Federal Reports

As required by the Inspector General Act of 1978 (as amended), this Semiannual Report summarizes the activities of the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General for the preceding 6-month period.

The Semiannual Report to Congress summarizes the results of OIG oversight, provides statistical information, and lists all reports issued April 1–September 30, 2017. During this reporting period, OIG audits, investigations, inspections, evaluations, and other reviews identified over $9 billion in monetary benefits for a return of $134 for every dollar invested in OIG oversight. During this reporting period, OIG issued 194 reports and work products on VA programs and operations, made 898 recommendations, and conducted investigations that led to 162 arrests.

Reports dealing with older grants administered by ARC and State agencies for which no ARC payments have been made, grants with smaller balances and grants with expired end dates and ARC balances and grants with zero balances

A need to emphasize and implement ARC policies with respect to performance periods including ineligible expenditures after the identified performance period.

This report updates prior reports dealing with grant management activities

September 30, 2017 Semiannual Report

We conducted this investigation in response to allegations that a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer at the Detroit Port of Entry, received a letter of reprimand prompted by his supervisor in reprisal for Complainant's attempt to report perceived Fourth Amendment and racial profiling violations to CBP's Office of Chief Counsel . The Complainant claimed the formal reprimand caused him to be denied a temporary duty assignment.

We determined that due to changes DHS made to the process, political appointees do not influence FOIA processors to delay or withhold the release of FOIA information. Unlike the former process, the new process does not provide opportunities for political appointees in headquarters to inappropriately interfere with releases of significant FOIA information, and we did not identify any instances in which headquarters officials used the process to engage in those activities. However, because DHS has not issued final guidance for the process, it is vulnerable to misuse in the future. We recommended that the Chief FOIA Officer/Chief Privacy Officer issue final guidance on the 1-Day Awareness Notification Process. The guidance should state: 1. the purpose of the process is to inform senior officials of the imminent release of information that may raise public interest; 2. FOIA staff determine whether information should be released or withheld under FOIA’s exceptions and exemptions.

We conducted this investigation in response to allegations that - (Complainant), a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer at the Detroit Port of Entry, received a letter of reprimand (LOR) prompted by his supervisor, (Supervisor #1), in reprisal for Complainant's attempt to report perceived Fourth Amendment and racial profiling violations to CBP's Office of Chief Counsel (OCC). Complainant claimed the formal reprimand caused him to be denied a temporary duty assignment.

The OIG performed data analytics to identify offices with expenses related to lost or stolen stamp stock shipments. We identified $11,640 of expenses related to stamp stock shipments for the James Crews Station, Leon Mercer Jordan Finance Station, and Northeast Finance Station between May 1, 2016, and April 30 2017. The objective of this audit was to determine whether internal controls over stamp stock shipments were in place and effective at James Crews Station.

In May 2017, we evaluated the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office (VARO) in Anchorage, Alaska, to see how well staff processed veterans’ disability claims, timely and accurately processed proposed rating reductions, input claim information, and responded to special controlled correspondence.We found Anchorage Veterans Service Center (VSC) consistently processed two types of disability claims we reviewed. We reviewed 30 of 124 veterans’ traumatic brain injury (TBI) claims (24 percent) and found that Rating Veterans Service Representatives (RVSR) accurately processed 28 of 30 claims—a significant improvement from our 2013 inspection when staff incorrectly processed three of the eight claims we sampled (38 percent). VSC staff processed proposed rating reductions accurately. However, we reviewed all 11 benefits reductions and found that staff delayed six of them (55 percent). Delays occurred because the Veterans Service Center Manager (VSCM) and Supervisory Veterans Service Representatives did not view this work as a priority at the expiration of the due process period, even though the Workload Management Plan directed the Supervisory Veterans Service Representative to identify and prioritize the 10 oldest non-rating claims each month, to include proposed rating reductions. Moreover, management and staff stated that the national backlog of disability claims was prioritized higher than proposed rating reductions.VSC staff needed to improve the accuracy of information input into the electronic systems at the time of claims establishment. We reviewed 30 of 243 newly established claims (12 percent) and found that staff did not correctly input claim and claimant information into the electronic systems in nine of the 30 claims (30 percent) due to ineffective oversight and training.Anchorage congressional liaison staff responded to special controlled correspondence accurately. However, improvements were needed to ensure documentation of receipt of special controlled correspondences in the electronic systems. We reviewed all four special controlled correspondences and found that staff did not properly document the dates of receipt of the special controlled correspondence inquiries due to inadequate oversight by VSC management and lack of training.We recommended the VARO Director implement a plan to ensure prioritization of proposed rating reductions; strengthen oversight for the claims establishment review process; implement a plan to monitor the effectiveness of training related to claims establishment; provide training to congressional liaison staff; and strengthen oversight for special controlled correspondence.The VARO Director concurred with our recommendations. Management’s planned actions are responsive and we will follow up as required.

