Federal Reports

What We Looked AtThe Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) requires agencies to identify, report, and reduce improper payments in programs susceptible to significant improper payments. The act also requires agencies to publish applicable payment integrity information in the materials accompanying their annual financial statements. Moreover, PIIA requires inspectors general to report annually on their agencies’ compliance. Accordingly, our audit objective was to determine whether DOT complied in fiscal year 2022 with PIIA’s requirements as prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). What We FoundDOT was in compliance with PIIA requirements for fiscal year 2022. DOT reported improper payment estimates for two programs identified as susceptible to significant improper payments. Generally, the payment integrity information in DOT’s 2022 Agency Financial Report and data posted to the Payment Accuracy website were accurate and complete. We found a data entry error at the website. DOT reported $104,907 under the cause category of Data/Information Does Not Exist instead of the correct cause category of Failure to Access Data/Information Needed. This error did not impact DOT’s PIIA compliance. DOT’s corrective action plan was adequately designed, focused on root causes, and effectively implemented. DOT also published improper and unknown payment amounts and estimated future improper and unknown payment rates on the Payment Accuracy website in the financial statement materials. The Federal Highway Administration’s Highway Planning and Construction Program did not meet its reduction target of 1 percent and reported estimated improper payments of 1.13 percent ($548.95 million). However, FHWA demonstrated improvement by reducing its overall improper and unknown payments. DOT developed a plan to meet the reduction target and reported an improper and unknown payment estimate of less than 10 percent for all programs reporting improper payments in fiscal year 2022. The Department has also taken steps to recapture improper and unknown payments. RecommendationsWe are making no recommendations at this time.

We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) fiscal year 2022 compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) and implementation of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. PIIA was enacted to prevent and reduce improper payments and require each agency’s inspector general to perform an annual review of the agency’s compliance with PIIA. Our objectives were to assess (1) whether HUD had met all requirements of PIIA and OMB Circular A-123, Appendix C, Requirements for Payment Integrity Improvement, and (2) HUD’s efforts to prevent and reduce improper and unknown payments.HUD did not comply with PIIA because it did not report improper and unknown payment estimates for the Office of Public and Indian Housing’s Tenant Based Rental Assistance (PIH-TBRA) program and the Office of Multifamily Housing's Project-Based Rental Assistance (PBRA) program, which spent $41 billion in fiscal year 2022 and represented 61.6 percent of HUD’s total expenditures. This noncompliance is significant because this was the sixth consecutive year in which HUD was unable to produce PIH-TBRA and PBRA improper and unknown payment estimates and that has contributed to HUD’s not complying with improper payment laws for 10 consecutive years.HUD did not report improper and unknown payment estimates for the PIH-TBRA and PBRA programs because it was not successful in planning and developing a platform to collect and secure supporting documentation that contained personally identifiable information (PII). Although HUD has systems that maintain PIH-TBRA and PBRA program PII data, the systems do not collect or maintain the supporting documentation from tenants and third parties that is needed to verify tenant income, including medical and other allowances, assets, number of household members, and other information used in the calculation of the housing assistance payments. Because HUD was unable to collect this information, it could not determine whether its improper and unknown payment estimate was below or above the statutory threshold. Without an estimate, HUD could not implement corrective actions to improve payment accuracy for programs above the statutory threshold.In addition, we found opportunities for HUD to enhance its process for assessing improper payment risk. HUD could better identify high-risk programs by updating its risk assessment methodology to adequately consider fraud and the risks associated with having its programs implemented by non-Federal administrators, consistent with OMB guidance. This condition occurred because HUD’s programs delegate significant authority within the payment cycle to non-Federal administrators and assessing risk outside HUD is challenging. HUD could also improve its application of the risk assessment methodology. HUD’s risk scoring for one of its factors depends on its having completed fraud risk assessments and questionnaires. However, HUD was in the early stages of developing a Fraud Risk Management Program and had not yet completed program-specific risk assessments for 10 of the 11 programs. By addressing weaknesses in its risk assessment process, HUD can more reasonably assess whether its programs are susceptible to significant improper payments.We also found that the Office of Public and Indian Housing did not conduct monitoring reviews to detect, prevent, and recover improper payments in the PIH-TBRA program. HUD suspended these reviews in fiscal year 2021 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and related waivers. However, those waivers expired on December 31, 2021, and the Office of Field Operations (OFO) did not resume its monitoring because it was working on updating its monitoring procedures. If HUD resumed OFO monitoring, it could better detect and prevent improper housing assistance payments from public housing agencies to landlords under the PIH-TBRA program, which spent $27.1 billion and accounted for 41 percent of HUD’s total expenditures.Overall, while HUD made some progress in fiscal year 2022, additional efforts are needed to bring HUD into compliance with PIIA. From an agencywide perspective, HUD is in compliance with the risk assessment requirements and has assessed all of its programs within the last 3 years; however, we found opportunities to strengthen this process. HUD also made progress this year in its Office of Community Planning and Development’s Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria program testing, and we found that it was compliant with PIIA. In its PIH-TBRA and PBRA programs, HUD could not provide detailed evidence to support that it was making substantive progress toward compliance. Since developing a secure platform to collect supporting documentation is only the first step in developing an estimate and HUD could not implement this in fiscal year 2022, significant efforts are needed to bring HUD into compliance with PIIA.Several recommendations and two priority open recommendations from prior-year audits remain open and will help to address the current-year findings. Most significantly, in 2021 we recommended that HUD ensure that the program improper payment rate estimates adequately test for and include improper payments of Federal funding that are made by State, local, and other organizations administering these programs and adequately disclose any limitations imposed or encountered when reporting on improper payments.This is the sixth consecutive year in which HUD has not been able to produce PIIA-compliant PIH-TBRA and PBRA improper payment estimates. This year, we recommend that HUD establish an improper payment council within HUD that consists of senior accountable officials from across the Department with a role in the effort that would work to identify risks and challenges to compliance and identify solutions as a collaborative group. We also recommend that HUD (1) develop a timeline, detailed plan, and secure storage information technology solution for completing compliant PIH-TBRA and PBRA program estimates and (2) make changes to its risk assessment to ensure that it adequately addresses the risk of non-Federal program administrators and fraud risk.

