Federal Reports

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Inspector General identified vulnerabilities related to the EPA's network structure, specifically, the Microsoft Office 365, or O365, environment in which little or no network segmentation exists between the EPA proper and the OIG. The EPA's 0365 administrators can modify OIG account settings as well as access and view sensitive data within the O365 environment without the knowledge or input of the OIG, including email and other data of senior OIG employees and sensitive shared email inboxes. Additionally, poor user access controls and limited event logging degrade the OIG's ability to determine details about user activity within the O365 environment.

Under federal law, the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) cannot employ individuals if they have been formally excluded from having a paid position in a federal healthcare program. Exclusions can result from an individual committing healthcare fraud, patient abuse, controlled substance violations, acts resulting in license revocation, and other misconduct as specified by federal law. The List of Excluded Individuals and Entities (LEIE) is maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General. LEIE screening is meant to prevent individuals who have been found unsuited for working in a federally funded healthcare program from having access to medical facilities that need to protect their assets, patients, and information systems.The OIG matched VHA personnel pay against LEIE data for the first pay period of January 2022 and found VHA was employing four former nursing professionals excluded from having VHA positions. They had housekeeping, clerical, or support positions—not engaged in patients’ health care. Three of them were on the list because of nursing license revocation or suspension, while the fourth was convicted of healthcare fraud. When notified, VA took prompt action to terminate the employees and the OIG confirmed they are no longer with VHA. VHA leaders also outlined actions to address the process failures the OIG identified. In addition, leaders concurred with the report’s three recommendations for completing those policy and process improvements, taking additional actions to prevent violations from recurring, and conducting a one-time audit to confirm compliance with the federal law outside the review period. The OIG will continue to monitor VA’s progress until sufficient documentation has been received to close the recommendations as implemented.

We present the status of the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation’s tribal consultation process and activities.

What We Looked AtWe performed a quality control review (QCR) on the single audit that FORVIS, LLP performed for the Indianapolis Airport Authority’s (IAA) fiscal year that ended December 31, 2021. During this period, IAA expended approximately $48.5 million from a U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) grant program, the Federal Aviation Administration’s Airport Improvement Program, which FORVIS determined was a major program. Our QCR objectives were to determine (1) whether the audit work complied with the Single Audit Act of 1984, as amended, and the Office of Management and Budget’s Uniform Guidance, and the extent to which we could rely on the auditors’ work on DOT’s major program; and (2) whether IAA’s reporting package complied with the reporting requirements of the Uniform Guidance. What We FoundIn our QCR, we determined that FORVIS’ audit work complied with the requirements of the Single Audit Act, the Uniform Guidance, and DOT’s major program. We found nothing to indicate that FORVIS’s opinion on DOT’s major program was inappropriate or unreliable. In addition, we did not identify deficiencies in IAA’s reporting package that required correction and resubmission.

We found the DOI can improve its oversight of tasers to reduce the risk of injury to the public and law enforcement officers.

Our objective was to determine the adequacy of National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST’s) oversight of MEP to ensure requirements are met. We found that NIST’s inadequate oversight of Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership has led to inefficient use of financial resources and concerns that recipients did not comply with key award terms. Specifically, we found NIST did notrequire Centers to use unexpended program income (UPI) during the award period and allowed Centers to retain substantial amounts of UPI from federal financial assistance awards; review executive salaries for reasonableness, resulting in Center executives receiving considerable salaries in excess of limits used by other federal agencies; andaddress potential conflicts of interest amongst recipients.

Our audit objective was to identify SWFO program challenges that may affect cost, schedule, or overall mission performance and assess the extent to which NOAA is addressing them. To satisfy our objective, we reviewed the SWFO program acquisition strategy, identified challenges in key program milestone activities, assessed program control activities, and analyzed selected issues and risks. We found that NOAA needs to ensure that SWFO-L1 has launch contingency options commensurate with its role as a critical, high-profile mission and that the SWFO program should improve its lessons learned processes and contract surveillance oversight. We also found that NOAA should update its space weather observation requirements in accordance with its validation criteria.

