Federal Reports

Implementing the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act is among the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) highest priorities in this time of national emergency. The CARES Act provides DOT with over $36 billion to prevent, prepare for, and respond to COVID-19 across all modes of transportation. To its credit, DOT swiftly distributed these funds and has begun implementing the Act’s requirements to provide much-needed relief to American workers, families, and businesses. As the Department is aware, the volume of CARES Act funds and the speed with which the funds have been disbursed creates oversight challenges. Therefore, to support the Department in meeting its mission while promoting effective stewardship of significant taxpayer dollars, we are providing a summary of key risk areas for DOT’s consideration in bolstering its oversight of CARES Act grantees and contractors. These potential risk areas and our suggested actions to mitigate those risks are drawn largely from our prior work assisting DOT with oversight of a significant influx of funds for economic stimulus and emergency relief. By maintaining focus on these risk areas early on and putting in place key internal controls, DOT can promote efficiencies; help ensure compliance; and better prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.

Protecting children in the Unaccompanied Alien Children (UAC) Program is an essential and ongoing responsibility of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). By law, ORR, which is within the Department of Health and Human Services' ACF, has custody of and must provide care for each child in the UAC Program.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for Children and Families (ACF), Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), has custody of and must provide care to minors (children younger than 18 years of age) in the Unaccompanied Alien Children (UAC) Program. ORR is responsible for providing a safe environment for all minors in the program. In recent years, ORR-funded facilities have reported allegations of sexual and physical abuse of minors in their care, some resulting in criminal convictions.

The objective of this report is to provide insight into the top management challenges facing federal agencies that received pandemic relatedfunding as identified by Offices of Inspector General.

This report presents the findings of an audit that examined whether VA’s police information systems provided program leaders and the workforce with adequate information to manage operations and in turn support effective governance. It builds on a December 2018 Office of Inspector General (OIG) publication that recommended improvements to VA’s national governance of its police program. The OIG found that VA lacked an effective strategy or action plan to update its police information system. In September 2015, the VA Law Enforcement Training Center (LETC) acquired Report Exec, a replacement records management system, for police officers at all medical facilities. Inadequate planning and contract administration mismanagement caused the system implementation to stall for more than two years. LETC spent approximately $2.8 million on the system by fiscal year 2019, but police officers experienced frequent performance issues and had to use different systems that did not share information. As of April 2019, only 63 percent of medical facility police units were reportedly using the Report Exec system, while 37 percent were still using an incompatible legacy system. As a result, administrators and law enforcement personnel at multiple levels could not adequately track and oversee facility incidents involving VA police or make informed decisions on risks and resource allocations. The audit also revealed that information security controls were not in place for the Report Exec system that put individuals’ sensitive personal information at risk. The OIG made seven recommendations that included evaluating which entity should oversee the records management systems for VA police, establishing a working group to assess whether the Report Exec system meets the needs of VA police, and developing a strategy to fully implement the system or its replacement. The OIG also recommended that an information security officer be consistently responsible for the Report Exec system.

We conducted a performance audit of the North Carolina Arts Council (NCAC) for the period of October 1, 2016 through September 30, 2019. Based on our performance audit, we concluded that NCAC generally complied with financial management system and recordkeeping requirements established by the Office of Management and Budget and the National Endowment for the Arts. However, we identified the following areas requiring improvement. NCAC: reported unallowable subaward costs on its Federal Financial Report; did not maintain current policies and procedures for subawards; did not have debarment and suspension policies and procedures; and did not have policies and procedures for the management of Federal awards.

For our audit of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO’s) Patent Capture and Application Processing System (PCAPS), our objective was to determine whether USPTO has adequate data recovery and contingency plans in place to ensure operational availability of PCAPS.We found that (1) USPTO has no assurance that it can restore critical applications in the event of system failure and (2) USPTO’s continued delay in updating legacy systems rendered a $4 million-per-year alternate processing site inadequate and impractical.

