Federal Reports

What We Looked AtEnsuring adequate staffing and training for air traffic controllers—an essential part of maintaining the safety and efficiency of the National Airspace System (NAS)—has been a challenge for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), especially at the Nation’s most critical facilities. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the Agency’s ability to maintain the required number of controllers at these facilities. Given the importance of minimizing the risks to the continuity of air traffic operations, as well as the potential impact of COVID 19 on staffing and training, we initiated this audit. Our objectives were to (1) assess FAA’s efforts to ensure that critical air traffic control facilities have an adequate number of controllers and (2) identify the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on FAA’s controller training program. What We FoundFAA has made limited efforts to ensure adequate controller staffing at critical air traffic control facilities. The Agency also has yet to implement a standardized scheduling tool to optimize controller scheduling practices at these facilities, and FAA officials disagree on how to account for trainees when determining staffing numbers. As a result, FAA continues to face staffing challenges and lacks a plan to address them, which in turn poses a risk to the continuity of air traffic operations. For example, we determined that 20 of 26 (77 percent) critical facilities are staffed below the Agency’s 85-percent threshold, with New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and Miami Tower at 54 percent and 66 percent, respectively. Additionally, COVID-19 led to training pauses over a period of nearly 2 years—significantly increasing controller certification times. FAA will not know the full impact of the training suspension on certification times for several years because training outcomes vary widely, and it can take more than 3 years to train a controller. Due to these uncertain training outcomes, FAA cannot ensure it will successfully train enough controllers in the short term. Our RecommendationsFAA concurred with our two recommendations to improve its ability to ensure adequate staffing at its critical facilities. We consider both recommendations as resolved but open pending completion of the planned actions.

What We Looked AtThe Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for safely managing the National Airspace System (NAS). This requires coordinating commercial and military aviation with increasing numbers of commercial space transportation launches and reentries. Citing this increasing frequency and the need to integrate commercial space operations into the NAS, the Ranking Members of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and its Subcommittee on Aviation requested that we examine the FAA’s Space Data Integrator (SDI) program and other actions taken by FAA and the aerospace industry related to commercial space integration. Our audit objectives were to assess (1) FAA’s progress in implementing the SDI program and (2) actions taken and planned by FAA and the aerospace and aviation industries to integrate commercial space operations into the NAS.What We FoundFAA deployed an SDI prototype in 2021, but its effectiveness in providing launch and reentry data to stakeholders is limited because it only receives data from one operator, only tracked one launch at a time until recently, and is only installed at the FAA Command Center. Additionally, FAA has not finalized plans and requirements for a successor program intended to leverage the SDI prototype. The Agency is not expected to make a Final Investment Decision regarding this new program until September 2027, with the intention of gradual implementation through fiscal year 2032. FAA has connected with stakeholders to provide input on commercial space integration issues and implemented some of their recommendations. However, FAA has postponed taking action on other identified shortfalls and recommendations pending final decisions on implementing a successor program for SDI, which is now delayed. Finally, while FAA has implemented procedures aimed at reducing the amount of time commercial space operations impact NAS airspace, the Agency faces operational and policy challenges to efficiently integrate these operations.Our RecommendationsWe made four recommendations to improve FAA’s ability to provide and capture information regarding its efforts to integrate commercial space operations. FAA concurred with all four recommendations and provided appropriate planned actions and completion dates.

