ ability to apply for aid. The Department of Education (Department) has also introduced several student loan forgiveness initiatives, including an initial debt relief plan, the Student Debt Relief loan discharge program, and the Saving on a Valuable Education Plan. As a result of Congressional concerns related to resources spent on these initiatives, we initiated a review to determine whether the Department’s Federal Student Aid (FSA) office could account for resources expended under these initiatives.  We conducted an inspection to determine if (1) for the FAFSA Simplification Act and student loan forgiveness initiatives, FSA has prepared accountings of appropriated funds, obligations, administrative expenses, and staffing for fiscal years (FY) 2021–2024; and (2) FSA provided Congress with detailed spend plans of anticipated uses of funds made available under the FYs 2021–2024 appropriations laws. We found that FSA does not have readily available full accountings of appropriated funds, obligations, administrative expenses, and staffing related to its FAFSA Simplification Act and student loan forgiveness initiatives for FYs 2021–2024. We also found that FSA provided spend plans to Congress from FYs 2021–2024 as required by the respective appropriations acts, though FSA’s initial submissions to Congress were late in all four fiscal years. Additionally, one of the required subsequent quarterly updates was not submitted in FY 2023, and another quarterly update was late in FY 2024. We also found that the spend plans provided limited information specific to the use of funds for FSA’s FAFSA Simplification Act and student loan forgiveness initiatives.

The audit objectives were to determine whether program funds were managed in accordance with the ARC and Federal grant requirements.

In this white paper, the OIG compared postal models across a selection of 26 posts: the U.S. Postal Service and 25 foreign national postal operators. While the Postal Service operates under a unique model that combines flexibility in meeting universal service obligations (USO) with significant constraints (such as stricter pricing regulations, mandated six-day delivery, and limited diversification), many foreign posts enjoy greater commercial freedom. 

For our evaluation of the National Weather Service's (NWS's) protection of operational technology (OT), our objective was to determine whether NWS has implemented effective security controls for its critical OT. We found that I. NWS did not implement strong credential management for some OT systems, and II. NWS lacked complete vulnerability scanning coverage for some OT systems.

The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA) requires that the Office of Inspector General of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission annually provide to the appropriate congressional committees the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from our reviews and audits performed under subsection 205(a) of the CPSIA as well actions taken with regard to employee complaints under subsection 205(b). The attached report fulfills these requirements for fiscal year 2024.

The audit objectives were to determine whether program funds were managed in accordance with the ARC and Federal grant requirements.

We rendered a qualified opinion on the EPA's fiscal years 2022 and 2021 Toxic Substances Control Act, or TSCA, Service Fee Fund financial statements, meaning that, except for material errors in expenses and income from other appropriations and earned and unearned revenue, the statements were fairly presented. We noted two material weaknesses: the EPA materially understated TSCA income and expenses from other appropriations, and the EPA materially misstated TSCA

earned and unearned revenue. We noted one significant deficiency: the EPA needs to improve its financial statement preparation process.

As part of its 10-year Delivering for America plan, the Postal Service plans to acquire 106,480 new delivery vehicles, including electric vehicles, between fiscal years 2023 and 2028. The investment in new vehicles will necessitate the replacement and disposal of many long-life vehicles (LLV), which may generate additional revenues. Thus, it is crucial for the Postal Service to establish and maintain internal controls over its evolving disposal processes to mitigate security and financial risks as the 10-Year Plan unfolds. 

Veterans Health Administration (VHA) administers healthcare services through a nationwide network of 18 regional systems referred to as Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISNs). This Office of Inspector General (OIG) report describes the results of a VISN-level oversight evaluation of credentialing and privileging processes at facilities within the VISNs. The OIG inspected VISNs 7, 8, 12, 15, 20, and 23 from December 5, 2022, through February 14, 2024. Specifically, the OIG determined whether VISNs complied with the following requirements:
   •    Senior strategic business partners, VISN human resources officers, and chief medical officers review licensure information for practitioners with a history of adverse licensure actions
   •    Practitioners with equivalent specialized training and similar privileges complete professional practice evaluations for solo and two-deep practitioners and facilities’ chiefs of staff
   •    VISN directors and privacy officers review evidence files for state licensing board reporting
   •    Chief medical officers review each facility annually and oversee credentialing and privileging processes
 