In September 2015, OIG received an allegation that the Office of Information and Technology (OIT) removed the Prescription Opioid Documentation and Surveillance (PODS) application from a VA server at the Northern California Health Care System (NCHCS) Pain Management Clinic. The complainant alleged the removal was potentially harmful to veterans who were put at increased risk of accidental overdose. We substantiated the allegation that OIT removed PODS. PODS used medical and mental health questionnaires to obtain patient information from patients prior to face-to-face evaluations with clinicians. According to the NCHCS Chief of Staff, PODS was “not a standard of care.” In addition, clinicians told us PODS was not necessary for prescribing and tracking opioids. Clinicians reported they clinically evaluated and assessed patients’ to determine the required level of monitoring and long-term opioid therapy. Because PODS was not needed to meet an appropriate standard of care, and clinicians reported they could provide requisite care without PODS, we concluded its removal did not put veterans at increased risk of accidental overdose. Although not part of the allegation, we found OIT failed to protect the integrity of VA’s enterprise and the security of the information it stored by allowing PODS’ use. PODS was started as a research project in 2006. After the research ended in 2012, clinicians continued to use PODS until it was removed in July 2015. However, PODS was an unsupported Class III software that did not meet system requirements, which created an unnecessary risk that veterans’ sensitive information could be accessed. These security concerns existed because OIT Region 1 staff failed to follow their standard operating procedures for the assessment and removal of Class III software.

We issued 12 audit recommendations in the 2013 audit report of Peace Corps/Zambia, all of which the post and the Office of the Chief Financial Officer implemented and we closed. However, during the follow-up audit we noted that the internal controls over the post’s financial and administrative operations required significant improvement to comply with agency policies and applicable Federal laws and regulations. Our report contains 21 recommendations directed to both the post and headquarters. At the post, our recommendations include implementing controls over fuel purchase and use, imprest funds, staff health insurance, disbursements, and security clearance for staff. We also recommend putting in place a contract with the auctioneer and enhancing controls over Volunteer allowances. We recommend that headquarters issue guidance on implementing internal controls over fuel purchase and use.

We determined that 9,389 aliens identified as having multiple identities had received an immigration benefit. When taking into account the most current immigration benefit these aliens received, we determined that naturalization, permanent residence, work authorization, and temporary protected status represent the greatest number of benefits, accounting for 8,447 or 90 percent of the 9,389 cases. Benefits for the remaining 10 percent of cases include applications for asylum and appeals to immigration court decisions. USCIS has drafted a policy memorandum, Guidance for Prioritizing IDENT Derogatory Information Related to Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records, outlining how it will review cases of individuals with multiple identities whose fingerprints were uploaded into IDENT through HFE. We did not make any recommendations.

The Fiscal Year 2018 – 2020 Strategic Plan includes the long-range goals and objectives designed to enhance OIG oversight in support of the Peace Corps and its three goals.

To view the report, please click on the link below.