This semiannual report summarizes the work we completed from October 1, 2022, through March 31, 2023, to deter fraud, waste, and abuse.

To see our report, click on the link below

We are pleased to present our report for the period October 1, 2022, to March 31, 2023. In this semiannual period, our audit, evaluation, and investigative activities identified more than $41.4 million in questioned costs; funds to be put to better use; and recoveries, fees, and fines; and opportunities for TVA to improve its programs and operations.As TVA begins its 91st year, challenges lie ahead as demand increases and TVA strives to have net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The mission of TVA remains steadfast and the TVA OIG remains steadfast in our mission to help TVA identify risks, find operational inefficiencies, and detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse for the benefit of the 10 million residents of the Tennessee Valley.

Each year agency program officials, chief information officers, and inspectors general must review their agencies’ information security programs and report to the Department of Homeland Security and Congress on the programs’ compliance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). The OIG contracted with an independent public accounting firm CliftonLarsonAllen LLP (CLA) to evaluate VA’s information security program for FY 2022. After evaluating 47 major applications and general support systems hosted at 23 VA sites and on the VA Enterprise Cloud, CLA concluded that VA continues to face significant challenges meeting FISMA requirements. The audit found continuing significant deficiencies related to access, configuration management, and change management controls, as well as service continuity practices, all of which are designed to protect mission-critical systems from unauthorized access, alteration, or destruction. These deficiencies can be remedied by improving the deployment of security patches, system upgrades, and system configurations to mitigate significant security vulnerabilities; enforcing a consistent process across all field offices and improve performance monitoring to ensure controls operate as intended at all facilities and communicate identified security deficiencies to mitigate significant risks; and addressing security-related issues that contributed to the information technology material weakness reported in the FY 2022 audit of VA’s consolidated financial statements. VA concurred with CLA’s 26 recommendations, some of which addressed repeat deficiencies from previous FISMA reports spanning multiple years. CLA will follow up on the outstanding recommendations and evaluate the adequacy of corrective actions in the FY 2023 audit of VA’s information security program.

