Federal Reports

From January 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021, the Denver, CO, Processing and Distribution Center reported 6,280 late arriving containers, 2.2 billion pieces of delayed inventory, and 168,490 delayed dispatch containers. This site was judgmentally selected based on the high number of delayed dispatch containers during this time period.

In FY 2018, S&T did not always adhere to DHS and internal purchase card policies and procedures. Of 421 purchase card transactions selected for review, we identified 394 transactions that did not have required supporting documentation, separation of key transaction duties, approvals and other required signatures, or compliance with other risk-based procedures. According to S&T officials, these issues were due to shortfalls in program oversight and training, as well as outdated policy. We identified $63,213 in questionable costs associated with purchase card transactions. We made four recommendations to improve S&T’s adherence to DHS policies and procedures for its Bankcard Program. S&T concurred with the four recommendations.

FEMA did not ensure Louisiana adequately managed and provided oversight of PA grants to make certain they complied with Federal regulations. Specifically, Louisiana had a backlog of 600 incomplete projects beyond their approved completion dates. We attributed this to the State not conducting regular site visits to assess subrecipients’ ongoing projects, identify and resolve issues as they arose, or ensure prompt project completion. In addition, FEMA had a backlog of 2,150 completed grant projects it had not closed out due to inadequate oversight of its Region 6 staff to ensure they promptly carried out this responsibility. As of the fourth quarter of 2018, the combined backlog of 2,750 grant projects represented nearly $6.6 billion in obligated funds. By May 2020, FEMA had reduced the backlog, but the significant number of remaining projects could lead to delays reimbursing applicants as well as deobligating funds that could be put to better use. We made three recommendations to FEMA to strengthen its oversight of project completion and closeout processes to ensure they are timely and compliant. FEMA concurred with one recommendation and did not concur with two. However, FEMA’s responses resulted in all three recommendations being considered open and unresolved.

OIG evaluated whether APHIS’ controls over select agents adequately reduced the threat to public, animal, and plant safety, and animal and plant products.

Allan Lummer, Farshad Sassounian, Sidney Cobos and Ashkan Kohanpour, medical marketers based in Los Angeles, were sentenced in United States District Court, Central District of California, in July 2021 for aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return. Sassounian, Cobos, and Kohanpour were each sentenced to six months in prison and ordered to pay $24,147.50 in restitution. Lummer was sentenced to two years’ probation for his role in the scheme.Our investigation found that the four defendants aided in the preparation and presentation of a false tax return to the Internal Revenue Service for Pharmacy Acquisition LLC. The defendants knew the tax return falsely claimed a deduction for expenses that were actually distributions made to them, as owners of the pharmacy. Further, our investigation found that Pharmacy Acquisition LLC provided medically unnecessary compounded drug prescriptions to Precise Compounding Pharmacy that were reimbursed by health care benefit programs, including Amtrak’s plan. As a result of the scheme, Amtrak’s insurance providers were fraudulently charged approximately $22,000.

As part of our annual audit plan, we audited costs billed to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) by The L.E. Myers Co. (LE Myers) under Contract No. 9070 for construction and modification services for TVA's Transmission and Power Supply Program. The contract provided for TVA to compensate LE Myers for these services on either a cost-reimbursable or fixed price basis. Our audit objective was to determine if costs were billed in accordance with the terms and conditions of Contract No. 9070. Our audit scope included about <br> $35.5 million in cost-reimbursable expenses billed to TVA from September 1, 2018, through December 31, 2019. In summary, we determined LE Myers overbilled TVA $120,152, including (1) a net $93,695 in unsupported and incorrect craft labor charges, (2) $13,955 in unsupported travel costs, and (3) $12,502 in unsupported equipment costs. In addition, we found that (1) LE Myers did not submit an electronic billing file to the TVA Office of Inspector General in the format and frequency provided for in the contract's terms, and (2) TVA did not revise the contract's equipment rate schedule to include a piece of equipment approved for use by TVA's Contract Manager.(Summary Only)