The OIG issued four recommendations for improvement:
   •    External practitioners with equivalent training and similar privileges complete timely evaluations for
      o    Solo and two-deep practitioners
      o    Facility chiefs of staff
   •    Review of state licensing board reporting processes for compliance with VHA policy
   •    The Chief Medical Officer oversees facilities’ annual self-assessment and ensures responses reflect accurate data

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has set a goal of increasing its solar capacity to 10,000 megawatts by 2035.  Due to issues in the solar industry resulting in project delays and price increases, we performed an audit of TVA’s solar power purchase agreements (PPAs).  Our audit objectives were to determine (1) how supply chain disruptions, construction and in‑service delays, contract restructuring, and other factors have affected TVA’s solar PPAs and (2) if any restructured PPAs are still in TVA’s financial interest.  Our audit scope included solar PPAs that were in place as of February 8, 2024, which included agreements for currently operating facilities and those contracted for future power generation.

We determined the COVID-19 pandemic, supply chain disruptions, construction and in-service delays, contract restructuring, and other factors resulted in TVA: 

• Renegotiating 18 of its 31 solar PPAs, including 10 that have been completed and an additional 8 that were in the process of being renegotiated.  Additionally, we determined 8 of the 10 renegotiated PPA contracts’ net present value decreased. The decline in project net present value was partially offset by anticipated revenue from renewable energy credits.  The cost increases had no impact on TVA's financial interests because purchased power costs are recouped through TVA's fuel cost adjustment.
• Changing its business model philosophy on entering into solar PPAs. 
• Making changes to improve the structure of its PPA contracts. 

In addition, we identified opportunities for improvement related to (1) requiring economic analyses and (2) selecting new solar developers.

Indian Affairs has taken actions to correct operational issues at BIA-funded and/or -operated detention facilities, but challenges remain.

We audited WSFR grants awarded by FWS to the District of Columbia Department of Energy and Environment to ensure compliance and cost allowability.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST’s) Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) is a national network of 51 MEP Centers—in all 50 states and Puerto Rico—providing any U.S. manufacturer with resources to improve production processes, upgrade technological capabilities, and facilitate product innovation. NIST makes federal financial assistance awards in the form of cooperative agreements to state, university, and nonprofit organizations to operate the Centers.

This report provides additional results identified during our evaluation of MEP economic impact reporting (OIG-24-037-I), as well as actions taken by NIST in response to our work. Specifically, the report provides details on two specific instances in which our work prompted NIST to conduct its own review and issue notices of material noncompliance to Centers.

First, we found that the California Center and its subrecipient did not accurately report program income. Second, we found that the Maryland Center’s use of state grant funds was unallowable and not properly reported. Our findings in both cases led to NIST issuing the Centers notices of material noncompliance.

We made four recommendations to help NIST recover amounts owed by these Centers, ensure that the California Center and its subrecipients accurately report program income, and ensure that the Maryland Center correctly uses funds on other NIST awards.
 

