Federal Reports

For our final report on our audit of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES)–R series program (the Program), our objective was to assess the Program’s progress in achieving launch readiness for the GOES-T mission. To satisfy our objective, we examined technical performance challenges and changes to technical, schedule, and cost baselines since GOES-S launched in March 2018. We found the following: I. The Program works toward the earliest achievable launch dates at potentially increased development risk; II. the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS) is planning GOES launches sooner than its policy requires without analyzing the costs; and III. NESDIS assumes ground storage of satellites is not viable, but has not formally studied tradeoffs.

The objective of our review was to evaluate the Department of Education’s plans and processes to ensure Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher Education (TEACH) grantees receive full-time credit toward their service obligations for part-time and temporarily interrupted service due to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). We found weaknesses in FSA’s development and implementation of plans and processes to ensure TEACH grantees receive full-time credit towards their service obligations for part-time or temporarily interrupted service due to COVID-19. Additionally, we found that FSA did not effectively develop or oversee the implementation of the TEACH Grant servicer contract modification.

We found that the BLM did not review the Federal exclusions to determine if mineral lease recipients were suspended or debarred before issuing leases.

We found that ONRR needs to strengthen its internal controls and processes to ensure accurate royalty reporting for adjustments.

We substantiated that an unknown individual fraudulently represented themselves as a DOI official and misdirected $64,097 of the official’s pay.

We audited the Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority’s Continuum of Care (CoC) program. The audit was initiated because of the homelessness crisis in the City of Los Angeles, which has the highest number of unsheltered people in the United States. In addition, the Los Angeles city controller issued a report in 2019, criticizing the Authority for falling short of City of Los Angeles homeless outreach goals. (See Background and Objectives.) Our audit objectives were to determine whether the Authority met the goals and objectives of housing and helping the homeless become self-sufficient through its CoC program and administered the program in accordance with HUD requirements.The Authority did not fully meet the goals and objectives of the program and did not always follow program requirements. Specifically, it (1) did not use $3.5 million in CoC grant awards and left the funds to expire, (2) did not support Homeless Management Information System and planning grant costs, and (3) did not submit timely annual performance reports (APR). As a result, the unused CoC funds represent a missed opportunity to meet the program’s goals of assisting the homeless, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) does not have assurance $879,847 in salary and rent costs were for the CoC grants, and CoC funds may have unnecessarily sat idle and unavailable for future awards.We recommend that the Director of HUD’s Los Angeles Office of Community Planning and Development require the Authority to (1) develop and implement policies and procedures to ensure that grant agreements are executed in a timely manner and effective monitoring is performed to prevent similar occurrences of grant funds going unused, (2) support payroll and rent costs or repay its CoC grants $879,847 from non-Federal funds, and (3) develop policies and procedures to ensure APRs are submitted in a timely manner and personnel are routinely trained on the grant closeout process.

Our inspection identified $155,575 in CARES Act and pandemic-related purchase card transactions with insufficient documentation.

During COVID-19, VHA’s Office of Community Care (OCC) took steps to ensure veterans continued to have expanded access to health care in the community, as required by the VA MISSION Act of 2018. OCC issued policies to VA facilities to postpone nonurgent appointments and offer alternatives to in-person care, such as telehealth. The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether VHA effectively managed community care consults for routine appointments during the pandemic.The OIG found that routine community care consults were unscheduled for an average of 42 days, not meeting VHA’s timeliness goal of 30 days. Community care staff faced significant challenges beyond their control that contributed to the scheduling delays, such as the lack of availability of appointments in the community. The OIG also found some patients were hesitant to schedule appointments during the pandemic, failed to return phone calls, or declined care once it was offered.While these challenges prevented the OIG from evaluating whether timeliness could be improved, they underscore the need to strengthen VHA’s governance over community care. The OIG found community care providers and staff did not consistently comply with requirements to manage routine consults, and leaders lacked tools to sufficiently monitor program operations that could have identified the problems. Deficiencies emerged in documenting when patients were contacted about scheduling appointments, designating patients eligible for alternative care, and ensuring staff were trained in ways that would address those weaknesses.The OIG recommended that the under secretary for health develop guidelines requiring supervisors to monitor documentation of communication between staff and patients, establish a tool to monitor whether community care staff both document the suitability of alternatives to face-to-face care and offer them to eligible patients, and reassess the frequency and approach to its training for scheduling community care consults.