To ensure the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) social mediaprogram is effective at helping EEOC achieve its objectives—to 1) promote EEOC’s educationand outreach activities, 2) encourage greater use of the EEOC website, and 3) increase publicaccess to information about rights and responsibilities under the laws EEOC enforces—theEEOC Office of the Inspector General (OIG) hired Hager Sharp to evaluate the program.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of Inspector General, has completed its audit of the HUD’s disaster preparedness from 2005 to 2018. We performed this audit due to an agreement with six other Inspectors General as part of a Disaster Assistance Working Group-Cross Cutting Functional Effort by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to determine to what extent the Federal departments were prepared for upcoming natural disasters. (See the Scope and Methodology section for details about the working group.) Our specific audit objective was to determine whether HUD’s Offices of Multifamily Housing Programs, Single Family Housing, Community Planning and Development, Native American Programs, and Public Housing can improve their preparedness to respond to upcoming natural disasters. We found HUD’s Offices of Multifamily Housing Programs, Single Family Housing, Community Planning and Development, Native American Programs, and Public Housing had weaknesses in their written policies and supervisory controls. The Offices of Multifamily and Single family had control weaknesses in their post disaster information-gathering activities. The Offices of Community Planning and Development and Native American Programs had weaknesses in their controls to ensure that all affected grantees and housing entities are contacted following a disaster. And, the Office of Public Housing did not track its outreach to PHAs.We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Office of Multifamily Housing Programs and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Single Family Housing establish and implement a process to ensure that policies, procedures, and supervisory controls are effective. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and Development establish and implement a process to ensure that supervisory controls are effective related to a requirement that staff contact grantees following a disaster. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing establish and implement a process to ensure that the Office of Native American Programs’ policies and procedures are effective. We recommend the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Field Operations improve the Office of Public Housing’s procedures with written guidance to ensure that its staff formally tracks outreach to public housing agencies.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is initiating a review of the Commission’s information security program pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) and in accordance with our risk-based Biennial Audit Plan for Fiscal Years 2020-2021.

Our objective was to assess the effectiveness of the Postal Service’s Secure Destruction program. The Secure Destruction program is one of the Postal Service’s key environmental sustainability initiatives. The Postal Service developed the program with commercial mailers (mailers) in 2014 to facilitate more efficient, secure, and environmentally responsible handling of undeliverable as addressed (UAA) mail. This mail could not be delivered for reasons including illegible addresses, individuals or businesses which have moved, or unknown addressees.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) needs better oversight and policy to adequately safeguard migrants experiencing medical emergencies or illnesses along the southwest border. CBP concurred with all three of our recommendations, which when implemented, should improve medical attention and procedures for migrants at the southwest border

In reviewing the circumstances surrounding the childbirth at the Chula Vista station, we found Border Patrol provided adequate medical assistance to the mother and her newborn and complied with applicable policies. We made four recommendations to improve CBP’s processes for tracking detainee childbirths, its practices for expediting release of U.S. citizen newborns, and its guidance to agents on providing interpretation for detainees.

