Federal Reports

DHS’ capability to counter illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) activity remains limited. The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans did not execute a uniform department-wide approach, which prevented components authorized to conduct counter-UAS operations from expanding their capabilities. This occurred because the Office of Policy did not obtain funding as directed by the Secretary to expand DHS’ counter-UAS capability. We made four recommendations to improve the Department’s management and implementation of counter-UAS activities. The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans concurred with all four of our recommendations.

What We Looked AtThe Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for the safety and certification of all civilian aircraft manufactured and operated in the United States. However, two accidents in late 2018 and early 2019 involving Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft raised significant safety concerns about FAA's certification of this aircraft. On March 19, 2019, Secretary of Transportation Elaine L. Chao requested that we compile an objective and detailed factual history of the activities that resulted in the certification of the 737 MAX 8. We also received similar requests from the Chairmen of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and its Subcommittee on Aviation; the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies; and Senator Richard Blumenthal. They requested that we review aspects of FAA's approach to certifying the MAX series of aircraft, its reliance on the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program, and the Agency's actions following the two accidents. Our overall audit objective was to determine and evaluate FAA's process for certifying the Boeing 737 MAX series of aircraft.What We FoundIn this report, we provide a detailed timeline of the activities resulting in the certification of the 737 MAX 8, beginning in January 2012, when Boeing submitted its initial application for an Amended Type Certificate to FAA. This report also compiles a timeline of events following the October 29, 2018, crash of Lion Air Flight 610 up until the crash of Ethiopian Air Flight 302 on March 10, 2019. In addition, during the same time period as FAA's certification efforts, Boeing, FAA, and our office were identifying issues that--although not specific to the 737 MAX 8--may have impacted the original certification of the aircraft. As such, we also provided a timeline of concurrent related oversight actions and events related to FAA's ODA program.Our RecommendationsWe are not making recommendations in this report. The data gathered are informational and represent our observations in response to the Secretary's and other congressional requests. We will report further on FAA's oversight of the certification process and other related matters, as well as make recommendations as applicable, in future reports.

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On Friday, September 6, 2019—the day Hurricane Dorian made landfall in the United States as a Category 1 hurricane—the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) issued an unsigned statement (Statement) in response to a request by the White House then-acting Chief of Staff to the Office of the Secretary. The Statement rebuked the NOAA National Weather Service’s (NWS’s) Birmingham, Alabama, office (NWS Birmingham) for a September 1, 2019, tweet that advised that “Alabama will NOT see any impacts from #Dorian” after the White House then-acting Chief of Staff requested a “correction or an explanation or both” of this NWS Birmingham tweet. This raised the possibility of political interference in the Department’s and NOAA’s handling of events that began on September 1, 2019.<!--break-->There was significant internal and public backlash against the Statement, resulting in multiple complaints to OIG from the public as well as Congressional inquiries. Among the complaints was that the Statement violated NOAA’s Scientific Integrity Policy; NOAA has since conducted an inquiry to determine whether its Scientific Integrity Policy had been violated.<!--break-->This report presents our findings as a detailed chronology and analysis of (a) the events leading up to the Statement, (b) the issuance of the Statement, and (c) the aftermath of the Statement. Our objective was to examine the circumstances surrounding the Statement, providing an independent account of the events that transpired in the interest of transparency and good government. Our conclusions, in brief, are the following: (I) the Department led a flawed process that discounted NOAA participation; (II) the Department required NOAA to issue a Statement that did not further NOAA’s or NWS’s interests; (III) the Department failed to account for the public safety intent of the NWS Birmingham tweet and the distinction between physical science and social science messaging; and (IV) one NOAA employee deleted relevant text messages, and the Department’s federal records guidance is outdated.

This report fulfills for 2020 the annual reporting mandate from the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA requires OIG to conduct a study of the extent to which formularies used by Medicare Part D plans include drugs commonly used by full benefit dual eligible individuals (i.e., individuals who are eligible for both Medicare and full Medicaid benefits). These individuals generally get drug coverage through Medicare Part D. Pursuant to the ACA, OIG must annually issue a report with recommendations as appropriate. This is the tenth report that OIG has produced to meet this mandate.

