Federal Reports

We determined that a key issue preventing CBP from transferring detainees out of its facilities within 72 hours was insufficient Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Enforcement and Removal Operations’ (ERO) bed space. ICE ERO also could not increase capacity quickly enough to keep pace with CBP’s apprehensions, and available bed space was not always appropriate for the aliens in need of placement. Consequently, CBP’s Border Patrol faced rapidly increasing numbers of detainees – especially single adults – who remained in its holding facilities intended for short-term custody. Despite worsening conditions, Border Patrol generally did not exercise its authority to release single adults from its custody, for fear they would “lose control of the border.” Border Patrol sectors created ad-hoc solutions to manage the rising detainee populations in its facilities, because, despite its dependence on ICE ERO to accept detainees, Border Patrol’s response plans did not account for ICE ERO’s detention limitations. Longstanding fragmentation in immigration enforcement operations between CBP and ICE ERO further exacerbated these challenges. DHS was aware of a potential land migration surge and the challenges it would pose. DHS had both a multi-component task force in place at the border and a plan for land migration surges, but used neither during the 2019 surge. Instead, DHS created and dissolved various interagency groups at its headquarters. In May 2019, DHS created a headquarters coordination group to advise leadership and help manage future emergencies, like a migrant surge. However, if the Department does not develop a DHS-wide framework for surges and address day-to-day fragmentation, CBP and ICE ERO will face the same challenges in future surges. We made six recommendations for ICE, CBP and DHS that will improve the Department’s response to migrant surges, including planning for surge detention capacity; standardizing alien processing paperwork; creating an inventory of best practices and surge infrastructure; and identifying thresholds for DHS intervention in future surges. DHS concurred with all recommendations.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a management advisory memorandum on differences in housing allowances for Post-9/11 GI Bill students attending non-college degree schools. These schools offer training programs, such as those for truck drivers, emergency medical technicians, and beauticians.Generally, the education program entitlement for these schools is 36 months. However, the OIG team found that the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) could allocate students from less than one month to almost six years of housing allowance because of how VBA is required to calculate the amounts.The calculations, which are required by federal law, are based on the number of school days, whether the student attends full-time or part-time, and the tuition and fees for the course or training program. A lower-cost school slowly draws down a student’s entitlement months, while more expensive schools quickly draw down the entitlement months. A student attending a higher-cost school could exhaust the education program entitlement and housing allowance in three months, while a student attending a lower-cost school could attend school for five years and still receive housing allowance payments. In comparison, full-time students attending institutions of higher learning generally receive three years of housing allowance benefits.The OIG memorandum provided more details on the calculations, as well as the team’s analysis of housing allowances for students attending non-college degree schools from August 1, 2014, through July 31, 2019. VBA’s response indicates it will consider using the analysis to determine whether to request a legislative change to how entitlements and housing allowance payments are calculated for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits.The OIG is not initiating an audit at this time. It requests that VBA inform the OIG of any actions taken in response to the memorandum and the outcome of those actions.

In October 2018 and January 2019, the OIG received unrelated complaints of potential irregularities regarding physician incentive compensation at two different healthcare facilities. The OIG did not substantiate either complaint.The first complainant alleged that beginning in fiscal year 2018, the director of a cardiac catheterization lab misused his government position for personal gain by restricting other cardiologists’ access to the lab when creating the monthly schedule and by performing an increased number of procedures to satisfy a new relative value unit- (RVU-) driven productivity component of performance pay.Beginning in 2013, the lab director prepared the cardiology department’s monthly physician assignments schedule, including for the cardiac catheterization lab. In fiscal year 2018, the healthcare system in which the lab director worked introduced an incentive to increase productivity tied to the number of procedures performed. An OIG analysis of physician productivity data for fiscal years 2016 through 2019 did not substantiate that the lab director restricted other cardiologists’ access to the lab or performed an increased number of procedures to satisfy the RVU-driven productivity criteria that would increase his own performance pay.The second complainant alleged that a medical center’s dental service chief inappropriately miscoded numerous patient encounters to satisfy the RVU-driven productivity criteria component of his performance pay. The OIG determined that, while the dental service chief incorrectly coded several patient encounters, the coding errors were due to his inexperience with VA dental and medical coding procedures and had an insignificant impact on his overall performance pay. The OIG recommended that the medical center audit the performance pay received by the dental service chief to ensure that the errors did not result in any improper payments.

The OIG investigated allegations that independent Government contractors colluded on bids for Bureau of Land Management (BLM) hay delivery contracts, that a BLM employee who was related to one of the contractors influenced the awards to benefit the relative, and that the contractors added weight to hay deliveries by watering the hay before delivering it to the BLM on contracts paid by the ton.We substantiated that one contractor assisted another contractor with bid packages for five separate contract solicitations from 2016 to 2019, but the evidence did not establish that they intended to work together on the contracts or that they discussed or developed the pricing component of their independent bids. BLM contract personnel detected the similarities between the bid packages before award and excluded both contractors from the contracts in question.We found no evidence the BLM employee attempted to influence the awards to benefit a relative. We also found no evidence that the contractors added weight to hay deliveries to the BLM.