This audit report found that the FCC security programs were ineffective in seven of the nine metric domains. The contractor’s assessment of the overall maturity of each metric domain remained relatively consistent with the prior year. The Supply Chain Risk Management domain is the one metric domain that improved from the prior year. The FISMA evaluation report included eight findings with 21 recommendations intended to 2 improve the effectiveness of the FCC’s information security program controls. FCC management concurred with the findings.

The Office of Community Planning and Development (CPD) traditionally uses onsite monitoring to monitor its grantees. However, in response to the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, CPD shifted to 100 percent remote monitoring. Monitoring was momentarily paused in fiscal year (FY) 2020 and was reinstituted remotely in FY 2021.To support its remote monitoring approach, CPD launched the Grantee Document Exchange (GDX), an externally accessible portal application that allows grantees and CPD to securely share documents during monitoring sessions. CPD trained its employees on the remote monitoring process, including on GDX. In a survey that we conducted on CPD employees’ experiences using remote monitoring, most CPD employees reported that the guidance, mentoring, or technical support prepared them well to monitor remotely. CPD’s Office of Field Management (OFM) delegated the responsibility of training grantees on remote monitoring to their respective field offices. Additionally, OFM issued materials with instructions to grantees on how to use GDX. Overall, most CPD employees found remote monitoring to be somewhat or very effective in achieving CPD’s monitoring objective. However, CPD employees faced challenges and limitations with remote monitoring related to safeguarding personally identifiable information, the duration of remote monitoring sessions, and the ability to verify physical assets effectively.Going forward, CPD has opportunities to use remote monitoring judiciously and provide its employees with additional guidance on how to use remote monitoring to further its monitoring objectives. In CPD’s formal comments, CPD indicated that it had begun taking action in this direction.

EAC OIG audited EAC’s testing and certification program. The Help America Vote Act established requirements for EAC to provide for the “testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software by accredited laboratories.”

The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) OIG conducted the review in accordance with Government Auditing Standards and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Guide for Conducting Peer Reviews of Audit Organizations of Federal Offices of Inspector General. The purpose of the modified peer review is to ensure that a system of quality controls relating to the performance of audits is in place and operating effectively. The USITC OIG concluded that the FEC OIG audit policies and procedures are current and consistent with applicable professional auditing standards.

While direct weapon products at Purchased Product Value Stream had the validity of their certificates of conformance (CoCs) verified through independent testing, indirect weapon products at Purchased Product Value Stream used in the production of nuclear weapons, such as commercial off-the-shelf products, did not always have their suppliers’ CoCs independently verified. The suppliers’ CoCs were not always independently verified because Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) used a graded approach, which is allowed in National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Policy (NAP) 401.1.§ 2.1, and the unverified products were deemed low risk. Per NNSA, subject matter experts from the Weapons Quality Division reviewed the rationale for the products not tested and found no issues with SNL’s approach. However, due to ambiguous language in NAP 401.1, we could not independently verify that NAP was followed. NNSA acknowledged that these sections of NAP 401.1 are an area of ambiguity across the complex.In addition, we also found that while SNL’s Microsystems Engineering, Science, & Applications (MESA) facility could demonstrate that the procured weapon products tested had their CoCs independently verified, our assurance was limited only to the suppliers tested because of the lack of a complete and accurate population. Specifically, SNL’s MESA facility did not require procured weapon products to be tracked as Mark Quality, nor formally identify the material as direct or indirect. As a result, we were unable to obtain reasonable assurance that the population of procured weapon products provided by MESA was complete and accurate for testing.