Staff at VA medical facilities work with contractors in the Contracted Residential Services (CRS) program to provide temporary housing and services to veterans experiencing homelessness. The OIG examined whether the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) effectively monitored veterans and administered CRS contracts to ensure veterans received needed services, contractors met the terms and conditions of their contracts, and funds were used appropriately.The OIG found facility staff did not consistently document case management and monitor the progress of veterans in the program. Case management involves evaluating veterans’ needs, planning and assessing their treatment, and advocating for treatment plan changes. Documenting this process helps facilities provide veterans with high quality care and establishes a record for continuity of that care.Further, four of the 14 CRS contracts reviewed had performance deficiencies, with one resulting in improper payments of $592,000. These deficiencies may affect the health and safety of veterans living in transitional settings. Moreover, VA lacks assurance that veterans received required services.There were also contract administration problems in 13 of 14 reviewed contracts. Contracting officers did not always properly delegate responsibilities to staff functioning as contracting officer’s representatives. Further, one facility’s representative did not ensure contractors provided meals or the means to purchase them, as required, and another lacked invoice supporting documentation for approval.The audit team estimated that 107 of 119 contracts had monitoring and administration deficiencies. Furthermore, the team estimated that VHA made $35.3 million in improper payments, of which approximately $21.6 million was technically improper because the individuals authorizing payment were not delegated authority to serve as contracting officer’s representatives.The OIG made five recommendations to VHA to address the issues identified such as establishing monitoring controls for CRS staff, contracting officers, and their representatives; updating the program handbook; and including quality assurance plans for contracts.

Our objective was to evaluate select mail delivery and customer service operations and determine whether internal controls were effective at the Newark Post Office.

What We Looked AtAfter Hurricane Sandy caused widespread damage to transportation infrastructure in October 2012, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act (DRAA) designated $10.9 billion for the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) new Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program. We assessed (1) FTA's progress in allocating, obligating, and disbursing its Hurricane Sandy funding and (2) any weaknesses in these processes that we identified.What We FoundThrough December 31, 2020, FTA allocated and obligated approximately $10 billion--most of its Hurricane Sandy appropriation--but only disbursed about $4.3 billion. The pace was influenced by a number of factors, including but not limited to project construction planning and execution and the complexity of competitive resilience projects. As a result, over 8 years after the storm, more than half of the funds remain to be spent. We also found that FTA inconsistently tracks and reports Hurricane Sandy funding data or does not fully comply with Federal guidance. The Agency has allocation data in a variety of sources, but--as FTA does not have procedures to accurately communicate allocated amounts over time--the data from these sources do not align. Thus, FTA cannot use these data to determine whether obligation amounts for specific recipients and purposes stayed within the allocated amounts in FTA's official documentation. Finally, FTA has not complied with a directive from the Office of Management and Budget to make DRAA obligation data readily identifiable on the USAspending.gov website. Overall, the weaknesses we identified reduced transparency for internal users, decision makers, and the public into FTA's use of Hurricane Sandy funds.Our RecommendationsWe made two recommendations to improve FTA's tracking and reporting on its use of Hurricane Sandy funds. FTA concurred with both recommendations and proposed appropriate actions and completion dates. Accordingly, we consider both recommendations as resolved but open pending completion of the planned actions.

The OIG conducted this healthcare inspection after receiving information from the facility that an audiologist had provided poor care and billed for unrendered services. The inspection focused on actions the Audiology Supervisor, Service Chief, and Chief of Staff (audiology leaders) took in response to the audiologist’s poor clinical care. A facility fact-finding review revealed the audiologist provided poor care to eight of 43 patients reviewed, including misinforming patients who needed hearing aids that hearing aids were not needed.Although the audiology leaders reported the fact-finding results to the OIG, they failed to evaluate whether patients needed clinical follow-up; determine whether additional patients were affected by the audiologist’s poor care; evaluate whether clinical disclosures were required for the affected patients; and communicate the fact-finding results to the Facility Director, who was therefore unable to initiate the process to determine the necessity of a large scale disclosure.The instances of poor care were also not reported to the Patient Safety Manager who was, as a result, unable to assess the adverse events to determine if patient safety interventions were indicated.The OIG also found that performance monitoring of facility audiologists was not conducted as required. Annual competency assessments and annual performance appraisals were not consistently completed and did not contain adequate performance standards.Audiology leaders failed to consider whether the audiologist’s actions warranted a report to the state licensing board due to a lack of understanding of the requirements for reporting and, therefore, the Facility Director was not informed of the need to initiate a state licensing board review.The OIG made 10 recommendations to the Facility Director related to ensuring patients affected by poor audiology care receive follow-up and disclosures as appropriate, overseeing audiologists, and ensuring audiology leaders’ compliance with policies regarding disclosure, adverse event reporting, and state licensing board reporting.