The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 requires annual audits of the U.S. Postal Service’s financial statements. In addition, the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 requires the Postal Service to comply with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This section requires the Postal Service to report the scope and adequacy of its internal control structure and procedures and assess their effectiveness.The U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors contracted with an independent public accounting (IPA) firm to express audit opinions on the Postal Service’s fiscal year 2021 financial statements and internal controls over financial reporting (an integrated audit). The IPA firm maintained overall responsibility for testing and reviewing significant Postal Service accounts, processes, and internal controls. We coordinated audit efforts with the IPA firm to ensure adequate coverage.

Following is a summary of internal control deficiencies for your attention that we determined did not constitute a significant deficiency or material weakness, see Appendix A for the full descriptions:Undelivered OrdersIt was determined that EEOC's balance in undelivered orders (UDOs) as of September 30, 2021, as calculated by EEOC personnel, included amounts that should have been de-obligated and not included in the year-end amount. This misstatement was caused by EEOC not consistently applying review procedures to the UDO balance. EEOC should ensure the existing UDO policy is followed and documentation of the process is reviewed by the CFO or their designee on a quarterly basis.The purpose of this communication, which is an integral part of our audit, is to describe, for management and those charged with governance, the scope of our testing of internal control and the results of that testing. Accordingly, this communication is not intended to be and should not be used for any other purpose.

We evaluated the SBA’s handling of the grant to train small businesses on federal resources available in the wake of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The Coronavirus Aid Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act authorized funds up to $25 million for SBA to administer a grant to an association or associations representing resource partner centers to establish a single centralized hub for COVID-19 information.We found SBA did not ensure the grant recipient developed and implemented an effective marketing and outreach strategy to ensure the hub successfully achieved the legislative purpose of the CARES Act. In addition, neither SBA nor the grant recipient set targets for any of the performance goals.SBA awarded $18.6 million for the informational and training hub. In the critical first year of the disaster response and launching the hub, less than 1 percent of the 30 million small businesses it was intended to help used it and only 62 of about 14,000 resource partner counselors and mentors completed any of the training modules. We found the grant recipient awarded contracts without assessing the reasonableness of contract costs in accordance with federal procurement requirements. We also questioned $14.8 million in costs that either did not adhere to procurement requirements or were not properly supported. We made five recommendations to improve the SBA’s oversight.SBA agreed or partially agreed with three of the five recommendations. The agency plans to implement corrective actions that will align performance goals with agency goals. It will also enhance oversight of the grant recipient’s compliance with award terms and federal requirements. Management disagreed with recommendations 4 and 5.

In fiscal year (FY) 2020, the U.S. Postal Service had about 133,000 rural letter carriers and associates delivering mail on over 79,500 rural routes. A rural route can be a government owned vehicle (GOV) route where the Postal Service provides the delivery vehicle, or an equipment maintenance allowance (EMA) route where the carrier provides the vehicle and receives fuel and maintenance reimbursement. That same year, the Postal Service paid rural letter carriers almost $583 million for more than 36,900 EMA routes. Our objective was to assess the Postal Service’s strategy for assigning GOVs to EMA routes.

FLRA's Compliance with the PIIA in the FY 2021 PAR

The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this self-initiated audit to assess the NCUA’s hiring practices. The objectives of our audit were to determine whether the NCUA’s: (1) hiring practices are in accordance with Office of Personnel Management (OPM), NCUA, and other federal requirements, and (2) hiring processes facilitated the efficient selection of high-quality candidates to help NCUA divisions and offices meet mission requirements.