VA spends millions of taxpayer dollars annually on healthcare resources procured without competition from affiliated institutions. This report is a summary of the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) 27 healthcare resource proposal reviews completed before VA awarded the contracts (preaward reviews) during fiscal year 2019 in order to help VA obtain the best pricing. OIG preaward reviews of healthcare resource proposals are internal reports for VA contracting officers. These reports are unpublished due to protected sensitive commercial pricing information. The OIG is publishing this summary to provide more information on the impact of these reviews. Preaward reviews provide VA with pricing recommendations based on the offeror’s actual expenses of providing the services. Preaward reports are used by contracting officers to negotiate fair and reasonable prices for the government and taxpayers. The OIG’s healthcare resources lower pricing recommendations collectively reflected approximately $198 million in estimated cost savings to VA. More than $26 million has been sustained by VA. The 27 proposals included 77,701 annual hours of physician services and services priced per procedure and ordered as needed.

The DOI will award most of its CARES Act funding to Indian Country through grants to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE). Of the $756 million, $522 million (69.0 percent) will be funded to Indian Country. As of June 13, 2020, $419,462,721, or 80.4 percent, had been obligated.These emergency response awards from the DOI–together with more than $8.7 billion in awards to Indian Country from other Federal departments—present a higher risk because they must be spent in a short period of time. In addition, we have identified Indian Country as a high-risk area in our recent Top Management Challenges reports because in the past, the BIA, the BIE, and tribes have faced many challenges with handling grant funds. This further increases the risk that Federal tax dollars will be misused, abused, and vulnerable to fraud. In addition, emergency situations could grow rapidly in size, scope, or complexity, thereby elevating the risk even higher.In this report we present lessons learned in our prior work that the DOI, the BIA, and the BIE should consider as they make awards, promote safety, and provide oversight under the CARES Act. In our previous reports, we found that the following areas are important for improved safety and successful oversight:• Ensuring Indian school safety and health while providing educational services• Providing oversight to help prevent mismanagement of financial awards• Minimizing the spread of the virus while maintaining safety within tribal detention centersThe BIA, the BIE, tribes, and tribal organizations will have specific challenges in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. We know there are risks and complexities surrounding emergency funds that can be difficult to manage. As such, we plan to help provide oversight and ensure the CARES Act moneys are spent appropriately.

In response to the outbreak of the Coronavirus (COVID-19), the National Park Service (NPS) closed most park buildings, facilities, and restrooms, and in some cases, entire parks. With States now easing stay-at-home restrictions, and in response to the White House’s emphasis to open the national parks, some parks have already increased access by implementing a phased reopening. To facilitate a safe reopening, the NPS issued the National Park Service COVID-19 Adaptive Operations Recovery Plan to the parks on May 28, 2020. We contacted each of the 62 national park superintendents to report on each national park’s current operating status, anticipated reopening date, and whether the park had begun developing a COVID-19 response operating plan.During our review, we learned that as of May 12, 2020, most of the national parks were entirely closed or still partially closed. Of the 62 national parks, we noted that 32 did not yet have an anticipated date to increase recreational access, visitor services, or use of some facilities, while 30 parks, including Everglades National Park, Yellowstone National Park, and Bryce Canyon National Park, had either already began a phased reopening or anticipated an opening date between May 2020 and July 2020. Twenty of those 30 parks had developed or had begun developing a phased reopening plan with COVID-19 considerations, while 10 parks had not started developing such a plan.We acknowledge the challenge the NPS has had in this ever-changing and unprecedented situation. We also recognize that the NPS cannot take a one-size-fits all approach to reopening its locations, as each national park must consider guidance from Federal, State, and local officials. Considering the risks associated with COVID-19 and the phased reopening of the national parks, it is imperative that all NPS locations have a park-specific plan to operate in a way that provides public access while protecting visitors and staff from further transmission of the virus.

