Federal Reports

We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Community Development Block Grant Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act program.Our audit objective was to determine what challenges grantees faced in using program funds for activities that prepare for, prevent, or respond to the coronavirus and its impact. We used a survey questionnaire to gather feedback and insight directly from 1,047 program grantees. As of July 30, 2022, grantees had drawn more than $1.79 billion, or 36 percent, of the $4.99 billion in program funds. We performed this audit to provide HUD, the public, and Congress with insight into the challenges that impacted the grantees in using program funds.Grantees responding to our survey questionnaire identified many challenges they were facing in using program funds for activities that prepare for, prevent, or respond to the coronavirus and its impact. Specifically, grantees reported facing challenges in (1) managing multiple funding sources, (2) spending program funds within required timeframes, and (3) meeting program objectives and requirements.Grantees attributed these conditions to capacity issues, HUD’s program rules and regulations, and other competing CARES Act application and expenditure deadlines. As a result, program funds are at risk of being recaptured if not spent by the designated deadlines to provide help to those impacted by the pandemic or for activities that prepare for, prevent, or respond to the coronavirus.We recommend that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and Development consider looking into (1) extending the spending deadline and (2) streamlining program requirements.

ERS’ Data Product Review Council (DRPC) reviews are designed to evaluate ERS data products’ adherence to six Office of Management and Budget quality standards and attributes; however, ERS has not performed a DPRC review since July 2019.

An Amtrak Trackman based in New York was terminated on September 20, 2022, after his disciplinary hearing for violating company policies. The former employee posted inappropriate and offensive images—including one depicting what appeared to be illicit drugs—as well as an internal company document, on his public Facebook account, which also identified him as an Amtrak employee.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a national review of the Intimate Partner Violence Assistance Program (IPVAP) to evaluate implementation status and identify perceived barriers to compliance. The OIG conducted a national survey of IPVAP coordinators, Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) lead coordinators, and VISN champions and interviewed select IPVAP coordinators and VISN champions. The OIG found over half of Veterans Health Administration (VHA) facilities did not have the required IPVAP protocol, which may contribute to leader and staff confusion and lack of knowledge about IPVAP roles, responsibilities, process, and procedures. The IPVAP coordinator may be a collateral duty, and 82 percent reported over half of their time was dedicated to the role. The IPVAP coordinators serving the facility with the most patients and the least patients reported dedicated time between zero and 25 percent. Although training is required, the majority of IPVAP coordinators reported providing training at fewer than half of new employee orientation sessions and to fewer than half of intimate partner violence (IPV) screeners. Fourteen percent of IPVAP coordinators reported that their facilities did not implement routine IPV screening, and IPVAP coordinators described challenges in IPV screening without a clinical reminder or mandatory status. Although IPVAP coordinators are responsible for program evaluation, the OIG found that VHA did not establish standardized program evaluation methods or measures. VISN champions identified the need for clearer role expectations, mandatory screening completion, and a designated VISN coordinator. About half of VISN lead coordinators reported dissatisfaction with support from the VISN champion. The OIG made seven recommendations to the Under Secretary for Health related to medical center IPVAP protocols, IPVAP coordinators’ dedicated time and population needs, administrative staff support, IPV staff training, IPV screening requirements, program evaluation processes, and VISN IPVAP champion and lead coordinator roles and oversight functions.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an audit to assess Regional Procurement Office Central’s (RPO Central) compliance with the Buy American Act of 1933 and associated guidance, which requires the federal government to purchase domestic products when possible.The OIG audited RPO Central because it had over $4.3 billion in obligations in FY 2021, making it the largest in terms of contract expenditures of the three procurement centers in the Veterans Health Administration’s (VHA) Procurement and Logistics Office. The audit team reviewed a statistical sample of 80 contracts, made from October 2017 through March 2021, and related files RPO Central officials use to ensure compliance with the act, and it examined internal reviews of compliance from 2017.Due to insufficient oversight and training, contracting officers did not always meet the act’s requirements, resulting in expenditures of about $280.6 million for foreign-made items and $351 million for domestic-made items with contract files that contained compliance deficiencies. Of the 40 contracts for foreign-made items, 37 did not comply with the act, compared to 15 of 40 that did not comply for domestic-made items. RPO Central reviewers did not identify deficiencies in almost 75 percent of the reviewed foreign-made contracts. Contracting officers indicated training did not fully address the complexities of the act. The audit team also determined that RPO Central’s executive director did not fully implement recommendations from a 2017 review by the VA’s Risk Management and Compliance Service.The OIG made two recommendations to the VA Office of Acquisition and Logistics’ executive director to ensure contracting office leaders assess compliance weaknesses, implement corrective actions, and require refresher training for contracting officers who made the deficient contracts. The OIG also made one recommendation to the VHA procurement executive director to evaluate contract file review procedures.