We assessed NASA’s progress in developing new technologies and sustainable energy options for aircraft propulsion.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Inspector General conducted this audit to determine whether the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board complied with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 in fiscal year 2022.

The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) was signed into law in March 2020. PIIA requires agencies to identify and review all programs and activities they administer that may be susceptible to significant improper payments based on guidance provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Additionally, the OMB Memorandum M-21-19, Transmittal of Appendix C to OMB Circular A-123, Requirements for Payment Integrity Improvement, requires agencies to report technically improper payments, which are defined as a payment to the right recipient for the right amount where the payment process failed to follow all applicable statutes and regulations.We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department of Energy met OMB criteria for compliance with PIIA.The Department’s fiscal year 2022 improper payment reporting was aligned with OMB criteria. Specifically, the Department published its fiscal year 2022 Agency Financial Report and posted that report, and the accompanying materials, on its website. However, we identified areas where improvements to the payment integrity process are warranted. Specifically, the Department informed us that it underreported its improper payments in the fiscal year 2022 Agency Financial Report by approximately $867,000 because of a data entry error created by a third-party contractor. Additionally, new spending and loan programs introduce an increased risk that the Department may exceed the OMB’s $100 million threshold for being susceptible to improper payments. Because of this influx of funds, we determined that enhancements to the payment integrity process are necessary. Our recommendations focused on: (1) completing planned corrective actions for the consolidation of payment reporting sites’ improper payment information in the Agency Financial Report; (2) updating the Office of the Chief Financial Officer’s annual guidance to sites to include more specific direction on payment reporting sites’ collection of useful and consistent data to identify detailed root causes of reported improper payments and on developing plans to mitigate them in the future; and (3) expanding the Office of the Chief Financial Officer’s use of data analytics, at both the Department-wide level and payment reporting site level, to identify potential root causes for improper payments that could lead to the Department’s improper payment rate exceeding the OMB threshold.Management concurred with our findings and recommendations, and its proposed corrective actions are consistent with our recommendations.

A post office suspension occurs when the U.S. Postal Service temporarily stops operations at a Postal Service-operated retail facility. A facility may be suspended due to a natural disaster, termination of a lease or rental agreement, lack of qualified personnel to operate the office, irreparable or severe damage to the retail facility, or the lack of adequate measures to safeguard the retail facility or its revenues. The Postal Service’s policy requires a post office suspension be resolved by either re-opening or permanently closing the facility, which is typically completed between 180 to 280 days.Post office suspensions have long been an interest of the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC), Congress, and other stakeholders. The PRC has publicly expressed concerns over the years about the number of unresolved post office suspensions. The Postal Service has been trying to clear a backlog of post office suspensions that developed over many decades. As of the end of fiscal year (FY) 2022, the Postal Service reported 381 unresolved post office suspensions. Since FY 2020, the PRC has required the Postal Service to provide a detailed plan to resolve post office suspensions in its Annual Compliance Report (ACR). The Postal Service has used its Change Suspension Discontinuance Center (CSDC) system since 2012 to track information on facilities throughout the post office suspension process.

This Office of Inspector General Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection Program report describes the results of a focused evaluation of the inpatient and outpatient care provided at the South Texas Veterans Health Care System, which includes the Audie L. Murphy Memorial Veterans’ Hospital in San Antonio, the Kerrville VA Medical Center, and multiple outpatient clinics in Texas. This evaluation focused on five key operational areas:• Leadership and organizational risks• Quality, safety, and value• Medical staff privileging• Environment of care• Mental health (emergency department and urgent care center suicide prevention initiatives)The OIG issued three recommendations for improvement in three areas:1. Leadership and organizational risks• Adverse event evaluation and institutional disclosures2. Medical staff privileging• Reprivileging decisions3. Mental health• Follow-up for patients at risk of suicide

A Las Vegas man pleaded guilty to charges of Wire Fraud and Aggravated Identity Theft in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, on May 17, 2023. The man admitted to participating in a "phishing" scheme in which he fraudulently obtained credit card and personal identifying information (PII) from his victims, including names and banking information. He used the victims' credit card information and PII to purchase online travel tickets on common carriers, including Trailways and Amtrak, and then resold the tickets to other individuals and kept the proceeds. He was indicted on July 11, 2019, and his sentencing hearing is pending.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Inspector General conducted this audit to determine whether the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board complied with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 in fiscal year 2022.