KPMG found FEMA did not always ensure that the Virgin Islands Emergency Management Agency (VITEMA), and Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority (VIWAPA) established and implemented policies, procedures, and practices to account for and expend PA disaster grant funds in accordance with Federal regulations and FEMA guidance. Specifically: 1) VITEMA did not have policies and procedures to ensure the timely submission of management costs for reimbursement; 2) VIWAPA did not fully ensure contract costs were reasonable and allowable; and 3) Neither VITEMA nor VIWAPA had fully implemented FEMA’s Grants Manager and Grants Portal system. This occurred because FEMA did not consistently provide adequate oversight. Because of these deficiencies, there is increased risk the PA program may be mismanaged and funds may be used for unallowable activities. We made three recommendations that, when implemented, should improve FEMA’s, VITEMA’s, and VIWAPA’s management of FEMA PA funds. FEMA concurred with all three recommendations.

The OIG evaluated the merits of a May 2018 complaint alleging that the Middle Tennessee Research Institute (MTRI), a nonprofit corporation affiliated with VA, overbilled the VA medical center in Nashville, Tennessee by at least $342,000 over several years. In addition, the OIG assessed whether MTRI had adequate controls over and provided sufficient oversight of its expenditures. The OIG also evaluated whether the Nashville VAMC had adequate controls in place and provided sufficient oversight of payments to the MTRI. Payments the OIG reviewed were related to Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) agreement reimbursements from January 2014 through April 2018, which allow VA and affiliated nonprofit corporations to collaborate on mutually beneficial research, education, and training activities. Under such agreements, VA may fund all or part of the salary and fringe benefits of employees working on VA approved projects. While the OIG did not substantiate the allegation of overbilling, the audit team found that the Nashville VAMC made about $720,000 in improper payments to MTRI due to a lack of proper supporting documentation. In addition, MTRI made about $337,000 in payments that lacked proper supporting documentation. The OIG made three recommendations to the director of the VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System. These include ensuring that MTRI’s board of directors establishes procedures to verify that supporting documentation is adequate before expenditures are approved. Recommendations to the VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System director included establishing procedures to ensure that (1) Research and Development Budget Office staff at the Nashville VAMC review VA affiliated nonprofit corporation invoices to confirm services were performed or goods received in accordance with IPA agreements before approving invoices for payment and (2) the Research and Development Budget Office supervisor conducts periodic reviews of VA affiliated nonprofit corporation invoices that staff authorized for payment.

The OIG evaluated the merits of a May 2018 complaint alleging the former executive director of the Northern California Institute for Research and Education, a VA-affiliated nonprofit corporation, spent about $740,000 on a project that was not reviewed by its board of directors. The OIG also examined whether San Francisco VA medical center officials had adequate controls and sufficient oversight of VA payments made to the nonprofit corporation. The audit team found the board was aware of project costs to expand or relocate some or all of the San Francisco VA medical center research and clinical activities. As a result, the OIG did not substantiate the allegation. However, the nonprofit’s board did not ensure its activities and expenditures complied with restrictions in federal law and Veterans Health Administration policy that limited its purpose to supporting VA-approved research and education. Spending funds on the relocation of the San Francisco VA medical center, including clinical services, went beyond facilitating research and education. The medical center made an estimated $11.7 million in improper payments to the nonprofit from January 2014 through April 2018 due to lack of required documentation. The OIG found the medical center’s internal controls and oversight of payments to the nonprofit did not meet requirements. As a result, medical center leaders had no assurance invoice amounts were valid or accurate. Continued lack of compliance with VA internal controls puts taxpayer funds at risk. The OIG recommended the San Francisco VA Healthcare System director establish procedures to ensure Research and Development Budget Office employees review invoices to confirm services were performed or goods were received before approving payment, and establish procedures to make certain the Research and Development Budget Office supervisor periodically reviews invoices authorized for payment by subordinates as required by VA policies.

Our objective was to determine if the U.S. Postal Service’s processing network is operating at optimal efficiency and meeting service standards.Our fieldwork was completed before the President of the United States issued the national emergency declaration concerning the novel Coronavirus disease outbreak (COVID-19) on March 13, 2020. The results of this audit do not reflect process and/or operational changes that may have occurred as a result of the pandemic.The Postal Service estimates significant revenue declines due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting economic fallout. Therefore, it is vital that the Postal Service focus on its financial health and address causes for costs increasing at a time when mail volumes decreased.