This is our final report on the Department’s top management and performance challenges for fiscal year (FY) 2018. The top management and performance challenges we reported on last year remain critical issues facing the Department. However, we have revised our discussion to reflect the Department’s progress, changing priorities, and emerging risks:Challenge 1: Delivering a Timely 2020 Census That Maintains or Improves Data Quality but Costs Less Per Household Than the 2010 CensusChallenge 2: Ensuring the Continuity of Environmental Satellite ObservationsChallenge 3: Securing Department Systems and InformationChallenge 4: Deploying a Nationwide Public Safety Broadband NetworkChallenge 5: Efficiently and Effectively Enforcing Laws That Promote Fair and Secure TradeChallenge 6: Modernizing the Department’s Legacy IT Systems and Improving Data QualityChallenge 7: Implementing Processes to Improve Management of the Department’s Contracts, Grants, and Cooperative Agreements

The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) had a process in place to ensure that Head Start grantees took corrective action on A-133 audit findings. Head Start grantees are required to have Single Audits conducted in accordance with Office of Management and Budget Circular A 133 (also known as A-133 audits) for fiscal years beginning before December 26, 2014. However, for Region VI Head Start grantees that submitted audit reports to the Federal Audit Clearinghouse (FAC), ACF did not always resolve recurring audit findings in accordance with Federal requirements and ACF policies and procedures. Specifically, ACF did not issue Audit Determination Letters (letters) for 20 of the 31 audit reports we reviewed within 6 months after receiving the reports. In addition, although ACF provided the grantees with letters stating that the corrective actions planned or taken should prevent recurrence of the findings, ACF did not establish specific dates for grantees to correct all deficiencies noted in the audit reports. Finally, ACF did not always follow up with grantees to ensure that they actually took corrective actions to resolve audit findings. The prompt resolution of audit findings helps ensure that Federal funds are effectively and efficiently used to carry out the activities for which they were authorized.

We determined that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) IT systems and infrastructure did not fully support its border security objective of preventing the entry of inadmissible aliens to the country. The slow performance of a critical system used for pre-screening travelers reduced Office of Field Operations officers’ ability to identify any passengers who may pose concerns, including national security threats. Further, incoming passenger screening at U.S. international airports was hampered by system outages that created passenger delays and public safety risks. IT systems and infrastructure also did not fully support Border Patrol and Air and Marine Operations border security activities between ports of entry. Poor systems performance and network instability resulted in processing backlogs and agents’ inability to meet deadlines for submitting potential criminal alien prosecution cases. Also, network outages hindered air and marine surveillance operations, reducing the situational awareness needed to detect inadmissible aliens and cargo approaching U.S. borders. CBP has not yet addressed these long-standing IT systems and infrastructure challenges, due in part to ongoing budget constraints. We recommended that CBP take steps to address passenger screening and border security IT systems and infrastructure challenges. We made seven recommendations and CBP concurred with all seven of our recommendations.

We identified that the Diocese generally accounted for FEMA funds on a project-by-project basis as required by Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. However, it did not follow Federal procurement standards in awarding two contracts totaling $897,955. The Diocese and its parishes did not provide supporting documentation for procurements or their local procurement processes. This occurred primarily because the Diocese was not familiar with certain Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. As FEMA’s grantee, New York should have done more to ensure the Diocese was aware of and complied with Federal procurement standards and documentation requirements. FEMA should emphasize New York’s role in proper grant administration.

We determined that the County accounted for and expended the majority of FEMA grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. However, the County claimed $246,294 of ineligible and unsupported costs for two large projects. County officials said these issues occurred because FEMA officials provided inconsistent guidance regarding the types of direct administrative costs that were eligible; and internal clerical errors for overstated material costs. We recommended FEMA disallow $246,294 of ineligible and unsupported costs and provide clearer guidance for documenting eligible direct administrative costs.

The Audit Tips provides an overview of OIG responsibilities; applicable disaster assistance Federal statutes, regulations, and guidelines; the audit process and frequent audit findings; and key points to remember when administering FEMA grants. Using this report should assist disaster assistance applicants to (1) document and account for disaster-related costs; (2) minimize the loss of FEMA disaster assistance funds; (3) maximize financial recovery; and (4) prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of disaster funds. We have updated the report to include information on FEMA’s second edition of the Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide that supersedes many of the Public Assistance publications and individual policy documents.

