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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
Department of State
Audit of the Department of State’s Coordination and Oversight of the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Did Not Identify and Report Potential Antideficiency Act Violations for 12 Contracts Used To Establish the Federal Marketplace Under the Affordable Care Act
A 2008 HHS review of its acquisition process concluded that HHS components, including the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), did not always obligate and expend funds in compliance with Federal requirements. As a result, in July 2011, HHS reported a department-wide Antideficiency Act violation totaling more than $1.4 billion. These previously identified deficiencies, combined with issues with the October 2013 launch of the Federal marketplace, raised concerns about CMS's management and oversight of contracts awarded in whole or in part for the support of the Federal marketplace. CMS relies extensively on contractors to operate many of its healthcare programs, including the Federal marketplace.
DHS does not have a unified approach for procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices despite the widespread use of these devices across multiple components. We recommended DHS establish a process to coordinate joint needs across components and maximize savings from strategic sourcing opportunities. We made two recommendations that should help improve unity of effort in procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices. DHS concurred with recommendation 1 but did not concur with recommendation 2.
This report is a review of the Denali Commission’s compliance with the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act). SB & Company (SBC), an independent public accounting firm, planned and performed the examination to obtain reasonable assurance about• Completeness, timeliness, quality, and accuracy of fiscal year (FY) 2019, first quarter financial and award data submitted for publication on USASpending.gov, and• The Denali Commission’s implementation and use of the Government-wide financial data standards established by the Office of Management and Budget and the U.S. Department of the Treasury. In SBC’s opinion, the Denali Commission’s DATA Act submission to Treasury’s DATA Act Broker for the first quarter of FY 2019 was complete and submitted timely. While the data submitted was accurate, the Commission did not consistently report grant information on File D2. As a result, SBC determined that the quality of the Commission’s data is considered “Lower” because of the missing financial assistance award information in file D2.
Financial Audit of Fondo Para la Accin Ambiental y la Niez's Management of the Connected Landscapes Program in Colombia, Cooperative Agreement AID-530-A-13-00005, January 1 to December 31, 2018
Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of Community Development Fund, Advancing Kosovo Together-Local Solution Project, Cooperative Agreement AID-167-A-14-00008, for the Year Ended December 31, 2016
Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of Center for Media Development and Analysis CRMA, Under Multiple Awards in Bosnia and Herzegovina, January 1 to December 31, 2018
FSA consistently administered its heightened cash monitoring payment methods for schools that FSA placed on heightened cash monitoring for the top five reasons, and the documentation generally supported FSA’s placement of the schools on heightened cash monitoring. In our review of supporting documentation for 43 of the 809 schools on a heightened cash monitoring payment method for the top five reasons, we generally found that (1) the reason for a school’s placement was consistent with applicable regulations and FSA’s “Method of Payment Procedures” and (2) the documentation consistently supported the level of heightened cash monitoring.However, FSA did not have adequate internal controls to reasonably ensure it consistently placed schools on a heightened cash monitoring payment status when they submitted late annual financial statements or had composite scores that fell below the minimum financial responsibility score. As a result, School Participation Divisions (School Divisions) did not consistently or timely cite and place schools on provisional and heightened cash monitoring for submitting financial statements after the due dates.Also, FSA did not have control activities to track a school’s method of payment status from the School Division’s recommendation for heightened cash monitoring placement until the placement was made. We determined that 99 percent of the schools (653 of 659) with composite scores below the minimum financial responsibility score either were properly placed on stop payment or required by FSA to participate under alternative standards and requirements. However, one of FSA’s eight School Divisions did not take the required actions for 6 (5 percent) of 113 schools with composite scores that fell below the minimum score for financial responsibility. Further, FSA did not retain all required documentation for administering its heightened cash monitoring payment methods for some of the 43 schools we sampled. While the documentation generally supported FSA’s placement of schools on heightened cash monitoring, we found that FSA did not retain all required documentation for 9 schools (21 percent). For the 25 schools we sampled, FSA did not retain at least one required document for 12 schools (48 percent) removed from a heightened cash monitoring payment method.Overall, FSA’s use of heightened cash monitoring was an effective oversight tool. Our review of FSA’s “Method of Payment Procedures” found that the processes, as designed, provided reasonable assurance that a school (1) placed on a heightened cash monitoring payment method implemented the required corrective actions before FSA returned the school to the advance payment method and (2) placed on heightened cash monitoring 2 submitted the required student payment documentation to FSA before being reimbursed by the Department.