The objective of the review is to determine the effectiveness of the Commission’s informationsecurity program and practices.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) assessed allegations and reviewed processes at the Eastern Oklahoma VA Health Care System in Muskogee (facility) related to the provision of ketamine for patients with treatment-resistant depression.The OIG did not substantiate an anesthesiologist self-referred facility patients to a private practice. The anesthesiologist provided intravenous ketamine to one patient at the private practice but did not self-refer the patient.The OIG substantiated that the anesthesiologist prescribed sublingual ketamine to treat a patient with depression and found the anesthesiologist prescribed sublingual ketamine for two patients for pain; however, VHA does not prohibit prescribing sublingual ketamine. The OIG determined there were inconsistencies with pharmacy staff’s approval of non-formulary requests for sublingual ketamine.The OIG substantiated that behavior medicine and psychiatry leaders did little to respond to a concern regarding the anesthesiologist’s prescribing practices and facility leaders did not resolve the disagreement between prescribers and pharmacists concerning ketamine prescribing.The OIG determined that the ketamine team’s informal process to review and approve patients for intravenous ketamine was not maintained after members changed and the team did not discuss or decide on approval for ketamine for four patients. Not formalizing a review process may have contributed to a nurse approving a community care consult for ketamine without the team’s approval.The OIG found that scientific opinions on the selection of patients for ketamine treatment differ from VA’s national ketamine guidance regarding the acceptable number of prior treatment failures in a current episode of depression.The OIG made one recommendation to the VHA Under Secretary for Health regarding determining whether the national protocol guidance should be modified, and four to the Facility Director related to non-formulary medication processes; informed consents; the ketamine standard operating procedure; and development of positive working relations among Anesthesiology, Pharmacy, and Psychiatry Services.

Veterans can appeal a VBA compensation benefits decision. Decision review operations centers (DROCs) are responsible for appeals processing. DROC staff must be designated and trained to decide complex appeals.This review assessed a March 2022 hotline allegation that a DROC was not designating or training the appropriate staff to decide complex appeals. After reviewing three samples of complex appeals, the OIG substantiated that some staff from each of the three DROCs did not meet all requirements and estimated that 1,200 complex appeals were decided by undesignated staff.The OIG found that VBA’s Office of Administrative Review did not monitor completed appeals to ensure they were decided by designated staff and further estimated that 400 complex appeals were assigned by the work routing system to undesignated staff because the system required manual updates for staff designations.The OIG made four recommendations to the acting under secretary for benefits.

Following the SolarWinds breach discovery in 2020, CISA improved its ability to detect and mitigate risks from major cyberattacks, but work remains to safeguard Federal networks. CISA coordinates Federal agencies’ defense against cyberattacks, but the SolarWinds response revealed that CISA did not have adequate resources — backup communication systems, staff, or secure space — to effectively respond to threats.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed the Opioid Safety Initiative (OSI) oversight processes at the VA Northern California Health Care System (facility).In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of OSI oversight processes at the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the OIG reviewed data of numerous providers across VHA. Several providers assigned to the facility’s Sacramento VA Medical Center were identified as prescribing “high dose” opioids. The OIG conducted a review of opioid therapy management practices by patient aligned care team providers (providers) and supervisors (supervisors) at the facility, in addition to facility and Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) oversight processes for opioid therapy.The OIG determined that supervisors ensured that providers received training on OSI. Facility providers and supervisors implemented safe opioid therapy prescribing practices, including completing informed consents. Facility providers and supervisors completed risk mitigations for patients receiving opioid therapy, including state prescription drug monitoring and urine drug screens. For calendar year 2021, facility completion rates for patients prescribed opioid therapy met or exceeded the VISN performance goal for informed consents (97 percent), state prescription drug monitoring (99 percent), and urine drug screens (89.8–93.9 percent).Facility providers had knowledge of VHA recommendations for a pain assessment to be completed every three months, with a completion rate of 73.6 percent over the last 100 days during the inspection.Facility and the VISN had staff, committees, and teams as required to provide oversight and support integration of the OSI into primary care.The facility did not have a required policy providing local guidance on state prescription drug monitoring and the facility pain management policy provided outdated guidance. The Facility Director concurred with the OIG’s two recommendations related to creating and updating the policies.