Our objective was to gather information on the Social Security Administration's (SSA) reconsideration level of appeal.

OIG reviewed the proposed Modernization of Swine Slaughter Inspection rule to determine whether FSIS’ worker safety analysis complied with applicable rulemaking requirements.

Five individuals who worked for Empire Care Dental at various California locations, including one dentist, one dental hygienist, and three office managers pleaded guilty to Health Insurance Fraud and to Practicing Dentistry Without a License. Our investigation disclosed that representatives of Empire Care Dental offered $50 - $100 payments to Amtrak employees if they used their services. In addition, our investigation found that Empire Care Dental submitted false claims for procedures more expensive than the ones performed and that the dentist practiced dentistry without a license. The five individuals were sentenced to 2-3 months in prison and ordered to pay joint restitution in the amount of $62,836.

We evaluated the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) practices for identifying and protecting personally identifiable information (PII). The evaluation assessed HUD’s current capabilities to properly manage and protect PII and to properly maintain paper and electronic PII records. This evaluation was conducted in conjunction with the fiscal year (FY) 2019 Federal Information Security Act of 2014 (FISMA) evaluation 2019-OE-0002.We determined that HUD had taken positive steps to improve its records management practices. It had initiated modernization efforts to transition paper-based processes to electronic processes, begun addressing and closing OIG privacy-related recommendations that had been open for several years, and developed a formal communications plan to increase program awareness. The records officer had increased and improved training for records specialists in program offices and was directing an extensive records inventory project. However, HUD had not designated a Senior Agency Official for Records Management (SAORM) at the Assistant Secretary level as required by OMB, and was not meeting certain Federal requirements. HUD was not able to identify and inventory all PII, or search for or track PII. Recordkeeping practices and retention schedules were outdated, and HUD had not fully integrated the records program with risk management and information technology programs.We provide nine new recommendations designed to address HUD’s most significant legal and regulatory obligations, along with other critical challenges laid out in this report.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigated allegations that the VA San Diego Healthcare System staff manipulated the time cards for seven fee-basis medical providers in order to pay these individuals on a salary or wage basis rather than a per-procedure basis. In addition, the allegations contended that a fee-basis care provider was told he would be converted to a full-time employee after working full time as a fee-basis provider for one year. The OIG substantiated that certain fee-basis care providers at the VA San Diego Healthcare System were being paid for their time improperly, rather than on a per-procedure basis as required. The OIG did not substantiate that a fee-basis professional had been promised conversion to full-time status. The OIG did not make any recommendations because the medical center took corrective action, including disciplinary action with respect to the supervisor who was accountable for this conduct.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) Administrative Investigations Division investigated alleged misconduct by two employees of the VA Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System in California. A complainant alleged that a supervisory health system specialist misused his/her public office for private gain when, as a part of the supervisor’s VA job responsibilities, he/she improperly participated in matters related to a contract maintained by the healthcare system with a vendor whose vice president was the supervisor’s significant other (non-spouse) and roommate. During the course of the investigation, the supervisor voluntarily resigned from VA, and as a result the OIG removed this allegation from the scope of the investigation. The complainant also alleged that a former medical center director failed to make proper rental payments while residing in the healthcare system’s quarters. Although the OIG determined the director underpaid VA a net amount of $158 for housing during the three years he resided on VA quarters, the OIG determined the cause was a coding error and identified no evidence that the error resulted from any misconduct on the part of the director. Because the error was unintended and corrective action has already been taken by the healthcare system, the OIG made no recommendations.