We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD), oversight of Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) grantees’ use of program income. We initiated this audit in accordance with our goal of ensuring and promoting accountability and effectiveness in disaster response and recovery. Our audit objective was to determine whether HUD ensured that program income generated from disaster funds awarded to CDBG-DR grant recipients was used to positively impact and support disaster recovery in affected areas and to benefit program beneficiaries. HUD generally ensured that its CDBG-DR grantees used program income generated from disaster funds to positively impact and support disaster recovery in affected areas and to benefit program beneficiaries. HUD’s grantees maintained adequate documentation for most program income vouchers tested, supporting that program income was generally used in accordance with Federal regulations and positively impacted the program. However, some grantees did not always (1) spend a substantial amount of their program income funds before using their CDBG-DR funds and (2) submit Federal financial reports (FFR) quarterly as required. Opportunities existed for HUD to improve its oversight of program income funds to reduce risks related to the reporting, reconciling, and spending of program income. As a result, (1) HUD could not effectively track the status of grantee financial data related to program income, and (2) HUD did not have reasonable assurance that it provided accurate grant data reports to Congress.

Congress enacted the Payment Integrity Information Act (PIIA) in 2019 to help agencies identify and reduce improper payments. For this mandated audit, we evaluated NASA’s compliance with PIIA requirements in fiscal year 2022.

This is a performance audit that the OIG conducted to determine whether the FTC’s Bureau of Competition expert witness contracts are administered in accordance with federal requirements.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL

We found that the Maine Department of Marine Resources used WSFR grant funds to pay for unfunded liability costs and charged unsupported employment termination benefits.

The National Credit Union Administration Office of Inspector General conducted this self-initiated audit to assess the NCUA’s Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) program. Our objectives were to determine whether the NCUA adhered to its Acquisition Policy Manual (APM) regarding the COR program and whether: (1) staff serving in the role of COR have been appropriately nominated, appointed, and received training/certification; and (2) appointed CORs were performing contract administration in accordance with applicable policies and procedures.

We conducted this audit to determine whether the EPA complied with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019, or PIIA, and related Office of Management and Budget, or OMB, guidance during fiscal year 2022.

This Office of Inspector General Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection Program report describes the results of a focused evaluation of the inpatient and outpatient care provided at the Tennessee Valley Healthcare System, which includes the Nashville VA Medical Center, the Alvin C. York VA Medical Center (Murfreesboro), and multiple outpatient clinics in Kentucky and Tennessee. This evaluation focused on five key operational areas:• Leadership and organizational risks• Quality, safety, and value• Medical staff privileging• Environment of care• Mental health (emergency department and urgent care center suicide prevention initiatives)The OIG issued eight recommendations for improvement in four areas:1. Leadership and organizational risks• Institutional disclosures2. Quality, safety, and value• Peer review processes• Patient safety events3. Medical staff privileging• Focused and Ongoing Professional Practice Evaluation processes• Privileging reviews4. Environment of care• Environmental risks for suicide

At the request of the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Supply Chain, we examined a company's standard design rates (i.e., indirect cost recovery rates) contained in the BWRX-300 Technology Collaboration Agreement (TCA). Our examination objective was to determine if the company's proposed indirect cost recovery rates were fairly stated.In our opinion, the company's proposed rates for the recovery of its fringe benefits, overhead, and general and administrative costs were fairly stated. However, we determined the total cumulative indirect rate listed in the TCA did not accurately represent the total rate that would be applied to the company's salary costs. Specifically, we found the TCA's total cumulative indirect rate and accompanied calculation represent a salary rate multiplier, instead of the indirect cost recovery rate, as it is labeled in the TCA. We suggest TVA management negotiate appropriate changes to the TCA to more accurately reflect the total indirect cost recovery rate.(Summary Only)

An Amtrak Electrical Journeyman based in Miami, Florida, resigned from his position on May 16, 2023, prior to his administrative hearing. Our investigation found that the former employee violated company policies by engaging in outside employment while on a medical leave of absence.