To see our report, click on the link below

We focused on the Trusted Traveler Program (TTP) membership revocations of three U.S. citizens associated with the migrant caravan and whether CBP revoked the TTP memberships in retaliation for the individuals’ support of the migrant caravan.

In October 2017, VA entered into an interagency agreement with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to use its Electronic Catalog (ECAT) to order VA medical supplies and equipment not available through existing contracts. VA created the ECAT Ordering Guide to describe VA policies and procedures for placing orders and to outline the ordering officials’ responsibilities. As of April 1, 2021, VA had spent approximately $592 million on purchases through ECAT.The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this review to determine whether VA’s procurements of medical supplies and equipment through ECAT complied with acquisition regulations, policies, and the terms of the interagency agreement. The OIG found that the Procurement and Logistics Office (P&LO) did not adequately govern the ECAT program. The ECAT Ordering Guide excludes the requirement for VA ordering officials to consider the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contracts for sales orders; purchasing through FSS could have saved VA up to $4.4 million. The guide also incorrectly describes how to apply the Rule of Two, potentially excluding veteran-owned businesses from contracting opportunities. Ordering officials did not follow documentation requirements in the ECAT Ordering Guide, and P&LO did not conduct required annual reviews of the interagency agreement.The OIG made six recommendations. The ECAT Ordering Guide should be updated to clarify the requirement that staff must consider FSS contracts before ordering through ECAT. VA should also monitor orders to identify recurring acquisitions that could be purchased through other contracts at lower prices and require justifications for ECAT orders if FSS contracts are available and not used. Additionally, P&LO should correct the Rule of Two diagram in the ordering guide and monitor compliance, establish a process to ensure documentation and audits of orders meet ordering guide requirements, and conduct and document annual reviews as required in the interagency agreement.

This Office of Inspector General (OIG) Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection Program report provides a focused evaluation of the leadership performance and oversight by Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) 8: VA Sunshine Healthcare Network in St. Petersburg, Florida, covering leadership and organizational risks and key processes associated with promoting quality care. This inspection also focused on COVID-19 Pandemic Readiness and Response; Quality, Safety, and Value; Medical Staff Credentialing; Environment of Care; Mental Health: Suicide Prevention; Care Coordination: Inter-facility Transfers; and Women’s Health: Comprehensive Care.The VISN’s executive leadership team had worked together since May 2019. The Chief Financial Officer, who was assigned in 2008, was the most tenured leader. Employee satisfaction survey scores indicated that VISN leaders were engaged and promoted a culture where employees felt safe bringing forward issues and concerns. VISN patient experience survey results were better than the VHA averages for inpatient care and on par with VHA averages for outpatient care. The OIG’s review of access metrics and clinical vacancies identified potential organizational risks. The executive leaders seemed to support efforts to improve and maintain patient safety, quality care, and other positive outcomes. They were also knowledgeable within their scope of responsibilities about selected Strategic Analytics for Improvement and Learning metrics and should continue to take actions to sustain and improve performance.The OIG issued two recommendations for improvement:(1) Medical Staff Credentialing• Physician credential review process(2) Women’s Health• Annual site visit completion

The objective of this review was to determine whether DHS effectively supported operable and interoperable emergency communications for Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government officials and critical infrastructure operators during the Coronavirus disease-19 (COVID-19) pandemic.

Our objective was to review the Next Generation Delivery Vehicle (NGDV) contract to determine if there are opportunities to better protect the U.S. Postal Service from fraud, waste, and abuse.

We substantiated allegations that a USGS employee fraudulently received donated leave, valued at $4,710, through the Voluntary Leave Transfer Program.