Following an investigation conducted in response to allegations made to the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) hotline, the Office of Special Reviews substantiated that an Office of General Counsel (OGC) attorney was using VA time and resources to work on matters related to his outside law practice. Moreover, the OIG determined that the attorney represented private clients in U.S. bankruptcy court in cases where the clients owed money to the federal government. This conduct implicated criminal conflict of interest laws, which prohibit federal government employees from representing third parties in cases where the United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest. The review team discovered that VA’s OGC received complaints about the attorney using VA time and resources to engage in his outside law practice as early as 2012. The OIG found that OGC's failure to appropriately supervise or meaningfully investigate the attorney's misconduct allowed it to continue. It was not until the OIG alerted OGC to this review’s preliminary findings that the OGC investigated the attorney, which ultimately led to his removal from federal employment in March 2020. The OIG's seven recommendations to the Acting VA General Counsel addressed actions to be considered in light of the attorney's misconduct and OGC officials' prior failures to take prompt appropriate action. These included revision to the OGC's relevant guidance and how OGC identifies and advises its employees who have outside employment. OGC was also asked to consider whether it should implement a supplemental regulation requiring some employees to disclose and obtain prior approval before engaging in outside employment. VA’s OGC concurred with all recommendations.

We investigated allegations that a senior U.S. Park Police (USPP) official asked the United States Attorney’s Office to dismiss criminal citations (tickets) issued to Presidio Trust employees and contractors at the request of Presidio Trust officials.We found that a Presidio Trust official asked a senior USPP official to request the dismissal of several tickets stemming from two separate incidents that occurred at the Presidio and that the senior USPP official’s decisions to request the dismissals were, in part, influenced by these requests. In addition, while we found that the senior USPP official had the discretion to request that the tickets be dismissed and that there was no USPP General Order or U.S. Department of the Interior policy about the process or authority for dismissing tickets, the senior USPP official appeared to deviate from past USPP practices at the Presidio when requesting the dismissals.We provided our report to the Deputy Director, Exercising the Authority of the Director of the National Park Service, for any action deemed appropriate.

FTC OIG Management Advisory 20-07 Travel and Purchase cards

OIG reviewed RHS’ SFHGLP controls to determine whether it adequately ensured lenders’ and appraisers’ compliance with agency and USPAP requirements.

The purpose of this review was to identify and address factors that contributed to the Hawaii Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's (MFCU's or Unit's) low case outcomes during federal fiscal years (FYs) 2016-18 and to assess Unit operations. In 2015, OIG issued a report from its 2014 onsite review of the MFCU that raised concerns about the Unit's ability to carry out its statutory functions and meet program requirements. To address the deficiencies identified during OIG's previous onsite review, the MFCU developed and implemented a corrective action plan. Despite this effort, we found that the Hawaii MFCU's case outcomes were low during FYs 2016-18, compared to other similarly sized MFCUs.

A Technician in Los Angeles was terminated from employment on May 20, 2020, and a Customer Service Supervisor and an Operations Supervisor from Los Angeles were terminated from employment on June 23, 2020, following their administrative hearings. Our investigation found that the employees violated company policy by allowing a doctor to fraudulently bill the company’s group health plan on their behalf. The employees accepted monetary gifts from the doctor, while allowing her to fraudulently bill the company’s group health plan.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) identified potential Post-9/11 GI Bill monthly student housing allowance overpayments by analyzing nearly 10 years of participant data. The review focused on students who continued to receive housing payments more than 18 months after their latest tuition payment; received more than 36 months of housing payments; and had fewer than 365 days between each housing payment—all indicators of potential errors. The OIG found the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) substantially overpaid monthly housing allowances to 16 students, totaling about $961,000. These overpayments were a result of control deficiencies that allowed some payments to continue beyond the allowable limits prior to VBA taking corrective action. The OIG considered the number of individual overpayments to be minimal, as more than two million students were enrolled in classes using Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits during the more than nine-year review period. VBA’s Education Service has added controls, such as a system update to prevent monthly housing allowance payments from continuing after the entitlement has ended. These controls have improved VBA processes and should reduce future risk of the substantial monthly housing allowance overpayments found in this review. They appear to have been effective, as there were no similar overpayments identified since the last control was implemented in June 2017, which was a non-college-degree job aid tool to help minimize payment calculation errors. The overall financial impact of the overpayments identified in this review was not significant to VA. However, the OIG encouraged VBA to implement measures to further reduce the risk of future long-term overpayments, such as monthly certifications by students. The OIG did not make any recommendations because VBA’s existing and planned controls appeared to address the errors found in this focused review. VBA concurred with the findings and agreed to consider additional measures.