We audited the Boston Housing Authority’s public housing program to determine whether the physical condition of the Authority’s program units complied with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) and the Authority’s requirements.  The audit was initiated based on our assessment of risks associated with public housing agencies’ program units and recent media attention and public concern about the condition of subsidized housing properties.The Authority’s public housing program units were not consistently maintained in a decent, safe, and sanitary condition and in good repair.  Specifically, we reviewed a sample of 36 units and determined that 31 units had 113 deficiencies.  Of the 31 units, 61 percent had 37 deficiencies that existed at the time of the Authority’s last inspection, and 35 percent had 18 life-threatening deficiencies that needed to be corrected within 24 hours.  Further, we reviewed the site, exterior, systems, and common areas of 29 of the Authority’s public housing buildings and determined that 24 buildings had 105 deficiencies, which included 31 life-threatening deficiencies that needed to be corrected within 24 hours.  Of the 24 buildings, 6 buildings had 18 deficiencies that existed at the time of the Authority’s last inspection.Additionally, the Authority did not consistently perform annual self-inspections for all public housing units and correct deficiencies in a timely manner. Specifically, for 55 units reviewed, the Authority did not perform 37 of the 103 required inspections, collectively, for the Authority’s 2022 and 2023 fiscal years. Additionally, we reviewed 71 deficiencies that the Authority identified during its annual inspections, consisting of 31 life-threatening and 40 non-life-threatening deficiencies.  We determined that the Authority did not correct (1) more than 22 percent of the life-threatening deficiencies within 24 hours, including six deficiencies that were miscategorized as non-life threatening and (2) more than 87 percent of the non-life-threating deficiencies within the Authority’s 20-day requirement.  See table 1 below.Table 1.  The Authority’s annual inspection deficiencies were not corrected in a timely mannerCategoryCorrection timeframeDeficiencies reviewedDeficiencies reported as corrected by the Authority after required timeframesLacked support of corrective actionsLife threatening 24 hours317-Non-life threatening 20 days40356Totals 71426The Authority also did not consistently correct life-threatening, non-life-threatening health and safety, and non-health and safety deficiencies identified during HUD’s Real Estate Assessment Center’s (REAC) inspections in a timely manner.  We reviewed a sample of 41 life-threatening, 35 non-life-threatening health and safety, and 86 non-health and safety deficiencies and determined that the Authority did not consistently correct the deficiencies within HUD’s or the Authority’s established timeframes.  It also did not consistently support that deficiencies had been corrected.  Further, of the 162 deficiencies, we determined that 66 still existed at the time of our observations, or we could not confirm whether the Authority had corrected the deficiencies.  See table 2 below.Table 2.  The Authority did not correct REAC inspection deficiencies in a timely mannerCategoryCorrection timeframeDeficiencies reviewedDeficiencies reported as corrected by the Authority after required timeframesLacked support of corrective actionsUncorrected or unverified at the time of our observationLife threatening24 hours412384Non-life threatening20 days35292314Non-health and safety25 days86735048Totals 1621258166Further, the Authority did not certify to HUD, within 3 business days, that the 41 life-threatening deficiencies had been corrected, remedied, or acted upon to abate within 24 hours.These conditions occurred because the Authority did not ensure that its (1) inspectors thoroughly inspected units in a consistent manner and (2) policy requiring quality control inspections of units and buildings was fully and consistently implemented.  Additionally, after HUD’s COVID-19 waiver of the requirement for annual inspections expired and the Authority resumed performing inspections, the Authority lacked staffing resources to inspect all units, create work orders, correct the deficiencies identified in the Authority’s properties during its own inspections and REAC’s inspections in a timely manner, and report and certify in HUD’s Physical Assessment Subsystem that life-threatening deficiencies identified through a HUD REAC inspection had been corrected in a timely manner.As a result, families resided in units that were not decent, safe, sanitary, and in good repair for longer periods, and HUD did not have timely information to monitor whether the Authority corrected life-threatening deficiencies in accordance with HUD’s 24-hour requirement.  If the Authority does not improve the quality of its inspections and address its increasing backlog of work orders, there is a risk of additional families’ residing in units that are not decent, safe, sanitary, and in good repair. We recommend that the Director of HUD’s Boston Office of Public Housing require the Authority to (1) develop and implement a plan to correct the deficiencies identified for its public housing program units and buildings, including the remaining outstanding deficiencies noted during HUD’s REAC inspections, and (2) implement quality control procedures for its inspection and work order processes and mitigation of noted deficiencies to enhance the effectiveness of its unit inspections and ensure that all units meet HUD’s and its own requirements. 

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) inspected two U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) offices to assess inventory and information security controls for excessing USDA’s computer equipment. OIG’s objectives were to determine whether USDA is effectively managing excess equipment in its inventory and whether controls exist to provide reasonable assurance that USDA has adequate security over its excessed equipment.

What the OIG Found

According to GAO’s strategic plan, it will reduce costs of operations, in part, by leveraging cloud-based technologies. Transferring data into the cloud (data ingress) is often free to users; however, some providers charge data egress fees for accessing data or transferring it out of the cloud. Despite the minimal costs GAO has incurred for data egress, opportunities exist for GAO to improve its monitoring and cost estimating processes for cloud services.