Through review of a sample of ICE segregation data and visits to seven detention facilities ICE uses to detain aliens held in Government custody, we determined that the seven facilities were generally following ICE guidance for documenting decisions on segregating detainees with mental health conditions and promptly reporting segregation placement information for detainees with mental health conditions to ICE field offices. However, the field offices we reviewed did not record and promptly report all instances of segregation to ICE headquarters, nor did their system properly reflect all required reviews of ongoing segregation cases. Also, ICE does not regularly compare segregation data in the electronic management system with information at detention facilities to assess the accuracy and reliability of data in the system. Unless ICE field offices comply with requirements to report and record these reviews, ICE headquarters cannot be sure required reviews are taking place and may not have all the information needed to assess the use of segregation, which could put detainees and facility staff at risk of harm. We made three recommendations to ICE to improve oversight and accountability for segregation of detainees with mental health conditions.

FEMA is currently responding to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, some of the most catastrophic disasters in recent United States history. Damages from Hurricane Harvey are estimated to exceed $100 billion. On September 22, 2017, The State of Texas General Land Office (Texas) entered into an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (agreement) to provide assistance to FEMA in the delivery of Direct Housing Assistance (DHA) to Hurricane Harvey survivors on a temporary basis. FEMA estimates these costs will reach approximately $1 billion. The agreement does not clearly identify basic controls to ensure (DHA) funds are spent according to Federal regulations. For instance, the agreement does not include approval authorities and physical inspections, or separation of duties and independent certifications. We are concerned that without adequate controls in place the federal funds may be at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. Therefore, it is imperative that FEMA ensure Texas’ proposed project management plan clearly identifies the internal controls needed to ensure that Federal funds will be properly spent. It also provides observations on the current and past issues with FEMA’s use of direct housing assistance programs.

To see our report, click on the link below

We determined that while the Commission has a system in place to account for funds on a project-by-project basis and generally expended Public Assistance grant funds according to FEMA guidelines, the Commission needs additional assistance in developing long-term solutions for repetitive damages to county roads and managing its $5.4 million FEMA grant. We found that the Commission did not receive adequate guidance from FEMA and Alabama concerning Hazard Mitigation funding for long-term solutions to repetitive damages to roads; thus, potentially costing FEMA millions of dollars in the future; and project formulation, causing improperly written project scopes. Additionally, the Commission did not have proper procurement procedures to ensure that small businesses, minority-owned firms, and women’s business enterprises have an opportunity to bid on Federal contracts; and adequate procedures to ensure proper documentation is collected to support $24,000 in costs. The report contains five recommendations to the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, to provide the Commission with additional guidance to properly manage its $5.4 million and save millions in the future. FEMA agreed with all recommendations.

This study continues OIG's body of work examining overpayments made by Medicare. Overpayments can be identified by a number of key players including providers and Medicare contractors. Recovering overpayments is critical to reducing improper payments in the Medicare program. Past OIG work found that overpayments referred by program safeguard contractors (PSCs) for collection did not result in significant recoveries to the Medicare program. As of 2012, CMS had transitioned the workload of most PSCs to six zone program integrity contractors (ZPICs). In 2016, CMS began transitioning the remaining PSCs and ZPICs to unified program integrity contractors (UPICs). OIG's work on both PSCs and ZPICs identified deficiencies in how contractors were tracking and reporting overpayment data. This study provides an update on the collection of ZPIC- and PSC-referred overpayments and identifies ongoing challenges that contractors face in tracking and collecting overpayments identified by ZPICs and PSCs.