For our final report on fiscal year (FY) 2019 improper payment reporting, our review objective was to determine the U.S. Department of Commerce's (the Department’s) FY 2019 compliance with the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA), as amended. In determining compliance, we also evaluated the accuracy and completeness of the Department’s improper payment reporting in the U.S. Department of Commerce FY 2019 Agency Financial Report (FY 2019 AFR) and its performance in reducing and recapturing improper payments. Based on our review, we concluded that the Department complied with IPIA compliance criteria. Additionally, our review did not identify any significant issues regarding the accuracy or completeness of the improper payment reporting data described in the FY 2019 AFR or the Department’s performance in reducing or recapturing improper payments. However, Departmental management informed us of three items that were not included in the data presented in the FY 2019 AFR, and identified corrective actions taken to prevent this type of oversight in the future. We will review these corrective actions as part of our FY 2020 compliance review.

Two years since enactment, DHS and its components have mostly complied with SAVE Act requirements. The SAVE Act requires the Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer (OCRSO), as delegated by DHS, to collect and review components’ vehicle use data, including their analyses of the data and plans for achieving the right types and sizes of vehicles to meet mission needs. Most components developed their plans as required. However, only two of the 12 components we reviewed fully met requirements to analyze and document vehicle use and cost data to help them achieve the right type and size of fleet vehicles to meet their missions. This occurred because DHS did not require components to include data analyses in their OCRSO-reviewed submissions, as mandated by the SAVE Act. Had ORSCO thoroughly evaluated component submissions, it would have identified that components did not fully comply with SAVE Act requirements. DHS concurred with all four recommendations that, when implemented, should improve the Department’s oversight over its vehicle fleets.

A Trackman in Jackson, Michigan, was terminated from employment on June 15, 2020, following an administrative hearing for violating company policy. Our investigation found that the employee submitted false information on the background questionnaire of his employment application, which was inconsistent with police investigative findings related to a previous felony criminal conviction. Specifically, the employee maintained that he was never in possession of a controlled substance, however, the court records signed by the employee confirmed that he pleaded guilty to a charge of intent to deliver controlled substances. In addition, the employee was dishonest with our agents during his interview.

See the additional details link below for the full report, report summary, multimedia or any agency follow-up.

On March 27, 2020, the President signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). Among its provisions, the CARES Act provided the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) with $756 million to support the needs of DOI programs, bureaus, Indian Country, and the Insular Areas.This report presents the DOI’s progress as of May 31, 2020, in spending CARES Act appropriations. Specifically, the DOI’s expenditures to date total $337,105,190 and its obligations total $448,680,794.We are also monitoring the DOI’s progress on reporting milestones established by the CARES Act and the Office of Management and Budget.We anticipate issuing updated status reports monthly.

Our objective was to report internal control weaknesses, noncompliance issues, and unallowable costs identified in the single audit to the Social Security Administration (SSA) for resolution action.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed a final action verification (FAV) of all 16 recommendations in our September 24, 2014 report, Plant Protection and Quarantine Preclearance Offshore Program (Audit Report 33601-0001-23). In a memorandum dated September 13, 2016, OCFO reported to APHIS that it closed all of the recommendations, and we concur with this decision.

During 2019, there was a surge in Southwest Border crossings between ports of entry, resulting in 851,508 Border Patrol apprehensions and contributing to what senior U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials described as an “unprecedented border security and humanitarian crisis.” Our unannounced inspections revealed that, under these challenging circumstances, CBP struggled to meet detention standards. Specifically, several Border Patrol stations we visited exceeded their maximum capacity. Although Border Patrol established temporary holding facilities to alleviate overcrowding, it struggled to limit detention to the 72 hours generally permitted, as options for transferring detainees out of CBP custody to long-term facilities were limited. Also, even after deploying medical professionals to more efficiently provide access to medical care, overcrowding made it difficult for the Border Patrol to manage contagious illnesses. Finally, in some locations, Border Patrol did not meet certain standards for detainee care, such as offering children access to telephone calls and safeguarding detainee property. In contrast to Border Patrol, which could not control apprehensions, CBP’s ports of entry could limit detainee access, and generally met applicable detention standards. Supplementing a May 2019 Management Alert recommendation, we made two additional recommendations regarding access of unaccompanied alien children to telephones and proper handling of detainee property. CBP concurred with the recommendations.

