Federal Reports

An Amtrak electrician based in Chicago, Illinois, was terminated from employment on March 7, 2025, following an administrative hearing. Our investigation found that the former employee was arrested and charged with first degree murder and was on a medical leave of absence while incarcerated.

San Jose Immigration Lawyer Extradited From The Kyrgyz Republic To Face Charges Of Large-Scale Visa Fraud

Federal Jury Convicts Joshua Aaron Holmes For Conspiracy To Commit Mail And Wire Fraud

The audit objectives were to determine whether program funds were managed in accordance with the ARC and Federal grant requirements.

The audit objectives were to determine whether program funds were managed in accordance with the ARC and Federal grant requirements.

The American Relief Act of 2025 provided the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) with approximately $39.8 billion to carry out projects and activities related to agricultural disaster assistance. It also provided USDA Office of Inspector General with $7.5 million for oversight of such projects and activities carried out with the funds made available to USDA under the Act. This document describes our plan to oversee these funds.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed Veterans Health Administration (VHA) assertions required by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in its fiscal year 2024 detailed accounting report and budget formulation compliance report. The OIG’s review was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, which incorporate the attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Those standards require that the OIG plan and perform the review to obtain limited assurance about whether any material modifications should be made to management’s assertions for them to be fairly stated. The OIG believes this review provides a reasonable basis for its conclusion. In the detailed accounting report, VHA reported three material weaknesses, three significant deficiencies, and certain matters concerning noncompliance with laws and regulations, as identified in the OIG report Audit of VA’s Financial Statements for Fiscal Years 2024 and 2023. A material weakness is a deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the entity’s financial statements will not be prevented or detected and corrected on a timely basis. A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or a combination of control deficiencies, that is less severe than a material weakness, yet important enough to merit attention by those charged with governance. Based on the OIG’s review, the OIG is not aware of any material modifications that should be made to VHA management’s assertions for them to be fairly stated.

Departments are required by law to develop and maintain governance structures, controls, and processes to safeguard resources and assets. A robust fraud risk framework helps to ensure that programs fulfill their intended purpose and that funds are spent effectively. HUD relies on public housing authorities (PHAs) to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in its housing programs.  Therefore, we audited the New York City Housing Authority’s (NYCHA) fraud risk management maturity with the objective of assessing its fraud risk management practices for preventing, detecting, and responding to fraud when administering HUD‐funded programs. We chose NYCHA because it is HUD’s largest PHA, administering billions of dollars in HUD funding and because its programs receive over 25 percent of HUD’s rental assistance funding nationwide.

We found that NYCHA has established several antifraud controls, but its processes to mitigate fraud risks are largely reactive. NYCHA is actively taking steps to formalize a more proactive fraud risk management approach and is progressing toward a more mature antifraud program.  We assessed NYCHA’s antifraud efforts against established best practices to determine the maturity of its fraud risk management practices, and found it to be at an “initial” maturity level. We found NYCHA does not have a comprehensive strategy or framework for identifying and responding to fraud risks. Specifically, it did not (1) assess fraud risks across NYCHA or develop a process to regularly conduct assessments to identify and rank fraud risks, (2) develop a response plan for fraud risks based on a fraud risk assessment, and (3) implement a process to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of fraud risk management activities.

Due to the size and complexity of NYCHA, as well as its high fraud risk exposure, it should aim for a higher fraud risk maturity level. Without a comprehensive fraud risk management framework or antifraud strategy, HUD funding will continue to be at an increased risk of fraud, and NYCHA will not be positioned to understand how it can best improve its programs to detect fraud or potential fraud.  Further, since HUD has not issued formal guidance to PHAs regarding its expectation of PHAs in assisting HUD with its responsibility to implement fraud risk management activities over HUD programs, it is likely that many PHAs have not implemented formal fraud risk management programs. As a result, HUD is missing a critical control using leading practices that could detect and prevent fraud and minimize fraud risk at the PHA level in the Office of Public and Indian Housing programs that spend approximately $38.5 billion annually on voucher and public housing programs, representing over 50 percent of HUD’s budget.