The OIG reviewed allegations the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) inappropriately used Government purchase cards to procure commonly used prosthetics, instead of establishing contracts to leverage VHA’s purchasing power, and failed to ensure fair and reasonable prices. Furthermore, VHA allegedly did not report purchases in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). We substantiated the allegation that for some prosthetic purchases above the micro-purchase limit, VHA did not leverage its purchasing power by establishing contracts and did not ensure fair and reasonable prices. This occurred because VHA controls did not ensure the Prosthetic and Sensory Aids Service (PSAS) sufficiently analyzed prosthetic purchases to identify commonly used prosthetics and the Procurement and Logistics Office (P&LO) did not adequately monitor Network Contracting Office procurement practices to ensure contracts were established. We estimated VHA may have paid higher prices for an estimated $256.7 million in prosthetics purchases during fiscal year (FY) 2015 by not establishing contracts.We did not substantiate the allegation that VHA failed to report prosthetic procurements in FPDS. However, we determined VA medical facility staff improperly procured prosthetics above the micro-purchase limit without authority. We estimated VHA made improper payments and unauthorized commitments totaling about $520.7 million in FY 2015. If VHA staff does not ensure P&LO and PSAS implement our recommendations and newly established controls, they increase risks for improper payments and unauthorized commitments totaling about $2.6 billion over a five-year period.We recommended the Acting Under Secretary for Health take additional actions to identify all commonly used prosthetics offering opportunities for leveraging VHA’s purchasing power and pursue appropriate contracts. We also recommended the Acting Under Secretary review FYs 2015 and 2016 prosthetics transactions to identify unauthorized commitments for ratification, conduct annual reviews, and consider holding cardholders and their approving officials accountable for unauthorized commitments, as appropriate.

CNCS-OIG received an allegation that a CNCS State Program Officer may have falsified documents when she awarded a VISTA grant.The investigation found no evidence that the employee falsified documents pertaining to the awarding of the VISTA grant; however, the employee failed to follow the VISTA Desk Reference guidelines when she failed to obtain the proper documents and verify the 501(c) (3) nonprofit status before awarding the VISTA grant.

OIG conducted a healthcare inspection to assess allegations made regarding the management of outpatient post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) consults by the PTSD Clinical Team (PCT) at Battle Creek VA Medical Center (facility), Battle Creek, MI.Specifically the complainant alleged:• Between May and July 2016, consults were improperly designated as complete although a PCT provider had not evaluated the patient.• A mental health provider used computer-based and written psychological testing as a substitution for evaluations.• Staff psychologists were unproductive.We substantiated that some PCT consults were improperly identified as completed between May 1 and July 30, 2016. We substantiated that four of the five identified patients had PCT consults inappropriately designated as complete roughly between May 1 and July 30, 2016. In spring 2016, PCT managers changed their assessment process to include multiple clinic visits rather than a single one. The change caused confusion relating to when a consult was considered complete. We reviewed the care of all patients who received a PCT consult between January 1 and March 31, 2016, before the process change, and between May 1 and July 30, 2016, after the process change. We found 37 of the 111 (33 percent) consults were marked as completed prior to the assessment process with a provider. However, we did not find any of the patients suffered adverse clinical impact. We confirmed that PCT managers decided to return the PCT consult process to its previous operation prior to our site visit in August 2016. In that the consult scheduling process was corrected and we found no adverse impact to patients, we made no recommendation. We did not substantiate a mental health provider used computer-based and written psychological testing as a substitution for an evaluation or that psychologists had nonproductive work hours during the new scheduling process.We made no recommendations.

In November 2015, Congress referred to OIG an allegation that Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) 23 may have misused medical funding when procuring information technology (IT) equipment and that purchase orders and contracts appeared to bundle IT hardware and software together with medical equipment while classifying them exclusively as medical equipment. We sought to determine whether appropriate funds were used and procedures were followed for 30 purchase orders and associated contracts. We did not substantiate the allegation and determined the 30 orders (about $57.9 million) and contracts were for IT hardware, software, and services dedicated to patient care. We found all 30 purchase orders were appropriately funded with medical appropriations but that VISN 23 improperly funded 1 purchase for patient WiFi and cable television services (about $245,000) by using the wrong type of medical appropriation. VISN 23 used Medical Support and Compliance funds instead of Medical Services funds because VA’s Office of Information Technology (OIT) guidance on what VISN 23 was allowed to fund with IT appropriations was outdated, unclear, and incomplete. The Office of General Counsel’s (OGC’s) determination that funding patient WiFi using Medical Services funds was acceptable was not communicated to the Veterans Health Administration’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO). We recommended the VISN 23 Director consult with OGC and take corrective actions and also ensure that appropriate funds are used for future IT procurements following the most recent VA policy and OGC guidance. The Director should work with the CFO to determine if an Antideficiency Act violation occurred and take appropriate action. We recommended the Acting Assistant Secretary for OIT update the 2016 IT/Non-IT Policy to address the dissemination of decisions and issues that may be systemic across VA. The Director concurred with Recommendations 1 and 2 and reported corrective actions were completed. We will close them once documentation is received. The Acting Assistant Secretary concurred with Recommendation 3. The corrective action plan is acceptable and we will follow up on its implementation.