The purpose of the VA Fiduciary Program is to protect beneficiaries who are unable to manage their VA benefits as a result of injury, disease, advanced age, or because they are under age 18. The Veterans Benefits Administration’s (VBA) Pension and Fiduciary Service administers the program through six fiduciary offices called “hubs.” The OIG examined whether program staff properly addressed allegations of benefit payments being misused and then reimbursed beneficiaries as required.Program staff initiated inquiries into approximately 12,000 allegations of misuse from January 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019. The OIG team assessed staff actions for 40 misuse determinations and did not find systemic issues. However, the team found instances of significant wait times for program staff to determine misuse and negligence and to reimburse misused funds. For example, one beneficiary waited 19 months after an initial determination of misuse before staff completed a negligence determination.VA then reimbursed the beneficiary over $20,000 in misused funds. Another beneficiary waited 14 months after the misuse determination before staff reimbursed approximately $5,800. VBA should consider whether the average number of days taken to complete each type of misuse action is acceptable to meet oversight responsibilities and fulfill the stated mission of protecting vulnerable veterans and other beneficiaries.The team also found that VBA did not adequately monitor all follow-up actions on reported misuse. VBA was unaware of unprocessed negligence determinations from 2016 and 2017 that the team identified. Additionally, the team examined the workload management plans and systematic analysis of operations for the two fiduciary hubs visited, but none of the documents discussed or identified pending reimbursements.The OIG made two recommendations to VBA to ensure prompt completion of determinations and reimbursements after December 31, 2017.

Our objective was to determine to determine whether Social Security Administration (SSA) staff used updated values of all resources when they completed redeterminations to determine whether recipients remained eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments.

Our objective was to report internal control weaknesses, noncompliance issues, and unallowable costs identified in the single audit to the Social Security Administration (SSA) for resolution.

To ensure that hospice care does not exceed the cost of conventional care at the end of life, there are two annual limits (called caps) to payments made to hospices. Hospices that receive claim payments exceeding the cap amounts must repay the difference (overpayment) to Medicare. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) contracts with four Medicare administrative contractors (MACs) to calculate cap amounts and recover associated overpayments. We selected Palmetto GBA, LLC (Palmetto), one of the four MACs, for our audit because it had the highest number of hospices in its jurisdiction during our audit period of cap year 2017. OIG has not performed previous work related to the hospice caps. When a beneficiary receives hospice services in more than one cap year, the beneficiary count is allocated to each cap year based on the percentage of total hospice days that occurred in each cap year. For the second cap year, Palmetto must adjust the previous year’s (i.e., the first cap year that hospice service was provided) cap calculation if the beneficiary count has changed. If a beneficiary continues to receive hospice care into a third cap year, Palmetto must adjust the cap calculations again for both previous cap years so that each beneficiary is counted only one time for his or her total hospice days. The process of redetermining the cap calculations based on the change in beneficiary counts for previous years is referred to as a “lookback.” Palmetto calculates each hospice’s aggregate cap amount for a specific cap year a total of four times, consisting of the initial cap calculation year and three lookback years. For example, the initial cap calculation for 2014 was performed after the 2014 cap year had ended. For cap year 2015, Palmetto performed a lookback of 2014. For cap year 2016, Palmetto performed lookbacks of 2015 and 2014. For cap year 2017, Palmetto performed lookbacks of 2016, 2015, and 2014. After the third lookback, Palmetto will not review the cap calculation for the initial cap year again. As a result, the 2017 cap calculation was the final lookback at 2014. A hospice is expected to repay cap overpayments promptly. If a hospice cannot repay a cap overpayment immediately, it may submit an Extended Repayment Schedule (ERS) request to Palmetto. If approved, a hospice may receive up to 60 months to repay an overpayment. Palmetto may approve ERS requests up to 36 months, but CMS must approve ERS requests for 37 to 60 months. If a hospice does not make ERS payments, Palmetto classifies the debt as currently not collectible and refers the debt to the Department of the Treasury. According to CMS, debt that is currently not collectible is unlikely to be collected.