The OIG found that, due to other priorities, GAO did not establish formal procedures implementing cloud cost management policies such as instituting and reviewing budget threshold alerts and cloud service usage reports. Due to the lack of procedures, GAO may not fully meet its strategic objective related to managing and reducing the cost of its cloud-based technologies in the future.

The OIG also found that GAO officials did not include data egress fees in a major system’s cost estimate and did not document the exclusion because they deemed data egress fees minimal. As a result, GAO may not be fully aware of the total costs for its cloud initiatives, which could impact its ability to implement new projects and the operation and maintenance of existing initiatives.

Why the OIG Did This Audit

The OIG conducted this audit to (1) describe GAO’s efforts to address data egress fees in procuring cloud services and (2) assess the extent to which the estimated costs of GAO’s cloud services programs quantify data egress fees.

Recommendations

GAO concurred with the OIG’s recommendations to (1) establish cost management procedures for its cloud systems, including addressing data egress fees and the implementation and review of alerts and reports, and (2) develop an oversight mechanism to ensure that all fees, including data egress fees, are quantified in the cost estimate, or the exclusion of any costs is documented.

We audited the project activity status for 12 grantees that received funds under the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) National Disaster Resilience (NDR) grant to determine whether the grantees have accomplished or are on track to accomplish the goals of the activities outlined in their action plans. 

We found that NDR grantees should be able to accomplish their program goals by leveraging deadline flexibilities that HUD offered. Grantees had spent more than 70 percent of their grant funds since program implementation in 2016. Grantees were working toward disbursing their remaining $250 million in grant funds for 75 project activities planned or underway by the revised program expenditure deadline.  Of the 12 NDR grantees, 4 had progressed well with accomplishing program goals. The other eight grantees experienced challenges related to one or more of their project activities. The 8 grantees that experienced challenges had a combined total of 24 project activities, of which 21 activities had been underway between 4 and 8 years from their original planned start dates, and the grantees had disbursed less than one-third of the funds allocated, with 3 activities still in “planned” phase, even though the grant agreements were executed more than 7 years ago. The grantees cited a variety of reasons for the delays, such as COVID-19, the newness of the program, and various other issues. Our review also found that grantees lacked adequate policies and procedures for the timely expenditure of funds and had staffing and partner capacity issues, which may have contributed to delays. In addition, HUD could improve its use and design of quarterly performance and action plan review checklists to be more effective in its regular monitoring and oversight of the grantees. 

These projects are vital to the communities they serve. Although the grantees were progressing in the implementation of their project activities, the slow pace of completing projects and deadline flexibilities provided by HUD resulted in delayed benefits to program beneficiaries and continued exposure to future damage to their communities. 

Our recommendations to assist in improving oversight of the NDR grantees include recommending that HUD (1) work with Connecticut and Shelby County grantees to create a plan of action to fully realize program benefits; (2) conduct onsite monitoring for the City of Minot and Tennessee grantees, which have not been monitored; (3) require the eight grantees with delayed activities to provide a detailed timeline for completing their projects to ensure that grantees stay on schedule; (4) revise and abbreviate the action plan and quarterly performance checklists for more effective use; and (5) require grantees to provide documentation showing that they have upfront collaboration with partnering entities.

The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) was not able to consistently interdict non-commercial vessels smuggling drugs into the United States. From fiscal years 2021 through 2023, the Coast Guard interdicted an estimated 421.9 metric tons of cocaine but fell short of its total cocaine removal goal of 690 metric tons. This occurred, in part, because the Coast Guard did not always have cutters available to perform the counterdrug mission and did not have a contingency plan to address the cutters’ unavailability. We found Coast Guard cutters were unavailable for 2,058 cumulative days over a 3-year period. Using the Coast Guard’s formula, we calculated that the Coast Guard could have interdicted an additional 57 to 89.1 metric tons of cocaine had these cutters been performing the counterdrug mission.

In this document, we outline our mission, vision, values, and lines of effort. We also identify our strategic goals for 2024 to 2028 and describe the objectives that will help us accomplish those goals.