Deputy Inspector General for Audits, Evaluations, and Special Projects’ Testimony before the Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives, March 8, 2023

Roll-up of the Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan Recipients’ Validation Memos Audit Memorandum Number SIGPR-A-22-003-17

Our objective was to identify the remaining Department Active Directories, which have not been reviewed by the Office of Inspector General (OIG), and summarize past OIG work related to the management of Active Directories. We found that a lack of adequate Active Directory security reviews caused similar issues across multiple Department bureaus and that the Department does not have a policy for regular Active Directory security reviews. Without effective security reviews, deficiencies will likely continue to exist within the Department, providing threat actors with additional potential attack paths to undermine the sensitive data and applications that are supported by Active Directories.

VA must submit an annual report to Congress documenting its capacity to provide specialized treatment comparable to that available as of October 9, 1996, for veterans with spinal cord injuries and disorders, traumatic brain injury, blindness, prosthetics and sensory aids, or mental health issues. Congress legislated this requirement to ensure that the decentralization of the Veterans Health Administration’s field management structure in the late 1990s did not adversely affect VA’s ability to care for veterans with disabilities. Each year, the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) is required to report to Congress on the accuracy of VA’s special disabilities capacity report. While the review found nothing that would lead the OIG to believe the information in the fiscal year (FY) 2021 capacity report was not fairly stated and accurate, it did identify some minor errors and data omissions that have persisted from the OIG’s FY 2020 review. For example, VA is unable to report mental health capacity data comparable to that from 1996 as required by law because of changes in how treatment outcomes of veterans with mental illness are defined and tracked. The capacity report also does not capture data on the services veterans receive through community care or changes in bed capacity at VA’s centers for spinal cord injuries and disorders. Congress would be better served by modernizing the reporting metrics to assess VA’s capacity to provide care for these veterans. The under secretary for health concurred with the OIG’s report.

The EPA did not follow the typical intra-agency review and clearance process during the development and publication of the January 2021 perfluorobutane sulfonic acid, or PFBS, toxicity assessment.

The previously-issued audit report containing the Annual Financial Statements of the Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (FPI) for fiscal year (FY) 2022, dated March 2023, was withdrawn and removed from the OIG’s website and Oversight.gov as a result of material misstatements in FPI’s financial statements that were discovered in FY 2023. The report now linked to this page contains the auditor’s report on the FPI’s restated FY 2022 financial statements and completed FY 2023 financial statements.

Prior Office of Inspector General reports identified inadequate controls related to the Department of Energy’s administration and oversight of financial assistance awards, and the Department had not ensured that annual independent audits were performed, as required. Financial assistance audits are intended to determine whether the grantee has an internal control structure that provides reasonable assurance that grants are managed in compliance with Federal laws and regulations and award terms and conditions.We conducted this audit to determine whether the Office of Science (Science) ensured that for-profit grantees were compliant with the audit requirements for Federal awards.We found that Science did not always ensure that for-profit grantees were compliant with audit regulations, including unaudited award expenditures, late audit report submissions, use of incorrect regulations or audit type, and incomplete reporting packages. These issues were due to Science lacking a system or tracking mechanism for monitoring grantees’ expenditures that may require an audit. Further, Science did not adequately review reporting packages or follow its reporting package review process. Finally, reduced staffing contributed to inadequate grant oversight.Award expenditures totaling $56,835,650 that were not audited, as required per 2 Code of Federal Regulations § 910, exposes the Department to an increased risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. Therefore, we are questioning $56,835,650 in award expenditures as unresolved costs pending audit. Not adequately reviewing the reporting package and not following the review processes increases the risk of undetected noncompliance with Federal program requirements and grant award terms and conditions. Grantees who did not have the required audits performed have a higher risk of charging unallowable costs to the Department. Although the scope of this audit was grants to for-profit grantees within Science, it is important that the Department consider the report findings across the complex because the Department received significant funding under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, and some of this funding will be awarded through financial assistance instruments, including grants.To address the issues identified in this report, we have made five recommendations that, if fully implemented, should help ensure that grantees are compliant with Federal grant audit regulations.In response to our Final Report on Audit Coverage in Office of Science Grants, four grantees provided written responses for the purpose of clarifying or providing additional context to specific references in the report. Three grantees did not agree with the dates of independent audit reports submitted to the Office of Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). One grantee submission date was prior to the date Science had previously provided to the Office of Inspector General and one grantee concurred with the date reported. The OCFO concurred with the original submission dates provided by two grantees. However, the OCFO disagreed with the submission dates provided by the other two grantees, asserting the submission dates were later than stated by the grantees. The dates provided by the grantees differed from Science and the OCFO because the Department’s visibility into its data is lacking; however, establishing a new tracking system as recommended in our report, should reduce future discrepancies.