A senior political employee did not comply with the Federal ethics pledge by meeting with representatives from a former employer.

The Office of the Inspector General found the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) industrial hygiene planning and assessment process had weaknesses that resulted in some hazards not being identified and evaluated. Specifically, we identified the following industrial hygiene process weaknesses: (1) TVA relied on limited information to identify health hazards; (2) there was no formal evaluation of the risks posed by hazards identified; (3) industrial hygiene plans did not prioritize hazards for control; and (4) incomplete monitoring efforts, which allowed for misalignment between plans and exposure assessments as well as limited coverage for retiring plants. We also found TVA did not take appropriate actions to address some adverse conditions identified during assessments. We determined actions were not taken to address four occurrences of elevated silica. We also determined some employees were not notified of hazard exposures or actions taken to address their exposures, as required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. In addition, we identified opportunities for improvement related to handling of industrial hygiene issues in the contractor population.

OIG data analytics identified the Ranson, WV, Post Office as having $36,694 recorded to account identifier code (AIC) 528, Refund Permit Postage and Fees, from October 1, 2019 to September 30, 2020. This amount represented 81 percent of the district’s $45,157 refunds for permit postage and fees for this time frame. In addition, we identified the unit had several months with little or no refund activity and four months with unusually high refund amounts for the period October 1, 2019, through March 31, 2021. Our objective was to determine whether Ranson, WV, Post Office employees properly issued, supported, and processed postage affixed BRM refunds.

Our objective was to determine if the Postal Service properly processed and supported online refund requests for Priority Mail Express (PME). We conducted this audit in response to concerns raised by the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and our Office of Investigations. The concerns related to potential erroneous payments with online PME refunds issued by the Postal Service from October 1, 2018, through July 31, 2020. The Postal Service provides customers the convenience of requesting refunds for domestic service failures (guaranteed delivery time commitment) for PME and applicable Extra Services online.

DHS issued notices to appear (NTA), to MPP participants that were mostly accurate and in accordance with laws and regulations. However, some NTAs were completed inaccurately. We made one recommendation to improve the accuracy and completeness of NTAs issued to MPP participants. CBP non-concurred with the recommendation due to it being overcome by events when the program was terminated by the Secretary of Homeland Security on June 1, 2021. We administratively closed the recommendation

During our unannounced inspection of Adams in Natchez, Mississippi, we identified violations of ICE detention standards that threatened the health, safety, and rights of detainees. We made seven recommendations to ICE’s Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) to ensure the New Orleans ERO Field Office overseeing Adams addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards. ICE concurred with all seven recommendations.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) CBP did not always protect Mobile Passport Control (MPC) applications (apps) from cybersecurity threats. We made eight recommendations that, when implemented, should improve the security of CBP’s MPC program. CBP concurred with all eight recommendations.

The Federal Labor Relations Authority OIG reviewed the system of quality control for the audit organization of the EAC OIG in effect for the year ended March 31, 2021. This report discusses their findings.

The EPA OIG has identified a critical control issue concerning the information security and scientific integrity of an environmental air sensor device. This critical control issue highlights the need for safeguards on remote devices procured, implemented, and operated by the Office of Research and Development.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a performance audit to determine whether theFTC’s Personal Identity Verification (PIV) badge access system meets federal requirements andappropriately safeguards access to FTC assets.

The Office of Inspector General conducted a follow-up review of issues identified in the Final Report on the Program Evaluation of Peace Corps/Moldova (IG-13-04-E). We followed up on five findings from this 2013 report that were significant areas of concern. Our report contains three recommendations, which, if implemented, should strengthen post operations and correct the deficiencies detailed in the report.