VA’s Office of Community Care (OCC) intended to use overtime to reduce a backlog of non-VA care claims. This backlog had been increasing since at least October 2016. The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) examined how the overtime was used, the effect on claims backlog reduction, and whether claims processors and nurses abused overtime. The OIG found neither OCC nor its Payment Operations and Management (POM) directorate established a policy requiring employees to use overtime exclusively to process those claims or detailed appropriate uses for overtime. Officials did not implement controls to ensure employees used overtime primarily to reduce the claims backlog. A data review of a sample of 45 POM employees found the employees were paid an estimated $11.6 million for overtime hours for which there was no evidence of claims-related activity in the Fee Basis Claims System in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, representing almost half of the total overtime paid. Significantly, 16 of the 45 employees each received more than $10,000 in overtime for hours during which there was no claims-related activity. The audit team referred those cases to the OIG’s Office of Investigations. There must be effective controls in place to monitor use of overtime. The OIG found that during the scope of this audit, such controls did not exist or were ineffective. Supervisors also did not effectively manage productivity during overtime hours, creating a high risk for fraud and abuse. The OIG recommended the under secretary for health review overtime activities for certain POM employees to determine whether disciplinary or other corrective action is warranted, ensure supervisors have the tools to effectively monitor overtime productivity to reduce the risk of abuse, clarify nurse productivity standards and requirements, and implement controls on the appropriate use of overtime.

The Greensboro P&DC is in the Greensboro District within the Capital Metro Area. In fiscal year (FY) 2019, the Postal Service reported 2.1 million late trips nationwide due to contractor failure. From October 1, 2019, to March 31, 2020, the Greensboro P&DC had the third highest number (10,921) of originating late trips due to contractor failure for P&DCs. The average time a trip was late was 42 minutes. There were 34 contractors with originating late trips due to contractor failure at the Greensboro P&DC. Three contractors accounted for 70 percent of the failures. Our objective was to assess the management of HCR irregularities due to contractor failure at the Greensboro P&DC.

The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) Office of Inspector General conducted this self-initiated audit to assess the NCUA’s Asset Management and Assistance Center’s (AMAC) ability to protect personally identifiable information (PII) found within the records of liquidated unions. The objectives of our audit were to determine whether: 1) AMAC management’s control activities over the liquidation process adequately considers and safeguards PII from initial identification to destruction; and 2) AMAC’s liquidation activities comply with applicable policies, procedures, laws, and regulations relating to the protection of PII.

OIG evaluated RUS’ monitoring and oversight of the Section 313A Program.

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The Office of Inspector General conducted a program evaluation of Peace Corps/Eastern Caribbean from December 2 through December 20, 2019. Our report contains 14 recommendations, which, if implemented, should strengthen post operations and correct the deficiencies detailed in the accompanying report.

Our objective was to (1) determine whether the Social Security Administration (SSA) made payments to beneficiaries and/or representative payees who were deceased according to New Hampshire or Vermont records and (2) identify non-beneficiaries in the State files whose death information did not appear in Agency records.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Missouri, and Joplin Schools did not properly manage and oversee this disaster award. Specifically, FEMA and Missouri did not provide proper grant management and oversight of Joplin’s subgrant activities. Joplin Schools disregarded Missouri’s authority as the grantee and did not always comply with Federal requirements and FEMA policies as required. This occurred because Joplin Schools heavily relied on the advice of its grant management contractor. As a result of the grant management and oversight issues, Joplin Schools did not follow Federal procurement standards when it awarded $187.3 million in non-exigent disaster-related contracts, including $609,676 in ineligible contractor direct administrative costs. We provided five recommendations to help improve FEMA and Missouri’s grant oversight and management process. We also included four recommendations for FEMA to disallow or not fund $187.3 million in ineligible contract costs. FEMA determined approximately $56 million, the net obligated amount, was eligible for reimbursement. FEMA concurred with all nine recommendations and completed actions to close recommendations 1 to 4 and 8. Recommendations 5 to 7 are resolved and open with a target completion date of June 1, 2020. Recommendation 9 is considered unresolved and open.