We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Section Eight Management Assessment Program (SEMAP) based on our report on HUD’s top management challenges for fiscal years 2020 through 2022 and HUD’s strategic goals and objectives reported in its strategic plan for 2018 through 2022. Our audit objective was to assess the effectiveness of HUD’s SEMAP as a performance measure for the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) Program.HUD has an opportunity to improve its process for evaluating the performance of public housing agencies’ (PHA) HCV Programs. HUD uses SEMAP to evaluate the performance of PHAs’ HCV Programs remotely. However, (1) the information reported by PHAs in SEMAP may not have accurately represented the performance of their HCV Programs and (2) HUD’s process for verifying the information PHAs use for SEMAP reporting did not effectively assist HUD in evaluating and identifying PHAs’ HCV Programs that may have needed improvement. These conditions occurred because (1) SEMAP uses performance indicators that are based on PHAs’ self-certifications and self-reported data and (2) HUD’s verification process did not capture the performance of all PHAs’ HCV Programs. Without an effective performance measurement process, HUD lacked assurance that PHAs’ HCV Programs met their intended objectives, which include assisting the maximum number of eligible families with obtaining affordable and decent rental units at the correct subsidy cost. In addition, HUD may have missed opportunities to identify PHAs experiencing difficulties in managing their HCV Programs.We recommend that HUD’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Housing and Voucher Programs enhance SEMAP or develop a new performance measurement process that would identify PHAs with underperforming HCV Programs. We also recommend that HUD’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Field Operations provide training and guidance to its program staff on SEMAP scoring, rating, and verification procedures, including confirmatory reviews, quality control reviews, and adjustments for the current and revised SEMAP processes.

A Labor Relations Specialist, based in Washington, D.C., violated policies when she shared access to folders and files on her company OneDrive account with her personal Gmail account. Many of the folders and files contained information of a sensitive nature. While our investigation found that the employee did not distribute these files beyond her Gmail account and she was taking these actions for a legitimate business purpose, she also did not obtain prior approval nor an exception from company policy, as is required. As a result of this investigation, we provided observations that may help the company better protect its data as it relates to the use of third-party accounts.Amtrak Management provided a response on March 3, 2023, stating that the employee had been counseled. In addition, the company implemented corrective action plans in response to our observations.

We audited the Office of Community Planning and Development’s (CPD) monitoring and oversight of the Community Development Block Grant - Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) program. The objective of the audit was to determine whether CPD had effectively and efficiently designed its CDBG-DR program requirements and monitoring to ensure that the grantees meet statutory and other Federal low- and moderate-income (LMI) requirements. Generally, CPD had effectively and efficiently designed its CDBG-DR program requirements and monitoring to ensure that the grantees met the various LMI requirements. Almost all (98 percent) of the closed grants met the requirements, and a majority (80 percent) of the active grants were meeting the requirements. Of the 193 grants reviewed, 1 closed grant did not meet the requirements, and 28 active grants needed to budget funds to meet the requirements. We identified opportunities for CPD to improve its monitoring and oversight of its grantees’ compliance with the requirements, such as (1) including an additional overall LMI benefit calculation in quarterly performance reports (QPRs) and (2) establishing budgeting benchmarks. If CPD implements the recommended improvements, it could potentially prevent other grants from becoming noncompliant and reduce the number of grantees that need to budget sufficient funds to LMI activities. The changes could also improve the accuracy of reporting.

