Federal Reports

As part of the Veterans Health Administration’s (VHA) suicide prevention strategy, suicide prevention coordinators at VA medical facilities are required to reach out to veterans referred from the Veterans Crisis Line. Coordinators provide access to assessment, intervention, and effective care; encourage veterans to seek care, benefits, or services with the VA system or in the community; and follow up to connect veterans with appropriate care and services after the call. VHA’s Office of Mental Health and Suicide Prevention is responsible for issuing policy and guidance for managing crisis line referrals. The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this review to evaluate whether coordinators properly managed crisis line referrals to ensure at-risk veterans were reached.The OIG found that coordinators mistakenly closed some veteran referrals because coordinators lacked the proper training, guidance, and oversight necessary to maximize chances of reaching at-risk veterans referred by the crisis line. VHA lacked comprehensive performance metrics to assess coordinators’ management of crisis line referrals, and coordinators lacked clear guidance on how to manage crisis line referrals. Until VHA provides appropriate training, issues adequate guidance, and improves performance metrics, coordinators could miss opportunities to reach and assist at-risk veterans.The OIG made five recommendations to the under secretary for health that include improving data integrity, training coordinators on using patient outcome codes, developing additional guidance, monitoring compliance with requirements to space calls over three days, and evaluating program data for additional opportunities to improve services for referred veterans.

The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 requires the Office of Inspector General to conduct an annual independent evaluation to determine whether the Department of Energy’s unclassified cybersecurity program adequately protected its data and information systems during the fiscal year. As part of that evaluation, the Office of Inspector General is required to assess the Department’s cybersecurity program according to Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 security metrics issued by the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.We conducted this evaluation to determine whether the Department’s unclassified cybersecurity program adequately protects data and information systems.Our fiscal year 2021 evaluation determined that the Department, including the National Nuclear Security Administration, had taken actions to address many previously identified weaknesses related to its unclassified cybersecurity program. Weaknesses included areas related to: risk management, supply chain risk management, configuration management, identity and access management, data protection and privacy, security training, information security continuous monitoring, incident response, and contingency planning. Many of the deficiencies were similar in type to those identified in our prior evaluations.The identified weaknesses in the Department’s unclassified cybersecurity program occurred for a variety of reasons. For instance, weaknesses related to configuration management, information security continuous monitoring, and contingency planning generally occurred because of deficiencies in related processes and procedures. In addition, some of the identity and access management issues we identified occurred because officials were unaware of current account management requirements. To correct the cybersecurity weaknesses identified throughout the Department, we made 61 recommendations to programs and sites during fiscal year 2021 including those identified during this evaluation and in other issued reports. Corrective actions to address each of the recommendations, if fully implemented, should help to enhance the Department’s unclassified cybersecurity program. Management concurred with the recommendations issued to programs and sites related to improving the Department’s overall cybersecurity program.

The U.S. Postal Service enters into customer agreements to provide customers with customized shipping solutions and mailing incentives. These agreements provide mutual benefits for the Postal Service and its customers. One type of customer agreement is a Negotiated Service Agreement (NSA), which is a contractual agreement between the Postal Service and a specific mailer that gives the mailer customized pricing in exchange for meeting volume and mail preparation requirements. During fiscal years (FY) 2019 to 2021, the number of domestic competitive NSAs decreased from 977 to 801 (18 percent), revenue increased from [redacted], and volume increased from [redacted] (105 percent each). Our objective was to summarize the results of our recent audits of customer compliance with five NSAs.

The former counselor did not appropriately notify the Ethics Office of employment negotiations and misused their position regarding former associates.