OIG evaluated quality of care at the VA Eastern Colorado Health Care System. This included reviews of processes that affect patient care outcomes—Quality, Safety, and Value (QSV); Environment of Care; Medication Management; Coordination of Care; Diagnostic Care; Moderate Sedation; Community Nursing Home Oversight; Management of Disruptive/Violent Behavior; and Mental Health (MH) Residential Rehabilitation Treatment Program (RRTP). OIG followed up on recommendations from the previous Combined Assessment Program and Community Based Outpatient Clinic and Primary Care Clinic reviews and provided crime awareness briefings to 138 employees.OIG identified certain system weaknesses in the QSV Committee; credentialing and privileging; utilization management; patient safety; general safety; environmental cleanliness; reusable medical equipment processes; anticoagulation policies/processes; transfer processes and documentation; point-of-care testing follow-up; moderate sedation data collection and reporting; management of disruptive/violent behavior; RRTP security; and nurse staffing.As a result of the findings, OIG could not gain reasonable assurance that the facility: 1. Has effective QSV program oversight, policies, and practices2. Maintains safety by conducting fire drills and maintains clean horizontal surfaces, ventilation grills, floors, and patient nourishment kitchens 3. Reprocesses reusable medical equipment per manufacturer instructions and ensures employee competency4. Has a comprehensive anticoagulation therapy management program5. Has safe inter-facility transfer processes6. Ensures clinicians take action regarding glucose point-of-care testing results7. Uses data to improve moderate sedation care8. Has a comprehensive program for managing disruptive/violent behavior 9. Secures the MH RRTP 10. Uses the nurse staffing methodology and conducts annual reassessmentsOIG made recommendations in the following eight areas: (1) QSV, (2) Environment of Care, (3) Medication Management, (4) Coordination of Care, (5) Diagnostic Care, (6) Moderate Sedation, (7) Management of Disruptive/Violent Behavior, and (8) MH RRTP. OIG made a repeat recommendation in Nurse Staffing.

At the request of the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Supply Chain, we examined the cost proposal submitted by a company for civil projects and coal combustion residual program management work at TVA's steam electric power plants. Our examination objective was to determine if the company's cost proposal was fairly stated for a planned <br> $150 million contract. In our opinion, the company's cost proposal was overstated. Specifically, we found: The company's proposals for a Cumberland Fossil Plant (CUF) project and a Bull Run Fossil Plant (BRF) project included overstated (1) equipment costs, (2) material costs, <br> (3) general and administrative (G&A) and small tool rates, and (4) labor costs. In addition, we found the company's proposed unit rate for BRF monthly maintenance was understated due to omissions in the company's unit rate cost buildup.The company's proposed labor rate attachments included (1) incorrect craft labor rates and (2) noncraft wage ranges that were not reflective of the company's actual wage ranges. In addition, the company's proposal omitted labor rate attachments for employees who receive limited or no benefits. We estimated TVA could avoid about $6.6 million on the planned $150 million contract by negotiating appropriate reductions to (1) equipment, labor, and material costs and G&A and small tools rates in the CUF proposal and (2) unit rates in the BRF proposal. In addition, we suggest TVA negotiate revisions to the company's contract rate attachments to correct errors and more accurately reflect the company's actual wage ranges.(Summary Only)

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OIG received a complaint from a veteran alleging that Peterson Regional Medical Center (PRMC) in Kerrville, TX, canceled his sleep study appointment because VA owed PRMC more than $2 million, and PRMC was no longer accepting VA referrals for non-VA Care (NVC) as a result. There was insufficient evidence to substantiate the allegation that PRMC canceled the veteran’s scheduled sleep study because of non-payment by VA or that PRMC limited other veterans’ access to care. While PRMC continued to accept patients through the NVC program, OIG discovered that PRMC improperly informed the veteran that he might be responsible for payment if VA did not pay. OIG recommended the Director of the South Texas Veterans Health Care System (STVHCS) should instruct PRMC to stop advising veterans that they could be liable for pre-authorized NVC. The Director of the STVHCS concurred with our findings and recommendation and stated that STVHCS would implement the recommendation. We will monitor STVHCS’ progress and follow up on the implementation of our recommendation until the proposed action is completed.