The U.S. Postal Service is required to provide universal service to every person in the United States. Most of Alaska’s communities are not connected due to its vast geography and lack of surface highway and road infrastructure. To meet its mission in Alaska, the Postal Service uses airplanes, helicopters, hovercraft, and other modes of non-traditional transportation to deliver mail to 82 percent of the communities that are not accessible by road.Alaska mail services includes two primary classifications of mail — priority and non-priority service. Priority mail consists of First-Class, Priority, and Express Mail; and non-priority mail consists of in-house non-priority and bypass mail. Bypass mail is prepared and tendered by authorized shippers directly to air carriers for transportation and delivery to rural Alaska, thus bypassing the Postal Service

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not implement controls to prevent state workforce agencies (SWA) from paying more than $2.6 million in Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) for potentially fraudulent claims made by Department of Homeland Security employees, or claimants who fraudulently used the identities of DHS employees to obtain LWA benefits.

The Biden administration purchased rapid COVID-19 test kits to give to Americans free of charge for home use and partnered with the U.S. Postal Service to package and deliver the kits. Within a short period, the Postal Service established a test kit program, which facilitated ordering, fulfillment, and delivery of kits to 125 million residential addresses. The Postal Service designed and developed a website for customers to order test kits for delivery to their homes.Our objective was to assess the accounting treatment and selected technology support associated with the distribution of the COVID-19 test kits to the public. To accomplish our objective, we reviewed accounting treatment and reporting of costs and the development of the online test kit website.

We determined that the Three Affiliated Tribes did not follow applicable requirements in an agreement with the BIA.

This report contains Sensitive Information and will not be posted.

What We Looked AtGeospatial data--which Federal agencies use to achieve their missions--contain information tied to locations, including geographic location identifiers. Transportation related geospatial data include instrument-flight-rule navigation charts and pipeline inspection boundary maps. In October 2018, Congress passed the Geospatial Data Act (GDA) on the management of the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI). NSDI has 18 geospatial data themes that cover data used by Federal agencies, including a transportation theme. Section 756 of the GDA requires Federal Geographic Data Committee to identify one or more covered agencies to serve as the lead covered agency for a specific data theme. The act's section 759 sets requirements for covered agencies. As the lead covered agency for the transportation theme, the Department of Transportation (DOT) must address requirements under GDA section 756(b) for the transportation theme, and as a covered agency the requirements under sections 759(a) and 759(b). The act also requires inspectors general of covered agencies to report to Congress once every 2 years on their agencies' geospatial data-related activities. Our audit objective was to assess DOT's progress since our 2020 GDA audit. Specifically, we assessed the Department's progress implementing its responsibilities (1) as a lead covered agency under section 756(b) and (2) as a covered agency under sections 759(a) and 759(b) of the act.What We FoundDOT has made progress complying with lead covered agency requirements. In 2020, DOT met two of the five lead covered agency requirements--information on user needs and theme administration. In 2022, DOT fully meets four requirements and partially meets one--a plan to implement standards for theme data. DOT has also made progress on the 12 applicable covered agency requirements. In 2020, DOT had met 4 of the 12 applicable requirements and in 2022, fully meets 9. The Department has not yet fully complied with the requirements for implementation of a geospatial information system strategic plan, records preparation, and the use of geospatial information. DOT complied with the requirements on annual reporting and maintenance of a geospatial data asset inventory.RecommendationsWe made one recommendation to help DOT comply with the requirements for lead covered agencies in the act's section 756(b). DOT concurred with our recommendation.

