Federal Reports

Beginning in 2021, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of Inspector General (OIG), conducted several audits to assess HUD’s anti-fraud efforts and to develop inventories of fraud risks in HUD programs. Our previous work found that HUD’s fraud risk management program was in its early stages of development, and we recommended that HUD perform program-specific fraud risk assessments and incorporate these assessments into an agency-wide plan to further advance its program.  To continue assisting HUD in improving its anti-fraud efforts, we conducted this work to identify potential fraud risks and schemes that that could negatively impact the Capital Fund formula grant program, HUD, and its public housing agencies (PHAs).  We identified four program-specific fraud risk factors that increase the chance of fraud occurring by increasing the incentive, opportunity, and likelihood that an individual will consider committing fraud.  We used these risk factors, along with the results of brainstorming sessions, interviews, and reviews of audit reports, investigations, and press releases from HUD OIG, and other agencies to develop an inventory of 73 fraud schemes.  The 73 fraud schemes include 58 that were listed in HUD’s fraud risk catalog and 15 schemes that we identified.  These fraud schemes can be used to defraud HUD and its PHAs and undermine the integrity of the Capital Fund program, which awarded $3.1 billion in formula grants in fiscal year 2024. We recommend that HUD use the fraud risks and schemes inventory in this report and involve relevant stakeholders to create a program-specific fraud risk inventory to support its anti-fraud efforts and enhance oversight of the Capital Fund program.  We also recommend that these fraud risks and schemes be communicated to all stakeholders, including public housing agencies.  Additionally, we recommend that HUD determine how data currently being collected can be leveraged to identify and mitigate fraud risks. 

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) Mental Health Inspection Program (MHIP) evaluates Veterans Health Administration’s (VHA’s) continuum of mental healthcare services. This inspection focused on inpatient care delivered at the Margaret Cochran Corbin VA Campus (facility) in New York.

The facility met some VHA requirements for inpatient mental health units, such as the presence of a mental health executive council and completion of twice-yearly environment of care inspections. The OIG could not confirm if the facility had a formalized interdisciplinary safety inspection team. The facility’s multiyear plan to direct veteran-centered, recovery-oriented care did not have input from the local recovery coordinator.

Some electronic health records reviewed did not include evidence of timely suicide risk screenings and documentation of medication risk and benefit discussions. Discharge instructions lacked important details for follow-up appointment locations and medication management. Consistent with prior published reports, inpatient staff did not complete the other lethal means text field in safety plans for addressing ways to make veterans’ environments safer. 

The inpatient unit physical environment incorporated recovery-oriented elements such as artwork. However, communal rooms were locked and therefore inaccessible to veterans unless there were staff to monitor. The OIG identified unit fire doors with three-point hinges that posed ligature risks and a nonfunctional panic button. Many inpatient staff did not complete training on environment of care inspection requirements or suicide prevention strategies. 

VA concurred with the OIG’s 17 recommendations. The Under Secretary for Health agreed to require staff completion of the other lethal means text field within the safety plan template. The Facility Director agreed to implement a range of corrective actions, including strengthened processes and staff training, a formalized interdisciplinary safety inspection team, and improved coordination and documentation practices to support safe, recovery-oriented mental health care on the inpatient unit.

What OIG Inspected 

OIG inspected the executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of Embassy Wellington. This inspection included Consulate General Auckland.  

What OIG Found

• Mission New Zealand’s Chargé d’Affaires, ad interim, and acting Deputy Chief of Mission generally complied with Department of State standards for tone at the top and standards of conduct, execution of foreign policy goals and objectives, adherence to internal management controls, security and emergency planning, and equal employment opportunity. The Front Office emphasized professionalism in the workplace and fostered employee resiliency.
• The delineation of Embassy Wellington’s responsibilities for the U.S. Antarctic Program was unclear. Specifically, mission staff did not have clarity on who was responsible for emergency response and assistance, and law enforcement or security support if a disaster or crime occurs involving U.S. citizens in the Antarctic region.
• The mission had deficiencies related to public diplomacy, consular, resource management, and information management operations.  

What OIG Recommends

 OIG made 19 recommendations to Embassy Wellington. In its comments on the draft report, the embassy concurred with all 19 recommendations. OIG considers all 19 recommendations resolved. The embassy’s formal response is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix B. 

Summary of Audit

An independent external auditor, working on behalf of and under the direction of the Office of Inspector General, audited the U.S. Department of State’s (Department) annual financial statements as of, and for the year ended, September 30, 2025. The external auditor found that the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Department as of September 30, 2025, and its net cost of operations, changes in net position, and budgetary resources for the year then ended, in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America. The external auditor found certain reportable deficiencies in internal control. Specifically, the external auditor found significant deficiencies in the internal controls over property and equipment, unliquidated obligations, financial reporting, and IT. The external auditor also found an instance of reportable noncompliance with a provision of the Prompt Payment Act. 

On 18 December 2015, Congress enacted the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq.) (the Act) to improve cybersecurity in the United States through enhanced sharing of cyber threat information. The Act creates a framework to facilitate and promote the voluntary sharing of cyber threat indicators (CTIs) and defensive measures (DMs) among Federal and between Federal and non-Federal entities. The Act required the Inspectors General of the “appropriate Federal entities,”
defined as the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, and the Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight, to jointly report to Congress by 18 December every two years, on the actions of the appropriate Federal entities to carry out the Act over the most recent two-year period. This report meets the biennial joint reporting requirement.

The FCC financial statements were fairly presented in all material respects, in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. In addition, Kearney did not find any reportable instances of noncompliance with laws, regulations, and contracts applicable to FCC. The report includes two significant deficiencies with 28 recommendations for improvement. 

For Oversight reporting, the FCC financial Statements (25-AUD-06-01) reported 1 recommendation and 27 recommendations for FISMA (25-EVAL-04-01).