We determined that FEMA’s policies are not sufficient enough to prohibit unaccredited, unlicensed, unregistered, and non-state approved non-profit schools from receiving Public Assistance funds. We made one recommendation for the FEMA Assistant Administrator for the Recovery Directorate to strengthen its policies and guidelines pertaining to non-profit schools eligibility for Public Assistance. FEMA agreed with our finding and recommendation, and will take corrective action to resolve the recommendation by February 28, 2018; therefore, we consider the recommendation resolved and open.

We found that the post’s financial and administrative operations required improvement to comply with agency policies and applicable federal laws and regulations. Our report contains 19 recommendations directed to the post and headquarters, including that the post strengthen controls over the processes for managing imprest funds, modifying contracts, creating bills of collection, collecting Volunteer overpayments, and closing grant projects. In addition, we recommend that the post work with Global Accounts Payable to obtain a waiver for the sub-cashiers when exceeding the maximum amount for a cashier advance, and that Global Accounts Payable publish guidance for mobile banking.

We found that Idaho’s oversight of the Title I and IDEA, Part B programs was adequate to determine whether services were being provided to students and that teachers were highly qualified, or that deficiencies were identified and corrective actions were required. Specifically, we found that it had sufficient policies and procedures for overseeing schools’ compliance with Federal program requirements. Idaho also conducted monitoring activities that supported implementation of these policies and procedures. However, we also found that Idaho needs to ensure full and prompt implementation of corrective actions and improve its Federal program oversight, as the issues we identified at one of the virtual charter schools, Inspire, were nearly identical to issues Idaho had identified several years earlier.

To view the report, please click on the link below.

We determined that Medicare costs related to the replacement of all recalled or prematurely failed medical devices could not be identified and tracked using only Medicare claim data. Such costs cannot be determined using only claim data because, although Medicare claim forms identify the medical procedures performed, they do not contain a field for reporting medical device-specific information. The lack of information on the claim forms prevents the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) from being able to fully understand and address the Medicare costs related to recalled or prematurely failed medical devices. In addition, the lack of information impedes the Food and Drug Administration and CMS's ability to identify poorly performing devices as early as possible. This diminishes device recipients' chances of receiving timely followup care.

The National Credit Union Administration Office of Inspector General conducted this self-initiated audit to assess NCUA’s IT examination program. The objective of our audit was to determine whether the IT examination program provides for adequate oversight of federally insured credit union cybersecurity programs to assess whether credit unions are taking sufficient and appropriate measures to protect the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of credit union assets and sensitive credit union information against cyber-attacks.

We determined that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) IT systems and infrastructure did not fully support its border security objective of preventing the entry of inadmissible aliens to the country. The slow performance of a critical system used for pre-screening travelers reduced Office of Field Operations officers’ ability to identify any passengers who may pose concerns, including national security threats. Further, incoming passenger screening at U.S. international airports was hampered by system outages that created passenger delays and public safety risks. IT systems and infrastructure also did not fully support Border Patrol and Air and Marine Operations border security activities between ports of entry. Poor systems performance and network instability resulted in processing backlogs and agents’ inability to meet deadlines for submitting potential criminal alien prosecution cases. Also, network outages hindered air and marine surveillance operations, reducing the situational awareness needed to detect inadmissible aliens and cargo approaching U.S. borders. CBP has not yet addressed these long-standing IT systems and infrastructure challenges, due in part to ongoing budget constraints. We recommended that CBP take steps to address passenger screening and border security IT systems and infrastructure challenges. We made seven recommendations and CBP concurred with all seven of our recommendations.