What We Looked AtUnmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), commonly known as “drones,” are rapidly growing in number in the National Airspace System. Currently, there is limited infrastructure available to manage widespread expansion of small UAS operations in low-altitude airspace (below 400 feet) where the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) does not provide air traffic services. Congress directed FAA to conduct activities that will allow implementation of UAS Traffic Management (UTM), including a UTM Pilot Program. Citing the importance of UAS traffic management, the Ranking Members of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and its Aviation Subcommittee requested that we evaluate FAA’s efforts to develop and implement UTM, including the pilot program and any interactions FAA has had with other Government agencies. Our objectives were to assess FAA’s (1) progress with UTM development and implementation, including results of its UTM Pilot Program, and (2) collaboration with other Government agencies regarding UTM. What We FoundFAA has made initial progress in developing a UTM framework and testing UTM concepts through the UTM Pilot Program. For example, FAA continues to develop and refine its concept of operations and has deployed some initial UTM capabilities, such as an automated system for authorizing UAS operations near airports. However, FAA has not established milestones for implementing the policies and processes necessary to allow for UTM deployment or finalized how the Agency plans to use the UTM Pilot Program results to inform near-term efforts. While UTM stakeholders stated that the pilot program was successful, they noted common areas of concern with UTM implementation, such as slow progress, the need for additional rules for remotely identifying UAS, and lack of information on next steps. In addition, FAA has not yet completed coordination with other Government agencies. Our RecommendationsFAA concurred with two of our four recommendations to improve FAA’s efforts to develop and implement a UTM and partially concurred with the other two. Based on FAA’s response, we consider all four recommendations resolved but open pending completion of planned actions.

What We Looked AtThis report presents the results of our quality control review (QCR) of an audit of the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) information security program and practices. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) requires agencies to develop, implement, and document agencywide information security programs and practices. FISMA also requires inspectors general to conduct annual reviews of their agencies’ information security programs and report the results to the Office of Management and Budget. To meet this requirement, we contracted with CliftonLarsonAllen LLP (CLA) to conduct this audit subject to our oversight. The audit objective was to determine the effectiveness of DOT’s information security program and practices in five function areas—Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. What We FoundOur QCR disclosed no instances in which CLA did not comply, in all material respects, with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Our RecommendationsDOT concurs with all eight of CLA’s recommendations. CLA considers all eight recommendations resolved but open pending completion of planned actions.

“According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), lead-based paint and lead-contaminated dust are some of the most widespread and hazardous sources of lead exposure for young children in the United States. When lead-based paint peels and cracks, it results in lead-contaminated paint chips and dust. Children can be poisoned if they chew on surfaces coated with lead-based paint, eat flaking paint chips, or eat or breathe in lead dust. CDC has reported that there is no safe blood lead level in people and there is no cure for lead poisoning, which is why it is important to prevent exposure to lead, especially among young children. Approximately 126,380 public housing buildings and 696,260 units were built before 1978, which was the year the Federal Government banned lead-based paint. As of March 2022, HUD’s Real Estate Assessment Center—an office within HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing—was establishing the Environmental Shared Services office (ESS) to improve its risk assessment and inspection capabilities for health and safety hazards, including lead-based paint hazards. ESS will provide insight into potential and existing environmental hazards, compliance issues, and data gaps to improve HUD’s decision making and facilitate allocating resources to drive effective hazard management strategies. As part of its purpose, ESS will rank risks related to four environmental hazards—carbon monoxide, mold, lead, and radon. In establishing its risk-ranking model, ESS identified five indicators for its lead risk ranking. Using the best available data collected from both HUD and sources external to HUD, we identified nine indicators of potential risk for lead-based paint hazards in public housing:American Healthy Homes Survey II estimated regional percentage of lead-based paint hazards.Number and percentage of public housing units in the region constructed before 1978.Number of recorded children with EBLLs living in public housing.Number of substandard or troubled Public Housing Assessment System scores.Number of public housing agencies (PHA) on the Lead-Based Paint Response tracker.Amount of funding received from HUD’s Lead-Based Paint Capital Fund or Housing Related Hazards Capital Fund grant programs.Amount of funding received from CDC childhood lead poisoning prevention programs.Number and percentage of confirmed EBLLs in tested children greater than 5 µg/dL, as reported by CDC.Lead Exposure Risk Index.Based on our analysis of these nine risk indicators, we identified five HUD regions and six States within those regions—New York, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Kentucky, Illinois, and Texas—with the most potential risk of having PHAs with lead-based paint hazards. In addition, our analysis identified eight other States that, while not measuring as the most at-risk State in their respective regions, also have a higher potential risk of having lead-based paint hazards. Although HUD has identified its own risk indicators for lead-based paint hazards, of which four overlap with our indicators, this report may be helpful to HUD as it continues identifying and evaluating risk indicators and evaluating how well those indicators are identifying potential issues of lead-based paint in HUD-assisted public housing.”