Attached for your action is our final report, Secret Service and ICE Did Not Always Adhere to Statute and Policies Governing Use of Cell-Site Simulators – Law Enforcement Sensitive. We incorporated the formal comments provided by your office.

This report contains information about recommendations from the OIG's audits, evaluations, reviews, and other reports that the OIG had not closed as of the specified date because it had not determined that the Department of Justice (DOJ) or a non-DOJ federal agency had fully implemented them. The list omits information that DOJ determined to be limited official use or classified, and therefore unsuitable for public release.The status of each recommendation was accurate as of the specified date and is subject to change. Specifically, a recommendation identified as not closed as of the specified date may subsequently have been closed.

We present the status of the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation’s properties and land use agreements.

An Amtrak Maintenance of Way Equipment Repairman, based in Rensselaer, New York, violated company policy by regularly disabling the Lytx camera in his company-owned vehicle by replacing a functioning fuse in the camera with a blown one.The repairman admitted to disabling the camera, as well as covering the camera with a towel on a regular basis during the entire duration of his overnight shifts. During our interview with the employee, we also found inappropriate photographs on his company-owned mobile device. The employee resigned in lieu of his disciplinary hearing on March 1, 2023.

For our final report on our audit of the First Responder Network Authority’s (FirstNet Authority’s) oversight of its first two reinvestment task orders (TOs), our objective was to determine whether FirstNet Authority’s process for reinvesting fee payments is effective and consistent with established practices, procedures, and regulations. We found that I. FirstNet Authority did not have sufficient performance measurements in the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan to adequately assess contractor performance for its first two reinvestment TOs; II. FirstNet Authority did not perform independent verification of contractor performance regarding deployables; III. FirstNet Authority contracting officer’s representatives relied on Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN) Program Management Office personnel that are not certified or formally appointed to conduct contract monitoring; and IV. FirstNet Authority’s Senior Management Council reviews were not conducted in a transparent manner for the NPSBN reinvestment TOs.

This report transmits the results of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Special Review of standard operating procedures related to coordination with non-FECA law enforcement inquiries. This special review was selected based on coordination challenges identified by external agency law enforcement personnel and in accordance with Section ( 4) of the Inspector General Act of 197 8, as amended.

The SEC Supported Federal Small Business Contracting Objectives, Yet Could Make Better Use of Data and Take Other Actions To Further Promote Small Business Contracting, Report No. 577

The SEC Supported Federal Small Business Contracting Objectives, Yet Could Make Better Use of Data and Take Other Actions To Further Promote Small Business Contracting, Report No. 577

DOI systems were operating without authorization, and the DOI did not consistently analyze and monitor security weaknesses.

We audited costs claimed by the State of Michigan, Department of Natural Resources, under grants awarded by the FWS through WSFR.

The audit objectives were to determine whether program funds were managed in accordance with the ARC and Federal grant requirements