We surveyed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention facilities from April 8-20, 2020 regarding their experiences and challenges managing COVID-19 among detainees in their custody and among their staff. The facilities that responded to our survey described various actions they have taken to prevent and mitigate the pandemic’s spread among detainees. These actions include increased cleaning and disinfecting of common areas, and isolating new detainees, when possible, as a precautionary measure. However, facilities reported concerns with their inability to practice social distancing among detainees, and to isolate or quarantine individuals who may be infected with COVID-19. Regarding staffing, facilities reported decreases in current staff availability due to COVID-19, but have contingency plans in place to ensure continued operations. The facilities also expressed concerns with the availability of staff, as well as protective equipment for staff, if there were an outbreak of COVID-19 in the facility. Overall, almost all facilities stated they were prepared to address COVID-19, but expressed concerns if the pandemic continued to spread. At the time of our survey, 23 facilities reported having detainees who had tested positive for COVID-19; this number had risen to 48 facilities as of May 11, 2020.

A former Machinist based in Albany-Rensselaer, New York, violated company policies by viewing pornographic videos during work hours on his company-owned computer. The videos were stored and accessed on a USB device. He admitted to viewing the videos and resigned on June 18, 2020, following his interview by Office of Inspector General special agents. The former employee is not eligible for rehire.

This Office of Inspector General (OIG) Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection Program report provides a focused evaluation of the quality of care delivered in the inpatient and outpatient settings of the VA Eastern Kansas Health Care System and multiple outpatient clinics in Kansas and Missouri. The inspection covers key clinical and administrative processes associated with promoting quality care. The inspection focused on Leadership and Organizational Risks; Quality, Safety, and Value; Medical Staff Privileging; Environment of Care; Medication Management: Long-Term Opioid Therapy for Pain; Mental Health: Suicide Prevention Program; Care Coordination: Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisions; Women’s Health: Comprehensive Care; and High-Risk Processes: Reusable Medical Equipment. The executive leadership team had been working together for two months, although the Director had served since 2012. Survey results revealed opportunities to improve employee satisfaction; however, patients appeared satisfied. Leaders were unable to speak knowledgeably about actions taken to maintain and improve performance and were minimally knowledgeable about Strategic Analytics for Improvement and Learning and community living center data. The OIG issued 39 recommendations for improvement in these seven areas: (1) Quality, Safety, and Value • Committee activities • Peer review processes • Utilization management processes • Root cause analysis processes (2) Medical Staff Privileging • Professional practice evaluations • Provider exit review processes (3) Environment of Care • General safety • Environmental safety and cleanliness • Medical supply storage and availability • Panic alarm testing • Privacy protection (4) Medication Management • Urine drug testing • Informed consent documentation • Follow-up after therapy initiation (5) Mental Health • Outreach activities • Suicide prevention care (6) Women’s Health • Community-based outpatient clinic-designated women’s health primary care providers • Women Veterans Health Committee processes (7) High-Risk Processes • Inventory file and standard operating procedures • Annual risk analysis • Airflow testing and equipment storage • Staff training