An Amtrak Electronic Specialist and a Maintainer based in Newark, New Jersey, resigned in lieu of their disciplinary hearings on September 14, 2022, and September 27, 2022, respectively. We determined that Keith Kovaleski, an Assistant Foreman based in New York who is currently awaiting sentencing after pleading guilty on March 21, 2022, to conspiring to distribute misbranded and unapproved new drugs, paid the two former employees to set up financial accounts to accept payments on behalf of Kovaleski for his illegal activities in exchange for a portion of the proceeds. In addition, the Maintainer received packages at his home for Kovaleski that contained misbranded and/or unapproved new drugs from Kovaleski’s company, All American Peptide (AAP). The Electronic Specialist ordered and received misbranded and/or unapproved new drugs from AAP at his home. The former employees are ineligible for rehire.

As required by FISMA, OIG reviewed USDA’s ongoing efforts to improve its information technology security program and practices during FY 2022.

The Geospatial Data Act of 2018 (Act) was signed into law in October 2018 to help develop, drive, and manage the National Spatial Data Infrastructure, which includes the technology, policies, criteria, standards, and employees necessary to promote geospatial data sharing throughout Federal, state, tribal, and local governments, and the private sector. The Act outlines requirements for Federal geospatial data governance structures, encourages organized use and collaboration within agencies, and promotes broader sharing of geospatial data—information linked to specific geographic locations—across agencies. The Act requires the Office of Inspector General to report on the Department of Energy’s collection, production, acquisition, maintenance, distribution, use, and preservation of geospatial data. In particular, the Office of Inspector General shall evaluate compliance with: (1) standards for geospatial data, including metadata for geospatial data established under the Act; (2) the agency responsibilities and requirements under the Act; and (3) limitations on the use of Federal funds under the Act. In September 2020, we released the results of our inaugural review that evaluated the Department’s initial efforts to implement the Act. At that time, we found that although the Department had initiated or completed actions related to each of the covered agency responsibilities, we identified that it had not fully implemented 12 of the 13 requirements outlined in the Act.We conducted our current audit to determine whether the Department met the requirements of the Act. This report documents the results of our test work.Due to limitations with agencies’ abilities to implement the Act, our test work was limited to identifying the Department’s efforts to implement the 13 covered agency responsibilities contained in Section 759 of the Act. In particular, the Federal Geographic Data Committee had not yet adopted or endorsed any Geospatial Data Theme Standards at the time of our review. As such, and consistent with current guidance issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, we did not evaluate the effectiveness of the Department’s efforts to implement these standards or to limit the use of Federal funds for geospatial data at this time. Our audit found that while the Department had taken some additional steps to implement the Act since our initial report in September 2020, significant work remained to fully implement the Act’s requirements. Specifically, the Department had completed additional actions related to the 13 covered agency responsibilities; however, we identified that it still had not fully implemented 12 of the requirements. For instance, we found:• Although the Department prepared and published a geospatial data strategy in support of the strategic plan for the National Spatial Data Infrastructure, as required by the Act, it had not implemented the strategy to advance geographic information, related geospatial data, and activities appropriate to its mission. • The Department also had not completed its geospatial data inventory and, therefore, could not optimize data integration between its geospatial users. Further, the Department had not ensured that all geospatial data included metadata and that the metadata was available through the GeoPlatform, as required by the Act.These concerns occurred, in part, because progress on the development and issuance of an implementation plan for the Department of Energy Geospatial Data Management Strategy 2021–2025 had been delayed. Additionally, there was confusion among program and site officials about the amount and types of geospatial data that existed within the Department. We also noted a general lack of awareness of the Department’s centralized geospatial data information sites dedicated to the sharing of geospatial data best practices and tools.Although we determined that the Department had made progress since our last review, significant work remains for it to meet the Act’s requirements. We made three recommendations that, if fully implemented, will improve understanding and implementation of the Act. In particular, we recommend that the Department’s Chief Information Officer: (1) determine the actions, milestones, and resources needed to fully implement the Department of Energy Geospatial Data Management Strategy 2021–2025 and issue a corresponding implementation plan to the Department’s geospatial data users; (2) develop and implement a process to increase engagement with the Department’s program offices and field sites to ensure that the requirements of the Act are better understood; and (3) develop a mechanism to ensure all Department program offices and field sites can access the Department’s centralized geospatial data information.

