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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
Federal Trade Commission
Audit of FTC Redress Program Data Management and Oversight of Contractors
The report summarizes the OIG’s follow-up evaluation of the FTC’s progress on, and effectiveness of, changes that the agency implemented in its Redress Program following the OIG’s March 4, 2020, report Audit of Federal Trade Commission Redress Process Controls. We narrowed our audit objective to focus specifically on the Redress Program’s effectiveness of contractor oversight and program data management.
We performed this review to determine whether the Burlington Community School District (Burlington) expended Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief (ESSER) grant funds for allowable purposes in accordance with applicable requirements. We determined that all the ESSER expenditures we reviewed for Burlington were allowable and in accordance with applicable requirements. We also found that Burlington complied with key Federal procurement requirements, including those covering the procurement methods to be followed and contract cost, price, and provisions, when procuring the goods or services associated with each ESSER expenditure we reviewed. Because we identified no exceptions, our report does not include recommendations.
In January 2024, we conducted onsite, unannounced inspections atfour U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) facilities in the DelRio area, specifically three U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol)facilities and one Office of Field Operations (OFO) port of entry(POE).
We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of Multifamily Housing Programs’ efforts to address multifamily mortgage application processing delays. When applications for these loans are delayed, it slows the production and availability of affordable multifamily housing units. During the COVID-19 pandemic, HUD took action to eliminate a backlog of over 500 applications waiting to be assigned to underwriters for review. We did this audit to assess HUD’s efforts for receiving and screening applications and assigning them to underwriters.HUD took steps to address delays in assigning applications to underwriters, but its methods and systems could be improved to help it manage applications and future challenges. HUD used several methods to address delays, including implementing (1) a nationwide queue, (2) an application completeness screening, (3) priority application processing, (4) use of contract underwriters, (5) workload sharing, and (6) an option to bypass initial feasibility reviews for certain applications (one-step processing). Although HUD eliminated the nationwide queue in November 2022, it was unable to transition successfully to a state-of-the-art processing platform. As a result, HUD still uses multiple systems, email, and other manual methods to process applications. We found this creates a future risk that HUD cannot process applications as quickly and effectively as possible. With a more integrated system and a plan for which methods will be used when applications exceed underwriter capacity, HUD can more easily identify, monitor, and address processing delays; evaluate its performance and processes; and manage future challenges, such as fluctuations in application volume. We recommend that HUD enhance its system for receiving, processing, and assigning applications in several important ways. These include tracking applications and capturing application intake, screening, and status, including key dates; capturing data on the type of underwriter used; developing a portal for receiving documents and communicating with lenders; and generating Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan numbers. Further, we recommend that HUD update its policies and procedures to include methods that will be used when applications exceed underwriter capacity, align intake and screening processes, and explain when timeframes will be enforced. Last, we recommend that HUD issue an industry wide letter to reinforce how intake, screening, and enforcement of timeframes will be handled.
Michael Holder, an Amtrak assignment clerk based in Chicago, Illinois, pleaded guilty on June 5, 2024, in U.S. District Court, Northern District of Indiana, to two counts of Wire Fraud related to the fraudulent receipt of benefits under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act. Our investigation found that Holder provided false and fictitious information to support an Economic Injury Disaster Loan application to the Small Business Administration. Further, Holder provided false and fictitious information to a financial institution to support a Paycheck Protection Program loan. Holder obtained a total of $30,833 to support his purported personally owned business. Holder will be sentenced at a future date.