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this inspection to evaluate concerns related to a Virtual Pharmacy Services (VPS) pharmacist’s discontinuation of an antidepressant medication for a patient of the Minneapolis VA Health Care System, which resulted in the patient not having prescribed antidepressant medication for approximately six weeks before dying by suicide. The OIG found the VPS pharmacist did not access the patient’s electronic health record or notify the psychiatrist when discontinuing an antidepressant medication order. Although the facility granted the VPS pharmacist access to the patient’s electronic health record, the pharmacist reported not being aware of this capability. The discontinuation of the patient’s medication may have contributed to increased depressive symptoms, including suicidal ideation, in the six weeks following the patient’s scheduled completion of the medication. The OIG was unable to determine that the medication discontinuation contributed directly to the patient’s death; however, the possible worsening of the patient’s underlying depressive illness may have been a contributing factor. The OIG identified discrepancies between VPS pharmacists’ duties outlined in their functional statement and duties actually performed. VPS pharmacists’ inability to fully execute certain functions may contribute to decisions that are not fully informed and patients may not receive medications as prescribed. The VPS productivity measure of 95 prescriptions processed per hour might be an unreasonable target and may contribute to increased risk for pharmacist error. Further, Pharmacy Benefits Management leaders did not ensure VPS prescription processing was adequately monitored for accuracy. Pharmacy Benefits Management leaders failed to clearly outline program management and quality assurance monitoring objectives and processes leading to deficiencies that can contribute to adverse patient outcomes. The OIG made five recommendations to the Under Secretary for Health related to standardizing software menu options, revising functional statements and performance metrics, and establishing certain quality assurance objectives.

OIG evaluated FSIS’ controls over meat, poultry, and egg product labels to ensure FSIS’ approval of labels was accurate and supported.

We audited the Los Angeles County Development Authority’s Family Self-Sufficiency Program due to a hotline complaint (HC-2019-4215) alleging that the Authority did not use its program funds in compliance with U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) requirements. Our audit objectives were to determine whether the Authority met its program goals and objectives to assist eligible families in becoming self-sufficient and administered its program in compliance with HUD requirements. In addition, determine whether the hotline complaint allegations of Authority employees misappropriating program funds for personal benefit had merit.We determined that the hotline complaint had no merit. The Authority met its goals and objectives to assist its participants in becoming self-sufficient and ensured that program funds were used in compliance with HUD requirements. Specifically, the Authority ensured that it (1) maintained the minimum program size; (2) provided participants with individual training and services plans, which included specific interim and final goals; (3) monitored participants’ progress to ensure that they met their goals to become self-sufficient; (4) calculated participants’ escrow accounts accurately; and (5) used program funds for supported and eligible activities.There are no recommendations.

A Coach Cleaner in New Orleans, Louisiana, was terminated from employment on June 18, 2020, following an administrative hearing for violating company policy. Our investigation found that the employee failed to report multiple arrests and criminal convictions for drug and weapons related charges during his tenure with the company. Specifically, we found that he failed to disclose his 2017 and 2019 arrests and their subsequent convictions to the company.

A supervisor and foreman in Chicago, Illinois, were terminated from employment on June 11, 2020 and issued a written reprimand on June 18, 2020, respectively, for violating company policies. Specifically, our investigation found that the supervisor violated company policies by driving a company-owned vehicle for personal use and operated the vehicle in excess of 90 mph while using a cellular telephone without a hands-free device. In addition, the supervisor directed the foreman to use another company-owned vehicle to tow the supervisor’s personally owned vehicle.

We found, based on our review of samples of approved and rejected TPD discharge applications, that FSA appropriately approved and rejected the applications. We determined that FSA applied appropriate criteria to approve and reject individual TPD discharge applications in accordance with Federal program requirements. We also found that Nelnet generally serviced those TPD accounts throughout the TPD discharge process in accordance with Federal program requirements.2 In addition, based on our review of FSA’s processes and samples of TPD discharge applications, we determined that FSA ensured that accurate information on student loan discharges was entered into the TPD databases.Although we found that FSA appropriately approved or rejected applications, we identified design weaknesses in FSA’s control activities for the TPD discharge application review process that may negatively affect the operating efficiency and effectiveness of the process and increase the risk that FSA approves applications that are inaccurate or incomplete. In addition, we found weaknesses in FSA’s documented procedures and its quality control review for its TPD discharge application review process. We also found weaknesses in FSA’s monitoring of the TPD discharge process.