The objective of our review was to determine the Department’s progress on spending program administration funds authorized by coronavirus response and relief laws, including how those funds have been used to date, and the Department’s plans for using remaining funds.We found that the Department has allocated nearly 100 percent2 of its pandemic assistance program administration funds and that the Department is on track to obligate all of its program administration funds prior to the dates the funds are set to expire. The Department allocated the funds to 11 principal offices and as of February 1, 2022, these principal offices have obligated3 or committed4 approximately $19.4 million (51 percent) of the $38 million in total pandemic assistance program administration funds.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a healthcare inspection to assess allegations of adverse clinical outcomes related to three patients’ surgical or invasive procedure(s) at the Columbia VA Health Care System (facility) in South Carolina.The OIG substantiated three patients experienced adverse clinical outcomes related to their surgical or invasive procedure(s). The OIG found quality of care concerns with two of the three patients however, no quality of care concerns were identified for the third patient who experienced complications following a surgical procedure.A medical intensivist incorrectly placed a chest catheter and a thoracic surgeon incorrectly placed a chest tube while attempting to drain a patient’s pleural effusion. The OIG found that clinical care deficiencies made by the intensivist and surgeon led to a series of unplanned events that contributed to the patient’s death. The OIG identified deficiencies in the peer review and quality management processes.A vascular surgeon conducted a wrong site surgery when amputating a patient’s third versus fourth toe. The OIG found that although removal of the patient’s third toe was clinically indicated due to infection, the surgeon failed to acknowledge and discuss the deviation from the informed consent and pre-operative plan with the patient and surgical team. Leaders failed to address the surgeon’s undermining of patient safety protocols and high reliability organization principles. Additionally, the OIG identified deficiencies in practitioners’ and surgical nurses’ compliance with informed consent and time-out protocols.The OIG made one recommendation to the Veterans Integrated Service Network Director regarding a comprehensive review of a patient’s care. The OIG made six recommendations to the Facility Director related to medically-complex patients, peer review practices, timeliness of institutional disclosures and internal reviews, the vascular surgeon’s disregard of patient safety protocols, and informed consent and time-out protocol compliance.