What We Looked AtThe Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) modernization of its National Airspace System (NAS) includes a plan to update the Agency’s aging voice switches with a voice-over internet protocol (VoIP) system. In August 2012, FAA awarded a contract to the Harris Corporation (Harris) to provide the NAS Voice System (NVS), but in December 2018, FAA and Harris agreed to terminate the contract, and FAA still depends on outdated voice communication. In response to a request from the Ranking Members of the U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and its Subcommittee on Aviation, we initiated this audit to assess (1) FAA’s reasons for terminating the NVS contract with Harris and NVS costs and expected benefits and (2) the information on NVS development that the Program Office provided to FAA management and Congress.What We FoundChanges in requirements and schedule delays led to the contract’s termination, and expenditures achieved few benefits. FAA lacked confidence that Harris’s demonstration systems would support VoIP communication in a substantial portion of the NAS. However, the issues with Harris’s systems stemmed in part from changes in FAA’s requirements. Since the termination, FAA has identified reasons for the contract’s failure and lessons learned from the NVS program. FAA spent $160 million on NVS and will spend $274 million to sustain its legacy switches. These expenditures have achieved few benefits. FAA’s Contracting and Program Offices raised performance concerns but delayed taking action. According to FAA, Harris was trying to stabilize its demonstration system. Because FAA would incur little cost from these efforts, allowing Harris to continue made more sense than ending the contract. Finally, FAA did not inform Congress until after contract termination because program costs and schedule variances did not exceed the thresholds required for such notification. RecommendationsFAA concurred with our recommendation to improve the Agency’s future modernization efforts and provided appropriate actions and completion dates. We consider the recommendation resolved but open pending completion of planned actions. 

Ensuring that NASA has an adequate number of astronauts with the skills needed for missions to the International Space Station and the Moon is critical to meeting the Agency’s ambitious space exploration goals. In this report, we examined NASA’s management of its astronaut corps.

The Office of the Inspector General OIG audited the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) use of remote application and desktop virtualization due to the risk of increased remote users during the COVID-19 pandemic and recent publicized remote access vulnerabilities. We found several areas where TVA was consistent with cybersecurity remote access best practices. However, we identified gaps in TVA’s configuration settings, architectural design, and administrative procedures. We recommend the Vice President and Chief Information and Digital Officer, Technology & Information, review the identified gaps and remediate as appropriate. Specifics of the identified issues were omitted from this report due to their sensitive nature in relation to TVA’s cybersecurity but were formally communicated to TVA management in a briefing on November 15, 2021.

This Office of Inspector General (OIG) Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection Program report provides a focused evaluation of the quality of care delivered in the inpatient and outpatient settings of the Charles George VA Medical Center in Asheville, North Carolina. The inspection covers key clinical and administrative processes associated with promoting quality care, focusing on Leadership and Organizational Risks; COVID-19 Pandemic Readiness and Response; Quality, Safety, and Value; Registered Nurse Credentialing; Medication Management: Remdesivir Use in VHA; Mental Health: Emergency Department and Urgent Care Center Suicide Risk Screening and Evaluation; Care Coordination: Interfacility Transfers; and High-Risk Processes: Management of Disruptive and Violent Behavior.At the time of the OIG inspection, the acting Director had been in the position for two days, but the Associate Director for Patient Care Services/Nurse Executive had been in the role for over 18 years, with other leaders in their roles for over a year. Employee survey responses demonstrated satisfaction with leadership and the workplace. Patient experience survey data implied satisfaction with the care provided, and selected survey results were generally more favorable than those for VHA patients nationally.The OIG’s review of the system’s accreditation findings, sentinel events, and disclosures did not identify any substantial organizational risk factors. Executive leaders were knowledgeable within their scope of responsibilities and tenure about selected VHA data used by the Strategic Analytics for Improvement and Learning models.The OIG issued five recommendations for improvement in two areas:(1) Care Coordination• Inter-facility patient transfer monitoring and evaluation• Transfer form completion• Medication list transmission(2) High-Risk Processes• Disruptive behavior committee meeting attendance• Staff training