EAC OIG issued this advisory to alert EAC's Chairman and Executive Director that EAC did not timely report assistance transactions on USASpending.gov.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) does not effectively coordinate and share best practices to enhance security across the commercial facilities sector. Specifically, CISA does not coordinate within DHS on security assessments to prevent potential overlap, does not always ensure completion of required After Action Reports to share best practices with the commercial facilities sector, and does not adequately inform all commercial facility owners and operators of available DHS resources. This occurred because CISA does not have comprehensive policies and procedures to support its role as the commercial facilities’ Sector-Specific Agency (SSA). Without such policies and procedures, CISA cannot effectively fulfill its SSA responsibilities and limits its ability to measure the Department’s progress toward accomplishing its sector-specific objectives. CISA may also be missing opportunities to help commercial facility owners and operators identify threats and mitigate risks, leaving the commercial facilities sector vulnerable to terrorist attacks and physical threats that may cause serious damage and loss of life. We made three recommendations to improve CISA’s coordination and outreach to safeguard the commercial facilities sector. CISA concurred with all three recommendations.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a healthcare inspection to evaluate allegations regarding management and patient safety at the Community Living Center (CLC). The complainant alleged that CLC managers discouraged incident reporting, coached staff on how to talk to residents or the resident’s personal representative following adverse events, and made staff fearful of retaliation for reporting concerns. Allegations also included inadequate staffing and oversight for resident care, mismanagement of laboratory specimens and medication delivery, and regulation of environmental temperatures. The OIG identified additional concerns related to employee dissatisfaction and laboratory staff’s failures to notify healthcare providers of critical laboratory results. The OIG did not substantiate managers discouraged incident reporting, inappropriately coached staff, or made staff fearful of retaliation for reporting concerns. System leaders acknowledged persistent staff dissatisfaction could have affected resident care. Although actions were taken to improve operations, unresolved issues related to employee satisfaction persisted. However, the OIG concluded the system maintained adequate nurse and provider staffing for resident care. The system exceeded Veterans Health Administration requirements for evaluating nurse staffing. Laboratory specimen handling led to falsely elevated potassium results and unnecessary treatment. Laboratory staff failed to thoroughly investigate and resolve the cause of inaccurate results. Additionally, the OIG found providers were inconsistently notified of critical laboratory results. CLC medication deliveries were also delayed. Although the causes for delays were undetermined, the lack of an on-site pharmacy likely contributed. During the inspection, the System Director announced plans for a pharmacy at the CLC. The OIG did not substantiate additional allegations of an inability to regulate environmental temperatures. Facility and engineering staff provided timely responses to periodic temperature issues. The OIG made five recommendations to the System Director related to CLC employee satisfaction, laboratory specimen handling, investigation of laboratory concerns, critical laboratory result notifications, and medication delivery.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated an inspection to assess allegations regarding deficiencies in nursing care in the Community Living Center (CLC). The OIG substantiated the allegation that a CLC nurse improperly left medication in a patient’s room. The inspectors conducted an observation of 35 patient rooms and did not find any medications left in rooms or hallways other than two creams on a bedside table. While the OIG was unable to determine the validity of many of the allegations due to a lack of information from the complainants or within the patients’ electronic health records, there were nursing documentation deficiencies identified in the CLC related to the allegations. These deficiencies included inconsistent documentation of compliance with medication order instructions, pain assessments and pain management plans, fall prevention and post-fall assessments, fall prevention measures (including inconsistent answering of call bells), and nursing wound prevention processes. The OIG made other findings not specifically related to the allegations, including failure to follow the approval procedure for a new hourly rounding form, ineffective implementation of a new procedure for nurse rounding, incomplete fact-finding reviews, inconsistent facility committee documentation, and inoperable CLC safety equipment. A contributing factor for the identified deficiencies was an outdated facility staffing policy that did not follow all Veterans Health Administration (VHA) staffing methodology requirements for calculating adequate levels. The OIG made nine recommendations addressing nursing processes including documentation of fall prevention and post-fall assessments, placement and use of call bells, wound prevention processes, medication administration, and pain assessments and pain management plans; compliance of rounding forms to facility procedures; establishment of fact-finding review processes; leadership committees’ tracking and monitoring of issues to resolution; checks that safety equipment used for transfers is operational; and staffing policy consistency with VHA requirements.

Our objective was to determine whether the Social Security Administration (SSA) had adequate controls over resolving potentially fraudulent Internet Claims (iClaim) identified by SSA's Office of Anti-Fraud Programs (OAFP).