This administrative investigation addressed allegations that VA’s Executive Protection Division (EPD), a component of VA’s Office of Operations, Security, and Preparedness (OSP) that provides protective services to the VA Secretary and Deputy Secretary, was inadequately equipped. The allegations included that EPD personnel (special agents and physical security specialists) had expired or no ballistic body armor (vests), that senior leaders in OSP were aware of this and had denied previous requests to purchase vests, and that special agents’ firearms malfunctioned frequently and needed to be replaced.The OIG found that VA had not procured ballistic vests for some EPD personnel despite a standard operating procedure requiring them to wear body armor most of the time they were working. Further, there were no procedures to assess compliance (such as routine inspections) or establish consequences for nonuse; procure body armor for new personnel; track the condition of armor assigned to personnel; or replace vests that were beyond the manufacturer’s warranty, did not fit, or had other defects.However, the available evidence did not substantiate allegations that senior leaders in OSP had denied vest procurement requests or knew that some personnel needed them. The OIG also could not substantiate based on documentation and interviews that EPD special agents’ firearms malfunctioned frequently and needed replacement.To effectively protect its employees and leaders, VA must provide EPD personnel with the basic safety equipment for performing their jobs. VA concurred with the OIG’s four recommendations for improvements to EPD procedures to address the issuance, maintenance, and replacement of ballistic body armor, as well as enforcing the requirement that EPD personnel wear their vests. It also concurred with the recommendation calling for a review of the condition of all firearms assigned to EPD special agents.

Election Mail is any mailpiece that an authorized election official creates for voters participating in the election process and includes ballots and voter registration materials. The U.S. Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and recording of Election Mail.Our objective was to evaluate the Postal Service’s readiness for timely processing of Election Mail for the 2022 mid-term election to be held Tuesday, November 8, 2022. To evaluate readiness, during primary elections, we reviewed Election Mail policies, analyzed service performance data, and conducted observations at six Processing and Distribution Centers and 10 delivery units. We also followed up on 14 prior recommendations to determine if the Postal Service’s corrective actions were effective.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this inspection to determine whether the Harlingen VA Health Care Center in Texas was meeting federal security guidance. The OIG selected the Harlingen center because it had not been previously visited as part of the OIG’s annual Federal Information Security Modernization Act audit of VA’s information security program and practices.The OIG team found deficiencies in the center’s component inventory, vulnerability management, and system life-cycle management. Specifically, the center had an inaccurate component inventory; unsupported versions of applications, missing patches, and vulnerable plug-ins; and critical or high-risk vulnerabilities in the network that had gone unidentified. Additionally, the inspection team found the system life cycle did not replace applications before they became unsupported. Without effective configuration management, users do not have adequate assurance that the system and network will perform as intended.The team also found the Harlingen VA Health Care Center was deficient in contingency planning. The center did not adequately plan for restoring local IT operations. Consequently, after a disaster, the center may not be able to readily restore all operations as they existed before.Further, the center had deficiencies in three access controls. Database managers did not adequately maintain log data for local databases, computer rooms and communications closets were not equipped with fire detection devices, and the center’s VA police computer room did not have a visitor access log. These deficiencies could impede the center’s ability to respond to incidents.The OIG made five recommendations to address the deficiencies.

This report presents the results of our audit to determine whether the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) maintained effective management control activities and monitoring of the design and implementation of third-party operated SBA systems. SBA needed information technology systems from third-party service providers that could improve the system efficiency and productivity to process high transaction volumes, transmit data between other information systems, and safeguard the integrity and confidentiality of the personally identifiable information processed by the programs.We found the agency’s entity-level control environment was not designed in accordance with federal guidance at the beginning of the COVID-19 assistance programs. The agency allowed the third-party systems to be put into service without conducting the baseline assessments. With no baseline, the agency could not perform effective continuous monitoring. Also, we found that control processes did not identify, communicate, and capture privacy and identity risks on an enterprise-wide basis.We made 10 recommendations to strengthen the agency’s entity-level IT control environment. The areas addressed included cybersecurity risk and privacy controls, system development life cycle, continuous monitoring, and the supply chain risk management processes.SBA management fully agreed with seven recommendations, disagreed with two recommendations, and stated one recommendation was specific to the pandemic and will not likely be repeated. While the agency agreed to implement seven recommendations, management’s planned corrective actions did not fully address identified control issues.