The Postal Service uses contracted, supplier-operated routes to transport mail and equipment between plants, post offices, and other designated points. These routes include “as needed” services that allow suppliers to travel anywhere within the continental U.S. “As needed” routes are on-demand services that operate infrequently, are generally more expensive than dedicated scheduled services, and involve multiple cost segments. Our objective was to assess the Postal Service’s use of the “as needed” transportation on Highway Contract Routes.

This guide summarizes the fraud reporting requirements most relevant to entities receiving pandemic relief funds and auditors of those entities.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) assessed allegations that a patient died by suicide the day of discharge from the Inpatient Mental Health Unit, and that facility leaders failed to complete an institutional disclosure.The patient, who was over 70 years old at the time of death, had diagnoses that included posttraumatic stress disorder and major depression. After approximately 15 years of care at a California VA facility, the patient transferred care to the facility in summer 2019.The OIG substantiated that the patient died by suicide the day of discharge. In summer 2019, outpatient providers did not complete required comprehensive evaluations with the patient. The emergency department social worker documented an incomplete comprehensive evaluation.The suicide prevention team did not assign the patient a high risk for suicide patient record flag in spite of the patient’s stressors and history of suicide behaviors.Staff did not adequately assess the patient’s substance use, incorporate relevant history into the treatment plan, or address the patient’s change in demeanor and concerning statements. The discharge safety plan had not been modified for approximately eight months in spite of significant life changes.Leaders had not established a mental health treatment coordinator (MHTC) policy. Staff assigned the patient an MHTC at the patient’s tenth visit and four MHTCs over nine months.Staff did not coordinate care with a geropsychologist, with whom the patient had nine appointments. Leaders did not effectively address the patient’s expressed complaints.The OIG substantiated that leaders did not conduct an institutional disclosure.The OIG made 10 recommendations related to evaluation of suicide risk and substance use disorder, incorporation of critical information into treatment and discharge planning, MHTC policy, discharge coordination, patient complaint response, identification of sentinel events, and an institutional disclosure for the patient’s care.

What We Looked AtThe Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) requires agencies to identify, report, and reduce improper payments in their programs. For fiscal year 2020, the Department of Transportation reported one program, the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) Highway Planning and Construction (HPC) Program, as susceptible to significant improper payments and subject to PIIA reporting requirements. HPC reported total expenditures of over $46 billion and DOT estimated that about $172 million of those payments were improper. PIIA also requires inspectors general to annually report on their agencies’ compliance. Our audit objective was to determine whether DOT complied with PIIA’s requirements as prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). We reviewed the improper payment testing results published in DOT’s fiscal year 2020 Annual Financial Report (AFR) and posted to the Federal Government’s Payment Accuracy website and used statistical sampling to test transactions. What We FoundDOT is in compliance with PIIA. For fiscal year 2020, DOT reported improper payment estimates for FHWA’s HPC. The payment integrity information in DOT’s 2020 AFR and data posted to the Payment Accuracy website was accurate and complete. DOT also conducted risk assessments of programs as the Office of Management and Budget requires. The Department published its planned and completed corrective actions in its supplemental data call posted to the Payment Accuracy website. DOT’s corrective action plans appear adequately designed, focused on true root causes, and effectively implemented and prioritized with an emphasis on reducing improper payments. Furthermore, for fiscal year 2020, FHWA’s HPC Program surpassed its fiscal year 2020 improper payment reduction target of 0.85 percent, reporting estimated improper payments of 0.37 percent or about $172 million—a decrease of $224 million from 2019. Lastly, DOT continues to take steps to reduce and recapture improper payments through its risk assessments, annual improper payment testing, and payment recapture audits. RecommendationsWe made no recommendations.