What We Looked AtAdvanced Air Mobility (AAM) is a Government and industry initiative to develop an air transportation system between and within rural and urban locations. This new technology, including highly automated hybrid and electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, promises many benefits. However, the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) regulations are still primarily intended for traditional small aircraft, creating challenges for FAA. Given these challenges, the Ranking Members of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and its Subcommittee on Aviation requested this audit. Our objective was to determine FAA's progress in establishing the basis for certification of AAM aircraft, including ensuring the safety of novel features and providing guidance to applicants.What We FoundRegulatory, management, and communication issues hindered FAA's progress in certifying AAM aircraft, and challenges remain. Given their unique features, AAM aircraft do not fully fit into FAA's existing airworthiness standards. For over 4 years, FAA made limited progress in determining which certification path to use. One issue is that, over 2 decades ago, FAA defined an aircraft category called powered-lift that is applicable to some AAM aircraft. However, FAA never established corresponding airworthiness standards and operational regulations, leading to significant internal debates and a lack of consensus on how to proceed. This lack of consensus affected rulemaking efforts that hindered the Agency's progress. Further, FAA changed its certification path, which caught industry by surprise. The Agency will likely continue to face challenges as it progresses through the certification process for AAM aircraft, including reviewing novel features and establishing new operational regulations. Finally, FAA has not sufficiently established policies and procedures for its Center for Emerging Concepts and Innovation, or communicated about its role in AAM certification. Continued ineffective coordination and communication, as well as the lack of timely decision making and established policies, could further hinder progress.Our RecommendationsFAA concurred with our four recommendations to enhance FAA's regulatory efforts and communication regarding the AAM aircraft certification process. We consider all recommendations resolved but open pending completion of planned actions.

The Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (the Appeals Modernization Act (AMA)), was designed to offer veterans faster resolution of disagreements with VA decisions. It established three review lanes: a direct appeal to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (not covered in this report); a higher-level review by a senior technical expert in which no new evidence may be presented; and a supplemental claim. Higher-level reviews and supplemental claims each have a completion goal of an average of 125 days. VA must report its performance to Congress and on a public website.The OIG found that VA developed reporting metrics for AMA decision reviews but could be clearer on some veterans’ wait times. Specifically, veterans who submit a claim for a higher-level review of a benefits decision and where a processing error is identified will have a new supplemental claim established—each with a completion goal of 125 days. VBA reports these separately. However, when the veteran is notified that a new claim has been established, there is no mention that they may need to wait for its completion, with a stated goal of another 125 days for a final decision. The cumulative wait time for higher-level reviews finalized as supplemental claims is not fully transparent to veterans.The OIG interprets the AMA to mean that for decisions under VBA’s jurisdiction, VA also must report the average duration from when a veteran files an initial claim through one year after VBA’s closure of the last decision on the AMA claim. VA omits the initial claim and one year.The OIG recommended VA update the reporting methodology to reflect veterans’ total wait for a final claims decision on higher-level claims completed as supplemental claims and revise and clearly state how it calculates the average duration of these AMA claims.

An Amtrak Customer Service Representative based in Hammond, Louisiana, signed a civil settlement agreement on June 20, 2023, with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Mississippi, and agreed to pay $18,182 in restitution and a $4,500 penalty for a total civil settlement amount of $22,682. Our investigation found that the employee submitted a fraudulent application to obtain a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan. We found that the employee falsely inflated the gross income of her business in the amount of $75,000 to qualify for the PPP loan, resulting in the receipt of funds to which she was not entitled.

What We Looked AtThe Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) authorized about $660 billion in funding for new and existing U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) programs for fiscal years 2022 through 2026—more than twice the amount in the previous 5-year authorization law. IIJA also changed existing surface transportation programs and created new programs. Federal programs face an increased risk of fraud when they experience unusually rapid growth or when new or changing laws significantly affect them. Because many IIJA-funded surface transportation programs experienced such growth and change, we initiated this audit to evaluate DOT’s fraud risk assessment processes. What We FoundDOT has an opportunity to expand its fraud risk assessment process for IIJA-funded surface transportation programs to better incorporate the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) leading practices. Following the passage of the Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015, DOT developed a Fraud Risk Management Plan (Plan). Although DOT anticipated fully implementing the Plan by October 2020, the Department has not yet completed two of its three planned phases. As DOT continues to implement its Plan, we found that the Department could enhance its fraud risk assessment processes to more fully incorporate leading practices identified in GAO’s Framework. Specifically, DOT could better incorporate leading practices related to planning and tailoring fraud risk assessments for all programs. DOT’s process could also better incorporate leading practices to identify and assess fraud risks and develop fraud risk profiles for its programs. By not more fully incorporating these leading practices, DOT may not be optimally positioned to comprehensively identify, properly assess, and appropriately prioritize resources to address the full spectrum of fraud risks across all of its programs, including its diverse surface transportation programs. Our RecommendationsDOT concurred with our two recommendations to improve the effectiveness of its fraud risk assessment processes. We consider these recommendations resolved but open pending completion of planned actions.