The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Office of Inspector General (OIG) Spring 2023 Semiannual Report to Congress (SARC) for the reporting period, October 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023. This report was submitted in accordance with the requirements of Section 5 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. DFC OIG has made significant progress to support our oversight mission of protecting America’s international development finance investments from fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

This independent auditors’ report on the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) improper payment reporting is required by the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019. We contracted with the independent certified public accounting firm KPMG LLP to conduct a performance audit of SBA’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 compliance with the Act. The auditor was engaged to review the payment integrity section of SBA’s Agency Financial Report Fiscal Year 2022 (AFR) and accompanying materials to determine whether the agency complied with the reporting requirements under the Act.In the report, KPMG auditors found SBA was not compliant with 9 of the 10 reporting requirements under the Act and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance.• The agency’s risk assessment methodology did not consider certain identified risk factors to adequately conclude whether the Restaurant Revitalization Fund, Shuttered Venue Operators Grant, and the payments for covered loans in the 7(a) and 504 Certified Development Company loan guaranty programs under the debt relief assistance program were likely to include improper and unknown payments above or below the statutory threshold.• The sampling and estimation methodology plans were not appropriate for the SBA disaster assistance loans, COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loans (COVID-19 EIDL), and Economic Injury Disaster Loan Targeted Advance programs and activities. • SBA did not demonstrate improvements to payment integrity for 7(a) loan guaranty purchases because the improper payment estimate increased between fiscal years 2021 and 2022, and• SBA did not publish improper and unknown payment estimates, corrective action plans, and reduction targets within the AFR and accompanying materials for PPP loan guaranty purchases and forgiveness activities.SBA indicates that it is committed to reducing the dollar amount of improper payments, ensuring program integrity, and continuing to implement effective risk management procedures in accordance with improper payment legislation.

This report presents the results of our audit of U.S. Postal Service Products Billing Determinants.

We performed a self-initiated audit at the Miami Processing and Distribution Center and four delivery units serviced by the P&DC during the week of January 30, 2023. The delivery units included the Allapattah Station, Doral Branch, Flagler Station, and Princeton Branch.

Quality Review of FLRA OIG Audit Operations for the Period April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023

We performed a self-initiated audit at the Miami Processing and Distribution Center and four delivery units serviced by the P&DC during the week of January 30, 2023. The delivery units included the Allapattah Station, Doral Branch, Flagler Station, and Princeton Branch.We issued individual reports for the four delivery units and the P&DC we visited. We issued another report summarizing the results of our audits at all four delivery units with specific recommendations for management to address.

This report offers the OIG’s perspective relative to fraud risks facing the company as it continues its expansion into large-scale acquisitions and infrastructure programs. If history is any indicator, funding from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act—like other large spending bills—will be targeted by criminals through a variety of unlawful fraudulent schemes. To its credit, the company recently established an Integrated Risk and Compliance Program (IRCP) to monitor fraud risks and establish capabilities to proactively identify fraudulent activity. We have already engaged with the IRCP, and we are optimistic that our insights will help make the company a harder target for fraud-related crimes. Since 2017, however, our office has investigated 99 fraud-related cases impacting the company and helped recover $120 million in restitution, forfeitures, and other recoveries. We have also issued 22 audit reports during this period identifying weak controls that would-be criminals could exploit. With the company anticipating that it will have at least $30 billion in active capital projects in fiscal year 2023, this report synthesizes some of our prior work, illustrates how fraud risks manifest, and shares ways the company can mitigate these risks. Our work focuses specifically on four high-risk fraud areas: • Contracts and procurements• Health care• Employee wrongdoing• Cybercrime

The Postal Service has been working on several measures to protect its international business. The OIG suggests it develop commercial shipping options, both in inbound and outbound, to better cater to the requirements of large ecommerce shippers and provide more support to help smaller merchants navigate the complexity of international shipping. USPS could also speed up efforts to combat fake, low-cost shipping labels on packages shipped to the U.S., which harm both revenue and brand. Finally, it could provide more clarity on the role the Postal Service intends to play in the international shipping arena now and in the future.