The City Carrier Cost System (CCCS) is a statistical study of mail delivered on city carrier routes. For each selected route, a data collection technician selects a sample of mail to be delivered on the scheduled test date. The technician records the mail class, product type, and other characteristics of each manually sampled mailpiece directly into a portable microcomputer using the Computerized On-Site Data Entry System (CODES) data collection software. The Postal Service conducted 9,257 and 8,694 CCCS tests in fiscal years (FY) 2019 and 2020, respectively. Our objective was to assess the reliability of CCCS data and evaluate CCCS sampling methodologies to identify opportunities for improved efficiencies.

We conducted a limited review of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Office of the Chief Procurement Officer’s (OCPO) administration of five procurement activities under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). The CARES Act and related Office of Management and Budget memorandums gave HUD flexibility in modifying existing contracts and required rapid delivery of CARES Act funds. Our objective was to determine what HUD had done to accommodate contractors’ pandemic-related issues while ensuring that HUD met its business objectives. In addition, our objective included determining what challenges HUD encountered in procuring and administering its contracts during the pandemic. Based upon a limited review of five COVID-19-related contract transactions and our understanding of the prepandemic controls and policies that HUD had in place, HUD was adequately prepared before the pandemic to accommodate contractors’ pandemic-related issues while ensuring that HUD met its business objectives. Because HUD was adequately prepared, it did not encounter substantial challenges in procuring and administering its contracts. HUD used its existing policies, procedures, and systems to modify contracts to allow contractor accommodations. We did not make any recommendations to HUD.

We conducted a performance audit of a National Endowment for the Arts (Arts Endowment) award issued to the Kansas Department of Commerce (KDC). Based on our review, we determined KDC generally met the financial and compliance requirements set forth in the award documents. However, we identified the following areas requiring improvement. For instance, KDC: did not report actual costs on its Federal Financial Report; did not document its methodology for recording and reporting allocated payroll costs for Arts Endowment awards; and did not have written policies and procedures in place to ensure that contractors are not debarred or suspended prior to the award of Federal funds. Thus, we are questioning overstated costs totaling $950. We have made two recommendations for KDC to improve these areas, and one recommendation to the Arts Endowment regarding the questioned costs.

In this audit, we evaluated NASA’s management of cooperative agreements it had with Universities Space Research Association, specifically management and oversight of 21 active cooperative agreements valued at approximately $476 million.

What We Looked AtThe primary mission of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) is to reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities involving large trucks and buses. To that end, FMCSA regulates commercial driver’s license (CDL) holders involved in interstate commerce and the transportation of hazardous materials. In the last 5 years, fatalities in crashes involving large trucks or buses increased by 12.4 percent, from 4,505 in 2014 to 5,064 in 2019. Federal regulations describe the minimum standards States must meet to comply with the Federal CDL program and permits FMCSA to review each State CDL program to determine compliance. Accordingly, the objective for this self-initiated audit was to assess FMCSA’s oversight of States’ actions to disqualify commercial drivers when warranted. What We FoundStates did not timely transmit electronic conviction notifications 17 percent of the time. Specifically, we estimate that States of Conviction did not timely transmit 18 percent of 2,182 major offenses and 17 percent of 23,628 serious traffic violations in our universe. We also estimate that 11 percent of 2,182 major offenses were not timely posted and 2 percent of 23,628 serious traffic violations in our universe were not posted to driver records at all. While States did take action to disqualify CDLs when appropriate, with exceptions, FMCSA’s evaluation of paper conviction notifications is limited by States’ processes for recording and tracking convictions sent by mail. Furthermore, FMCSA's Annual Program Review process lacks adequate quality control measures for verifying that State CDL programs meet Federal requirements. Finally, State noncompliance with Federal CDL disqualification requirements and other State actions pose challenges for FMCSA’s oversight. For example, some States offered administrative appeals to out-of-State drivers, overturned disqualifications, and backdated CDL disqualification periods. As a result, some drivers served shorter disqualification time periods than Federal law requires. Our RecommendationsWe made seven recommendations to strengthen FMCSA’s oversight of States’ actions to comply with Federal CDL disqualification requirements. FMCSA concurred with all seven recommendations, which we consider resolved but open pending completion of the planned actions.