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether veterans received accurate compensation when hospitalized by VA for more than 21 days for service-connected disabilities. The OIG also examined whether claims processors met requirements to document the competency of veterans to handle VA funds who were admitted for service-connected mental health conditions. Veterans hospitalized for more than 21 days are entitled to receive temporary increases to 100 percent in tax-free disability compensation. Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) employees process the compensation adjustments based on hospital admission and discharge reports. Staff’s failure to properly start or end the temporary compensation increases can lead to underpayments or overpayments. The OIG estimated VARO employees did not adjust or incorrectly adjusted disability compensation benefits in about 2,500 of the estimated 5,800 cases eligible for adjustments, creating an estimated $8 million in improper payments in calendar year 2018. The OIG estimated 1,900 cases did not have competency determinations documented for service-connected mental health conditions. The deficiencies occurred because employees did not consistently generate required reports and maintain report logs. Managers also provided ineffective oversight. As a result, veterans risked not receiving the proper benefits. Employees who processed benefit adjustments also lacked proficiency. They lacked sufficient ongoing experience and training to maintain requisite knowledge. This is also why employees were unclear on the requirement to document the relevant competency of veterans admitted for service-connected mental health conditions. The OIG made six recommendations to the under secretary for benefits, including ensuring proper admission and discharge reporting, as well as making certain that employees receive refresher training when needed to properly process temporary benefit adjustments for eligible veterans.

Overpayments

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a risk assessment of VA’s charge card program evaluating the three types of charge cards—purchase cards (including convenience checks), travel cards, and fleet cards—for transactions during fiscal year (FY) 2019. The OIG conducted its risk assessment from January through March 2020. The team reviewed applicable VA policies, procedures, and other controls. The team also analyzed FY 2018 and FY 2019 charge card data to identify transactions or patterns of activity that represent potentially illegal, improper, or erroneous charge card purchases. The OIG determined that the purchase card program remains at medium risk of illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases, as previously assessed for FY 2018. Data mining of purchase card transactions identified potential misuse of purchase cards. OIG investigations and reviews continue to identify patterns of purchase card transactions that do not comply with the Federal Acquisition Regulation and VA policies and procedures. The OIG also found that VA’s Travel Card Program and Fleet Card Program both remain at low risk for illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases. The risk assessment team assigned a low risk level to both programs primarily because data mining established a low percentage of potential duplicate and split purchases. Travel card transactions represented only about 3 percent of the more than $5 billion spent by VA on charge card transactions during FY 2019. Fleet card transactions represented only about 0.3 percent of that amount.

The OIG conducted this audit to determine whether VA implemented key elements of the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) consistent with the requirements for Chief Information Officer Authority Enhancements (Section 831). Specifically, the audit team evaluated two groups of requirements involving the role of the VA chief information officer during fiscal year 2018. They related to the CIO (1) reviewing and approving all information technology (IT) asset and service acquisitions across the VA enterprise and (2) planning, programming, budgeting, and executing the functions for IT, including governance, oversight, and reporting. The audit team found that VA did not meet FITARA requirements and identified several causes. These include VA policies and processes that limited the chief information officer’s review of IT investments and the oversight of IT resources. The audit team noted that limitations to the chief information officer’s role could adversely affect VA’s ability to achieve its goal to modernize systems and focus resources more efficiently. The OIG made 10 recommendations to help the department meet FITARA requirements. The recommendations focused on VA ensuring that the chief information officer reviews and approves all IT acquisitions. A chief information officer assignment plan should also be submitted for the Office of Management and Budget’s review and approval. Other recommendations called for implementing an agencywide IT acquisition awareness and training program covering FITARA requirements; providing clear and consistent acquisition processes to ensure FITARA compliance; ensuring all VA administration and staff offices work with the chief information officer for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of all IT resources; and implementing department-level oversight processes to ensure the chief information officer is a member of governance boards that make informed decisions on all IT resources across the agency.