We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) temporary policy for endorsement of loans with COVID-19 forbearance activity because an analysis of data in HUD’s systems showed that there may have been loans that did not comply with the policy’s requirements. The policy was one aspect of HUD’s broader emergency response to COVID-19, which also included an eviction moratorium and loan forbearance for borrowers experiencing financial hardship. The objectives of the audit were to determine (1) whether HUD’s temporary endorsement policy related to COVID-19 forbearance activity was properly followed by lenders, (2) whether HUD monitored and enforced indemnification agreements for loans that were subject to the temporary policy, and (3) HUD’s reasons for ending the policy during the pandemic and its plans to evaluate and use such policies in the future.HUD could improve oversight of the temporary endorsement policy. Specifically, HUD did not ensure that (1) lenders consistently followed policy requirements and (2) indemnification agreement data and records related to the policy were complete and accurate. These deficiencies occurred or went undetected due to unclear guidance and because HUD did not update its oversight strategy to specifically cover the policy and reconcile relevant data and records. As a result, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance fund was exposed to greater risk from at least $83 million in loans for which lenders did not follow requirements, and HUD’s ability to monitor and enforce indemnification agreements could be compromised until it corrects its data and records. Additionally, HUD terminated the policy due to limited use and did not have plans to further evaluate or use the policy in the future. As a result, HUD did not know whether using a similar policy during future disasters and emergencies or permanently could manage risk to the insurance fund while increasing lender participation.We recommend that HUD (1) require lenders to execute 5-year indemnification agreements for loans that were missing required agreements or were otherwise ineligible to put up to $1.8 million to better use by avoiding potential losses; (2) request and analyze data from lenders for loans at risk of noncompliance to identify loans that should have been subject to the policy or were otherwise ineligible for insurance and require lenders to protect HUD against losses on these loans to put up to $26.8 million to better use; (3) record indemnification agreement data in its system for agreements that were executed but not recorded to put up to $3.5 million to better use; (4) review and correct indemnification agreement data as needed in its system; (5) update indemnification agreements with incorrect or missing information; and (6) consider evaluating whether and how a similar policy could be used in the future. This should include studying lenders’ use of the policy, the long-term performance of loans endorsed under it, and the compliance, guidance, and process issues discussed above to refine future policies.

I am pleased to present the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Semiannual Report (SAR) to Congress. This document highlights our oversight efforts from October 1, 2022 to March 31, 2023.

The Office of the Inspector General conducted a review of Transmission Planning and Projects (TPP) organization to identify factors that could impact TPP’s organizational effectiveness. During interviews, TPP personnel revealed positive interactions with team members and business partners provided positive feedback on TPP. However, we identified issues that could negatively impact TPP’s effectiveness, if not addressed. These issues include (1) engagement risks, (2) insufficient resources, (3) system risks related to an ineffective estimating and material processing system and the inadequacy of customer relationship management systems, and (4) needed improvements with business partner support.

Interim Report: Audit of the Effectsthe Main Street Lending Program’sLoan Losses Have on Treasury’sInvestment in the Program

This report presents the results of our audit of the Sure Money process and performance.

The objective of the audit is to express an opinion on whether the Commission’s financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles

This is a performance audit that the OIG conducted to determine whether the FTC’s Bureau of Competition expert witness contracts are administered in accordance with federal requirements.

This Semiannual Report to Congress reflects how the EPA OIG is achieving its mission of preventing and detecting fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and misconduct related to the programs and operations of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board during the reporting period, October 1, 2022, through March 31, 2023.

The Office of the Inspector General conducted an evaluation to determine if hazardous chemicals at Power Operations’ sites were (1) adequately identified and communicated and (2) properly handled and stored. We determined hazardous chemicals at most Power Operations’ sites we visited were not adequately identified or communicated. Specifically, most sites had incomplete hazardous chemical lists or unmarked containers. In addition, we selected items from a storage location at each site and determined hazardous chemicals selected were properly stored according to their safety data sheet instructions. We were unable to determine if hazardous chemicals were being handled properly because we did not observe any chemical use. However, we did find that 10 of 33 individuals interviewed could not retrieve a safety data sheet, which could increase the risk that hazardous chemicals may not be properly handled and stored. Additionally, our testing identified two sites with best practices.