The U.S. Postal Service uses the Time and Attendance Collection System (TACS) as the primary application to collect employee time and attendance data to capture the number of workhours employees spend working various Postal Service operations.This was a follow-up to our Timecard Administration audit issued December 9, 2020. In the prior audit we identified issues with disallowed timecard adjustments, management oversight, time collection devices replacement strategies, and TACS control deficiencies. We recommended management reiterate disallowed time policy; establish a formal oversight process to ensure periodic reviews of supervisors’ documentation supporting disallowed timecard adjustments; resolve system deficiencies that allow supervisors to bypass completing the time disallowance record in TACS; and procure and test new, automated time collection devices.

Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan Recipient’s Validation Memo – SpinLaunch Inc.

We found the fund’s financial statements to be fairly presented and free of material misstatement.

The U.S. Postal Service’s package volume and weight have increased as First-Class Mail has declined, representing a change in mail mix.The OIG found a correlation between total package weight and letter carrier injuries.The OIG found that the Postal Service has no specific protocols in place outlining how a carrier should deliver a heavy package. Although the Postal Service has numerous policies, trainings, and other resources to promote safety, opportunities exist to strengthen procedures for heavy packages.

The objective of our review is to describe how selected local educational agencies (LEA) allocated Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief (ESSER) funds provided under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act).As of March 2022, the 46 LEAs spent over $19.2 million, or about 95 percent, of the $20.2 million in ESSER I funds that they were awarded. The majority of these ESSER I funds were spent on district-wide programs, and about 26 percent of ESSER I funds were allocated to specific schools, with the majority of that portion allocated to Title I schools over non-Title I schools. Regardless of whether LEAs spent ESSER I funds at the district or school level, they may have used the funds for the benefit of all students, including children with disabilities. Further, LEAs designated a portion of funds to exclusively serve children with disabilities.This is an informational report that does not include any recommendations to the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education. Our sampling methodology was not designed to include any projections.

We evaluated USDA’s coordination of, and performance measures for, the beginning farmers and ranchers programs and followed up on recommendations made in our prior audit report.

Objective: To determine whether the Social Security Administration (SSA) is complying with strategic and talent management human capital planning requirements.

The DOI has made progress in meeting 10 of the 13 Geospatial Data Act requirements we reviewed but we found areas for improvement.

To see our report, click on the link below

This interim report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of the efficiency of selected processes at the Montrose Heights Station in Henrico, VA (Project Number 22-141-3). This audit was designed to provide U.S. Postal Service management with timely information on potential financial control risks at Postal Service locations. The Montrose Heights Station is in the Virginia District of the Atlantic Area. We judgmentally selected the Montrose Heights Station for our audit.

This interim report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of the efficiency of selected processes at the Southside Station in Richmond, VA (Project Number 22-141-2). This audit was designed to provide U.S. Postal Service management with timely information on potential financial control risks at Postal Service locations. The Southside Station is in the Virginia District of the Atlantic Area. We judgmentally selected the Southside Station for our audit.

The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this review to assess Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) eligibility for nonprofit organizations. Based on data analysis, we identified 179 PPP loans, totaling approximately $684 million, made to potentially ineligible nonprofits that may have exceeded SBA’s requirements for business size, known as size standards, at the time of application.We also reviewed PPP loans for three large nonprofits, including Planned Parenthood of Illinois that received over $3.8 million, Goodwill of Southwestern Pennsylvania that received over $6 million, and YMCA of the Rockies that received over $3.5 million. OIG included a Planned Parenthood organization to address concerns from some members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. We determined that the Planned Parenthood organization met PPP loan eligibility requirements. The Goodwill organization was not eligible for a PPP loan at the time of application but subsequently became eligible for forgiveness due to updated PPP guidance. The YMCA organization we reviewed did not meet eligibility requirements because they exceeded the applicable size standard of no more than 500 employees at the time of application and forgiveness.We also reviewed the three national organizations associated with the PPP loans to the aforementioned Planned Parenthood, Goodwill, and YMCA for potential affiliation with the PPP loan recipients. We found no affiliation between the national organizations and the loan recipients.We recommend SBA review the 179 PPP loans, totaling approximately $684 million, to ensure eligibility requirements were met and seek remedy or repayment for all loans deemed ineligible, and seek remedy or repayment of the PPP loan we reviewed for YMCA totaling $3.5 million. SBA management partially agreed with recommendation 1 and agreed with recommendation 2.