Our objective was to determine whether there were individuals receiving retirement benefits who may have been eligible for, but not receiving, higher widow(er)'s benefits.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of Inspector General, audited Englewood Apartments’ Project-Based Section 8 Rental Assistance program based on a request from HUD’s Region 7 Office of Multifamily Housing Programs.  HUD conducted a management and occupancy review in January 2018 to assess the overall quality of management and services provided in accordance with HUD guidelines and instructions.  Overall, Englewood Apartments received a “below average” rating.  HUD also conducted a tenant file audit and found that the tenant files were noncompliant.  Our objective was to determine whether the Englewood Apartments' ownership and staff managed its Project-Based Section 8 Rental Assistance program in accordance with applicable requirements.We found that Englewood Apartments did not comply with tenant eligibility and recertification requirements when it did not review Enterprise Income Verification system reports at recertification, perform physical inspections of units, conduct 90-day income reviews for zero-income tenants, or properly calculate household incomes.  In addition, it did not always have proof of birth and Social Security cards or the Enterprise Income Verification Summary Report in the tenant file, charge tenants the minimum total tenant payment, give tenants applicable deductions, and properly apply rent schedules.  Further, Englewood claimed a subsidy payment for an unidentified individual, did not always properly verify and document participant assets, authorized tenants additional bedrooms in the unit without adequate support, processed paperwork with a deceased tenant’s signature, and did not always maintain tenant files or support documents.  As a result, the owner collected a projected amount of more than $377,000 and $24,295 in ineligible and unsupported housing assistance payments respectively.We recommend that HUD require Englewood Apartments to (1) repay the projected $377,108 in housing assistance payments for tenants who were not eligible for assistance; (2) support or repay $24,295 in unsupported housing assistance payments; and (3) implement appropriate controls, including a formalized process, to use when conducting initial certifications and interim and annual recertifications.  We also recommend that the Director of the HUD Departmental Enforcement Center consider whether administrative action against the owner is warranted.

Transportation is a core part of Postal Service operations, combining Postal Service-owned and operated assets with contractor operations. Every day a team of transportation and logistics professionals manage an average flow of over 390 million mailpieces throughout the Postal Service network, which includes 285 processing facilities and about 35,000 retail locations. Postal Service facilities are linked by a complex transportation system that depends on the nation’s highway, air, rail, and maritime infrastructures. The success of each system affects the success of the others. This audit focuses on the surface and air networks, as they transport most of the mail. Our objective was to assess opportunities to optimize the Postal Service’s transportation network and meet service performance goals.

CFTC OIG Semi-Annual Report ending March 31, 2020

Transmittal Letter for OIG Semi-Annual Report to Congress ending March 31,2020

As part of our annual audit plan, we audited costs billed to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) by Morsey Constructors, LLC (Morsey) for general construction and modification services performed under Contract No. 9275. Our audit included approximately $8.3 million in costs billed to TVA during calendar years 2014 through 2018. Our objective was to determine if Morsey billed TVA in accordance with the contract's terms.In summary, we determined Morsey overbilled TVA up to $3,819,541, including (1) from $1,543,520 to $3,698,483 in subcontractor costs that had not been preapproved by TVA, <br> (2) $100,354 in overbilled equipment costs, (3) $36,945 in unsupported and ineligible travel costs, and (4) a net underbilling of $16,241 because Morsey billed incorrect craft and noncraft time and materials billing rates. In addition, we determined TVA paid an additional $134,810 in labor costs because Morsey used statutory payroll tax rates instead of effective payroll tax rates in the build up of its craft and noncraft labor billing rates. (Summary Only)

The OIG assessed the merits of a hotline complaint received in March 2019 regarding building conditions and patient safety at the Northport VA Medical Center in Northport, New York. The complainant alleged that medical center managers did not take adequate action to maintain the center’s buildings. According to the complaint, the delivery system for steam heat failed and caused damage that contaminated employee and patient areas with asbestos, lead paint, and other debris. The review team determined that damage occurred in building 65 of the medical center and that four rooms were closed for repairs from February through mid-October 2019. The room closures did not, however, affect patient care because other space was available. The team also found that prior medical center leaders did not plan effectively to address building 65’s deficiencies. The OIG made three recommendations to the Veterans Integrated Service Network 2 director. These included developing an oversight process to make certain that medical center leaders effectively develop and execute the master plan to reduce the medical center’s footprint in order to better manage aging infrastructure. The OIG also recommended that the medical center’s director define a timeline for implementing the master plan and communicate plan objectives to stakeholders. The recommendations call for (1) the medical center’s master plan and the strategic capital investment plan to be consistent and (2) the master plan to be executed following agreed upon milestones and available resources. Finally, the OIG recommended that the medical center director develop processes and procedures for submitting work orders—including for notifications when work orders are assigned and reviewed for accuracy and consistency—to help the center’s engineering service prioritize work and manage resources.