This update expands on our January 2023 Fraud Alert that identified 69,000 questionable Social Security Numbers (SSNs) used to obtain $5.4 billion in potentially fraudulent loans made in the COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program and Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). As detailed in that Fraud Alert, PRAC data scientists, using our Pandemic Analytics Center of Excellence, identified the questionable SSNs after determining that the names, SSNs, and/or dates of birth used in connection with COVID-19 EIDL/PPP applications did not match Social Security Administration’s (SSAs) records. SSAs verification results identified an additional 20,404 SSNs associated with deceased individuals. The PRAC worked with the Department of the Treasury’s Do Not Pay (DNP) system to obtain the dates of death for these individuals and identified dates of death for 15,307 of the 20,404 SSNs associated with 3,222 COVID-19 EIDL/PPP disbursed and undisbursed applications. This discrepancy is likely the result of Treasury’s DNP system not having access to the SSA’s full Death Master File.

This Office of Inspector General Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection Program report describes the results of a focused evaluation of the outpatient settings at the West Texas VA Health Care System and associated outpatient clinics in Texas and New Mexico. This evaluation focused on four key operational areas:• Leadership and organizational risks• Quality, safety, and value• Medical staff privileging• Environment of careThe OIG issued one recommendation for improvement related to medical staff privileging:• Ongoing Professional Practice Evaluations

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) concluded for fiscal year 2021 that VA complied with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019. As required, in the materials accompanying its annual financial statement, VA published estimates of improper and unknown payments for susceptible programs. Yet, while assessing compliance, the OIG determined VA can improve its testing procedures for these payments. Improper payments are payments that should not have been made or that were made in an incorrect amount under statutory, contractual, administrative, or other legally applicable requirements, according to the Office of Management and Budget; unknown payments are those a program cannot discern were made to the correct recipient or for the correct amount.The OIG found testing procedures for two programs—Purchased Long-Term Services and Supports, and Medical Care Contracts and Agreements—do not go far enough. Because they do not include reviewing documentation for proof of receipt, they may not identify payments for goods and services never rendered. Identifying and including such payments would increase unknown payment rates.The OIG determined that because of the testing deficiencies, VA understated the improper and unknown payment estimates as follows:• Purchased Long-Term Services and Supports. VA reported approximately $1.9 billion in improper and unknown payments and a rate of approximately 73 percent; the OIG estimated $1.95 billion and approximately 75 percent.• Medical Care Contracts and Agreements. VA reported approximately $159 million in improper and unknown payments and a rate of approximately 16 percent; the OIG estimated $190 million and approximately 19 percent.While these differences were not large, improved testing procedures are needed so that VA’s future estimates remain valid. Therefore, the OIG believes VA needs to ensure adequate documentation is reviewed during payment testing.

Audit of the U.S. Department of the Treasury’sProcess for Its Direct Loan to YRC Worldwide, Inc.Under Section 4003 of the CARES Act

This report presents the results of our audit of Package Tracking Messaging.

Postal Service employees who sustain a work-related injury or occupational disease are covered by the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA). These benefits include wage-loss compensation, medical and rehabilitation services, and death benefit payments to surviving dependents. The Department of Labor’s (DOL) Office of Workers’ Compensation Program has the exclusive authority to administer, implement, and enforce FECA, including paying claims on behalf of injured employees. The Postal Service manages efforts to return injured employees to work through its Injury Compensation Program. During chargeback year (CBY) 2022 (July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022) the Postal Service reimbursed $1.31 billion to DOL for its compensation claim costs, including administrative fees.Our objective was to evaluate management’s initiatives to reduce workers’ compensation costs and examine good practices for controlling workers’ compensation activity. We reviewed workers’ compensation data from fiscal year (FY) 2017 through FY 2022 and visited five districts based on management’s implemented cost containment initiatives.