The unclassified version of the SAR covers the period from October 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021, and reflects what the NSA OIG could release publicly about its work for that SAR Report Cover reporting period. The OIG issued 16 oversight products during the period, making 256 recommendations that we believe will be impactful in improving the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of this critical Agency's operations. NSA's management agreed with all OIG recommendations that were made during the reporting period. The Director of the NSA and Congress previously received the classified version of the SAR in accordance with the IG Act.

To see our report, click on the link below

Sports adapted for athletes with disabilities can play a vital role in improving veterans’ quality of life. VA’s Office of National Veterans Sports Programs and Special Events (NVSPSE) granted $47 million to organizations with experience in managing adaptive sports programs from fiscal year (FY) 2017 to FY 2020.In December 2019, the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a hotline complaint alleging fraud in how the NVSPSE was “closing out” adaptive sports grants—bringing a grant to an end after determining recipients have completed all requirements. The OIG examined whether officials effectively managed the program to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations. The team also examined whether grant recipients were reimbursed on time.The OIG did not find evidence of fraud in the grant closeout process; however, it found that the NVSPSE was not effectively managing the program. The NVSPSE’s director had not established adequate internal controls, including developing standard operating procedures for managing adaptive sports grants. As a result, the NVSPSE could not effectively evaluate risks from grant recipients, did not reimburse some recipients’ expenses on time, did not always close out grants on time, and did not appropriately authorize extensions for using funds.By not closing out grants on time, the NVSPSE failed to free up about $346,000 that could have been used for other purposes. It also improperly allowed recipients to spend $328,000 in FY 2017 appropriations outside the approved period and improperly reimbursed 19 recipients a total of about $247,000. These expenditures may have violated both the Purpose Statute and the Antideficiency Act.The OIG made seven recommendations to improve management of the adaptive sports grants program and to determine whether Purpose Statute or Antideficiency Act violations occurred.

This Office of Inspector General (OIG) Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection Program report provides a focused evaluation of the quality of care delivered in the inpatient and outpatient settings of the VA Portland Health Care System and multiple outpatient clinics in Oregon. The inspection covers key clinical and administrative processes that are associated with promoting quality care. This inspection focused on Leadership and Organizational Risks; COVID-19 Pandemic Readiness and Response; Quality, Safety, and Value; Medical Staff Privileging; Medication Management: Long-Term Opioid Therapy for Pain; Mental Health: Suicide Prevention Program; Care Coordination: Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisions; Women’s Health: Comprehensive Care; and High-Risk Processes: Reusable Medical Equipment.The healthcare system executive leadership team appeared stable, with all positions permanently assigned. Employee survey items revealed opportunities to improve satisfaction and staff feelings of moral distress at work. Patients appeared satisfied with their inpatient and specialty care experiences, but leaders have opportunities to improve the patient-centered medical home experience. The OIG’s review of the system’s accreditation findings, sentinel events, and disclosures did not identify substantial organizational risk factors. However, the OIG noted concerns with the healthcare system’s identification of sentinel events. Leaders were generally knowledgeable about selected data used in Strategic Analytics for Improvement and Learning models and should continue to take actions to sustain and improve performance.The OIG issued 17 recommendations for improvement in seven areas:(1) Quality, Safety, and Value• Improvement action implementation and monitoring• Root cause analyses(2) Medical Staff Privileging• Provider exit review forms(3) Medication Management• Aberrant behavior risk assessments• Urine drug testing• Informed consent• Patient follow-up(4) Mental Health• Patient follow-up• Suicide prevention training(5) Care Coordination• Life-sustaining treatment decision notes(6) Women’s Health• Women veterans health committee reporting and membership(7) High-Risk Processes• Standard operating procedures• Storage area humidity levels• Staff training