What We Looked AtThe Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Airport Improvement Program (AIP) provides grants to airport sponsors for land acquisition. Airport sponsors that choose to reduce the impact of airport noise on nearby communities may acquire land, known as noise land, with these grants. Given FAA's large investment in these acquisitions and ongoing concerns over aviation noise, we initiated this audit. Our audit objectives were to assess FAA's (1) oversight of land that airport sponsors acquire with AIP grants for noise compatibility, (2) processes for determining whether airport sponsors identify land they no longer need for noise compatibility, and (3) oversight of airport sponsors' disposal of noise land.What We FoundFAA did not always comply with Federal standards for internal control which direct agencies to design measures to support accurate and timely recording of transactions. FAA's record on grants awarded for noise compatibility between 2005 and 2020 was incomplete and grants for noise land valued at approximately $32 million were erroneously omitted. FAA also did not follow policy when it reimbursed two of five sample airports' noise land purchases, totaling approximately $2.1 million, prior to receipt of evidence of the sponsors' good land title. Furthermore, FAA's processes for monitoring noise land status are insufficient and processes for overseeing sponsors' disposal of noise land are inadequate. FAA policy requires sponsors to promptly dispose of noise land they no longer need but does not establish a time standard for FAA follow-up on disposal status. Two sample airports retained noise land parcels for over 10 years and 15 years, without FAA-approved plans for final disposition.RecommendationsWe are making nine recommendations to help FAA strengthen its oversight of AIP grants for noise compatibility and sponsors' disposal of noise land. FAA concurred with recommendations 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. FAA partially concurred with recommendations 2 and 4. We consider recommendations 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 resolved but open pending completion of planned actions. We consider recommendation 4 open and unresolved and request that FAA reconsider its position.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), lead-based paint and lead-contaminated dust are some of the most widespread and hazardous sources of lead exposure for young children in the United States. There is no safe blood lead level in children, and there is no cure for lead poisoning. Therefore, it is important to prevent exposure to lead, especially among children.U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) officials reported that policies and guidance related to lead-based paint hazards and elevated blood lead levels (EBLL) were clear and well written. However, HUD did not align its EBLL value to CDC’s blood lead reference value (BLRV) for children under the age of 6. As of August 2022, HUD was using the EBLL value of 5 micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood (µg/dL), despite CDC lowering the BLRV to 3.5 µg/dL in October 2021. By aligning EBLL processes with CDC’s BLRV, HUD can help to ensure that cases of children with EBLLs between 3.5 µg/dL and 4.9 µg/dL are reported and monitored.HUD uses its EBLL tracker to monitor cases of children with identified EBLLs residing in public housing. However, the EBLL tracker’s data fields needed improvement. For example, the EBLL tracker did not enable field staff to reference historical EBLL cases; indicate how many children living in a housing unit had an EBLL; or specify whether the unit, building, or development previously had an EBLL case. Additionally, the EBLL tracker contained instances of unreliable data, which reduced its usefulness to HUD officials and hindered HUD’s ability to monitor EBLL cases and ensure that children residing in public housing with confirmed EBLLs were living in lead-safe units. Lastly, we compared the percentage of public housing development buildings constructed before 1978 to a snapshot of the EBLL tracker. We found it notable that New York and Pennsylvania together accounted for virtually all (94.1 percent) of EBLL tracker cases of children living in public housing with an EBLL resulting from a confirmed lead-based paint hazard. This result was despite other States’ having the same amount or more public housing development buildings built before 1978, when lead-based paint was banned.HUD uses its lead-based paint response (LBPR) tracker to monitor and resolve cases in which public housing agencies had missing or incomplete lead-related documentation. However, the COVID-19 pandemic halted HUD’s Real Estate Assessment Center inspection process, which determines whether HUD needs to create an LBPR tracker case for the inspected property. Additionally, there are no timeliness standards for the LBPR tracker, and we identified several cases in which there was no evidence of HUD action for long periods. Developing timeliness standards for the LBPR tracker would help HUD avoid delays in closing LBPR tracker cases.By improving its EBLL tracker and LBPR tracker, HUD could better ensure that it has accurate, complete, and useful data regarding where EBLLs and lead-based paint hazards are prevalent.

The EPA’s ineffective residential wood heater program puts human health and the environment at risk for exposure to dangerous fine-particulate-matter pollution by allowing sales of wood heaters that may not meet emission standards.