An Amtrak senior management official based in Chicago, Illinois, was terminated from employment on February 21, 2025, as a result of our investigation. We found that the employee violated company policies by participating in the hiring process for a newly created position that resulted in the employee selecting a close friend for the position. The employee’s participation in the hiring process, at a minimum, created the appearance of a conflict of interest. During the employee’s interview with our agents, the employee acknowledged that his/her actions could create the appearance of a conflict of interest or bias.

We found that a BLM State Office Director violated the Standards of Ethical Conduct, the Federal Travel Regulation, and DOI policy.

Management Implication Report 24-0012-I, Resulting from Investigation into Alleged Theft of Passports at the Stennis Secure Production Facility (SSPF), Mississippi.

The OIG examined whether the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) provided effective oversight of its two third-party administrators (TPAs), Optum and TriWest, to make sure VHA made accurate and timely community care payments for outpatient healthcare and dental services. The OIG estimated that VHA accurately paid Optum for outpatient healthcare services 98.6 percent of the time, totaling $5.1 billion for 33.1 million transactions, and accurately paid TriWest 99.8 percent of the time, totaling $4.4 billion for 25 million transactions. Review periods varied, and although error rates were small, the combined estimated errors resulted in overpayments of about $178.5 million because VHA did not charge the correct Medicare rate or applicable VA fee rate, sometimes because these rates were not available. VHA has made some overpayment recoveries, but others still need to be completed.
Community providers, VHA, and the TPAs generally met contract requirements for payment timeliness. Review periods varied. For Optum, the on-time rates were the following: providers submitting claims to the TPA, 99.8 percent; the TPA paying the provider, 97.8 percent; and VHA reimbursing the TPA, 92.5 percent. For TriWest, these on-time rates were, respectively, 99.9 percent, 98.2 percent, and 97.4 percent.
The OIG estimated that VHA paid over $900 million more to both TPAs combined than the TPAs paid community providers for dental services. This occurred because the contracts for four of the five community care regions did not limit VHA’s reimbursement payments to TPAs to the amount the providers invoiced to the TPAs.
VHA officials concurred with six of the OIG’s seven recommendations; they concurred in principle with recommendation 3.

The audit objectives were to determine whether program funds were managed in accordance with the ARC and Federal grant requirements.

This report communicates the results of the Fiscal Year 2024 Federal Trade Commission Office of Inspector General review of the FTC’s compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) (Public Law 116-117).

An Amtrak employee working remotely from Texas resigned during our investigation into allegations that she was also working full time for another company since March 2023 during the same hours of the day. The secondary employer cooperated with our investigation, confirmed her employment, and subsequently terminated her. The former employee is not eligible for rehire.

Our Objective(s)To evaluate single audit reports uploaded to the Federal Audit Clearinghouse between October 1, 2024 and December 31, 2024, and identify findings that affect directly awarded Department of Transportation (DOT) programs.
Why This AuditOIG performs oversight of independent, non-Federal auditors' single audit reports. Over the past 3 fiscal years, on average over 250 single audit reports were issued that included findings related to programs directly funded by DOT. We issue memoranda that summarize the single audit reports' significant findings and recommendations that require priority action by DOT. When warranted, we also recommend that DOT recover funds that were inappropriately expended by non-Federal entities.
What We FoundAuditors reported 29 incidents of significant noncompliance with Federal guidelines related to 14 grantees that require prompt actions from DOT's Operating Administrations.

Of 29 findings, 12 were repeat findings related to 4 grantees.

Auditors identified questioned costs totaling $6,873,168 for seven grantees.

Of this amount, $5,574,091 was related to The Navajo Nation, Window Rock, AZ and $419,296 was related to Toledo Area Regional Transit Authority, Toledo, OH.

We identified nonmonetary repeat findings that caused disclaimers of opinions for two entities.
RecommendationsWe made four recommendations to OST to resolve and close the findings and recover questioned costs, if applicable.

While the EPA Office of Water issued two memorandums on implementing the Build America, Buy America Act requirements, its guidance related to manufactured products, documenting compliance, the consequences for noncompliance, using current waivers, and applying for new waivers was not sufficient. Without additional guidance, state revolving fund program administrators and manufacturers had concerns about complying with the Act's requirements.