The objective of our audit was to review the U. S. Department of Education’s (Department) compliance with the requirements outlined under Section 759(a) of the Geospatial Data Act. Specifically, we determined whether the Department implemented the 13 covered agency responsibilities listed in Section 759(a) of the Geospatial Data Act.We found that the Department is in compliance with the applicable responsibilities outlined under Section 759(a) of the Geospatial Data Act. Specifically, we found that the Department implemented all 12 of the 13 covered agency responsibilities listed in Section 759(a) of the Geospatial Data Act that we reviewed. We were unable to evaluate compliance with one covered agency responsibility as the applicable data standards related to this responsibility have not yet been defined by the Federal Geographic Data Committee and the Office of Management and Budget.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducts information technology (IT) inspections to assess whether VA facilities are meeting federal security requirements. They are typically conducted at selected facilities that have not been assessed in the sample for the annual audit required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) or at facilities that previously performed poorly. The OIG selected the Alexandria VA Medical Center (VAMC) in Louisiana because it had not been previously visited as part of the annual FISMA audit.The OIG inspections are focused on four security control areas that apply to local facilities and have been selected based on their levels of risk: configuration management, contingency planning, security management, and access controls. The OIG found deficiencies with configuration management, security management, and access controls, but not with contingency planning controls.The deficiencies in configuration management included inaccurate inventories, uninstalled patches, and out-of-date operating systems, all of which deprive users of reliable access to information and could risk unauthorized access to, or the alteration or destruction of, critical systems. The team identified a security management issue in the center’s video surveillance system that could impact the integrity and protection of that system. Weak physical access controls, such as incorrectly installed or failing equipment, compromised the security and maintenance of the information system, and an outdated operating system prevented accurate tracking of access to the data center.The OIG made six recommendations to the assistant secretary for information and technology and chief information officer to improve controls at the Alexandria VAMC because they are related to enterprise-wide information technology security issues similar to those identified on previous FISMA audits and IT security reviews. The OIG also made two recommendations to the Alexandria VAMC director.

This report presents a summary of the results of our self-initiated audits assessing the efficiency of selected processes at three selected retail units in the Georgia District (Project Number 22-125). These retail units include the Atlanta, GA Main Post Office (MPO), the Marietta, GA MPO, and the Stone Mountain, GA Post Office (PO) in the Southern Area. We previously issued interim reports to district management for each of these retail units regarding the conditions we identified.

This interim report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of the efficiency of selected processes at the Bon Air Branch, Richmond, VA (Project Number 22-141-1). This audit was designed to provide U.S. Postal Service management with timely information on potential financial control risks at Postal Service locations. The Bon Air Branch is in the Virginia District of the Atlantic Area. We judgmentally selected the Bon Air Branch for our audit.

Final results of the FTC OIG’s survey of contracting officer’s representatives (CORs)

Objective: To review the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) efforts to implement new incoming data exchanges to reduce its reliance on beneficiaries’ self-reporting information that could affect their eligibility and payment amounts.

In accordance with House Report 117-80 related to the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act 2022, the United States Capitol Police (USCP or Department) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was directed to assess current practices to prevent bias within the USCP workforce that would cause harm to or distract from the USCP mission. In response, OIG conducted a review. OIG is encouraged to provide this report to the Committees no later than 180 days after the enactment of this act.

The Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which also provides oversight for the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, or CSB, contracted with the independent accounting firm SB & Company LLC to initiate an evaluation of the CSB’s compliance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, or FISMA.

Our objective was to determine whether Gulf Coast State College (Gulf Coast) used 2019 Emergency Assistance to Institutions of Higher Education (Emergency Assistance) program funds in accordance with Federal requirements and its approved application for program funds.We found that Gulf Coast used about $1.8 million in 2019 Emergency Assistance program funds for activities that were not allowable in accordance with Federal requirements.