We audited the Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority’s management of its Commodore Perry Homes development. We selected the Authority based on congressional interest. Half of the development’s buildings were demolished more than 20 years ago, and the majority of the remaining buildings and units have been vacant for years without redevelopment activity. The objective of the audit was to determine whether the Authority properly managed its Commodore Perry Homes development. Our work focused on the period beginning in July 2013.The Authority did not properly manage the Commodore Perry Homes development to address longstanding redevelopment needs and health and safety issues. While the Authority had made various redevelopment plans for the property since 2013, none fully materialized, and all dwelling units in the development are now vacant. Further, the Authority did not adequately address urgent, ongoing health and safety issues with the vacant development. These issues occurred for various reasons, including that the Authority did not consistently prioritize taking action at its Commodore Perry Homes development, lacked a cohesive redevelopment strategy over time, and lacked sufficient processes to address recurring issues. While HUD and the Authority had recently taken steps toward developing a plan forward, no redevelopment had occurred at the site. As a result, fewer low-rent units were available to families in need, the vacant development continued to deteriorate, and the surrounding residents and local community continued to be exposed to significant blight and health and safety issues.We recommend that HUD determine (1) whether the development represents an imminent threat to public safety and activities to control the situation could be taken before the full environmental review process, and (2) which environmental review process would be most beneficial to ensure that it is completed as soon as possible. Further, we recommend that HUD continue to provide training and technical assistance to the Authority and require it to (1) identify and address urgent health and safety issues; (2) develop and implement a plan to routinely identify and address recurring urgent health and safety issues; and (3) develop and implement plans for the remaining public housing units at the development and for the original property related to the units converted during previous redevelopment efforts. Last, if the Authority does not follow through on its asset repositioning plans, misses deadlines, or the plan is no longer feasible, we recommend that HUD consider and use available remedies.

Transmittal of the Final Report Assessing the Federal Trade Commission’s Compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Redacted for public release)

Our objective was to assess the management of Postal Service employees in absence without leave (AWOL) status to identify opportunities to timely address employees in AWOL status and manage cost.

We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) oversight of Federal Housing Administration (FHA) refunds based on a hotline complaint alleging that HUD was trying to make it difficult for claimants to obtain refunds or discourage them from pursuing the refunds, which are due to eligible homeowners from the unearned portion of the upfront mortgage insurance premium paid. Our audit found the allegations from the hotline complaint submitted to the HUD Office of Inspector General had some merit. Also, HUD did not have adequate controls in place to ensure that refunds were appropriately tracked, monitored, and issued. Specifically, HUD (1) did not ensure that the homeowner information for at least 23,579 loans with unpaid refunds totaling approximately $15.8 million was included in its public listing of unpaid refunds, (2) did not adequately track the status of refunds, (3) lacked policies and procedures for various stages of the refund process, (4) did not fully implement procedures it developed requiring additional documents from homeowners, and (5) did not follow the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act. This condition occurred because HUD did not emphasize reviewing or monitoring the refund process to identify weaknesses and focused primarily on sending refund applications and issuing refunds to homeowners who returned the applications. As a result, HUD could not ensure that it implemented a consistent refund process, and homeowners and third-party tracers were not able to search for all refunds HUD owed, which may have reduced the chance for homeowners for at least 23,579 loans to obtain approximately $15.8 million in refunds. We recommended that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Finance and Budget (1) develop and implement written policies and procedures and controls for the refund process to address the deficiencies identified, (2) develop, and implement policies and procedures for locating homeowners, a standard timeframe for mailing refund applications, and verifying the termination date, (3) research, develop, and implement policies and procedures to reduce the number of refunds that have remained unclaimed for an extended period, (4) develop and implement controls for the designation of legal representation for applicants, (5) ensure that the requirements that were developed for additional documents for identification are fully implemented, and (6) obtain approval under the Paperwork Reduction Act for the insert document mailed with the refund application and the Tracer Found Case form.

The EPA does not have a formal process for updating its federal radiation guidance and policies, but it has updated its radiation guidance to incorporate new data.

The objective was to determine whether Irwin County Detention Center (ICDC), in Ocilla, Georgia provided Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainees adequate medical care and adhered to COVID-19 protections.

The objective was to determine whether U.S. Immigration and Services’ (USCIS) adequately managed the U visa program.

We substantiated allegations that an oil and gas company failed to pay Federal mineral royalties, and ONRR recovered a total of $1,903,261.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) continues to phase out its use of alternative contracting methods to administer the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).

We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of Community Planning and Development’s (CPD) oversight and monitoring of its Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) slow-spending grantees. This was a self-initiated audit consistent with our oversight activities and current top priority areas. Our objective was to assess CPD’s monitoring and oversight tools related to the progress of grant expenditures and determine the status of the grants and impacts of COVID-19 on grantee spending.CPD has tools available for the oversight and monitoring of its grantees. The tools mainly assist in evaluating or tracking the progress of the grants. While one tool identified slow spenders on a short-term basis, it did not help assess slow spending in the long term. We identified opportunities for CPD to enhance its (1) monthly CDBG-DR grant financial report, (2) use of Disaster Recovery Grant Reporting (DRGR) system flags, (3) use of grantee expenditure projections, (4) documentation for quarterly performance report reviews, and (5) documentation for monitoring reviews and updating the related exhibit (questionnaire). Enhancing these tools may allow CPD to provide more effective oversight of grant expenditures and better assist its grantees with the progress of their spending. It will also assist in preventing the recapture of funds from communities with needs that can benefit from these funds. As of July 30, 2021, more than $3.7 billion remained unspent of the $18.5 billion appropriated in CDBG-DR funds for disasters that occurred from 2011 through 2016, and the pandemic has slowed the progress of these grants.We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary require CPD to (1) continue developing proper methodology to identify slow spenders and update policies, procedures, and its monitoring exhibit; (2) establish a reasonable timeframe for grantees to adequately address the system flags in DRGR, and resolve or remediate outstanding flags; (3) require updated grantee projections; (4) sufficiently document its basis for conclusions in its monitoring and quarterly performance reviews; and (5) consider grantee suggestions to assist with the progress of spending funds.

We audited the City of Houston’s Hurricane Harvey Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) program. We initiated this audit as part of our commitment to helping the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) address its top management challenges and to support HUD’s strategic objective to support effectiveness and accountability in long-term disaster recovery. Further, Congress has expressed strong interest in HUD’s disaster programs. Our objective was to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the City of Houston’s Hurricane Harvey CDBG-DR program. We found that the City of Houston faced challenges in administering its Hurricane Harvey CDBG-DR program efficiently and effectively. Specifically, 3 years after Hurricane Harvey, the City had spent only 1.8 percent of its suballocated grant funds, which substantially delayed assistance to participants. Further, it had assisted only 297 of 8,784 housing program participants, leaving affected Houstonians without the help they needed. This weak performance contributed to HUD’s designating the Texas General Land Office (Texas GLO) as a slow spender. These conditions occurred due to significant disagreements between the City and the Texas GLO over how to implement the City’s programs. Also, the Texas GLO did not provide programmatic benchmarks in its contract to hold the City accountable. As a result, the City’s slow performance risked its missing HUD’s spending deadlines, recapture of the Texas GLO’s grant funds, and potential loss of the City’s $1.275 billion in suballocated Hurricane Harvey grant funds. We recommend that the Director of the Office of Block Grant Assistance require the Texas GLO to ensure that (1) it includes milestones and appropriate consequences for not meeting them in future subrecipient agreements and (2) processes are in place to assist participants transitioning from the City’s programs to the Texas GLO’s programs. With HUD’s approval of action plan amendment 8, we recommend that the Director require the Texas GLO to also (1) provide its plan to continuously monitor the City’s pace and performance in its remaining program and take appropriate action to ensure that program goals are met, (2) set performance and financial milestones for all programs and activities funded under the City’s subrecipient agreement, and (3) provide its plan to ensure that the City complies with the Texas GLO’s guidelines and requirements. Implementation of these recommendations would include a process for repurposing additional grant funds if necessary.

To assess the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) efforts to expand the use of health information technology (health IT) to obtain and analyze medical records for disability claims.