Federal Reports

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The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is not effectively designating Surge Capacity Force (SCF) volunteers and managing the SCF program during disaster operations. In 2017, FEMA was not prepared to deploy SCF Tier 4 volunteers rapidly and efficiently because FEMA had neither a clear commitment from agencies outside DHS to participate in SCF, nor a roster of volunteers capable of rapidly deploying. FEMA did not adequately measure SCF performance because it did not have mechanisms to collect data and feedback to gauge program success. FEMA did not effectively manage the SCF financial program because it relied heavily on the financial controls of volunteers’ home agencies without guarding against breakdowns in those controls. Finally, FEMA did not close mission assignments promptly because it did not make closing them a priority in what officials described as a series of “overwhelming” catastrophes. We made four recommendations for FEMA to improve designation of SCF volunteers and management of the SCF program. FEMA concurred with three of our four recommendations.

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not monitor the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) to ensure it continues to fulfill needed capabilities. Although the AIT met the requirement for system availability, TSA did not monitor the AIT’s probability of detection rate and throughput rate requirements set forth in TSA’s operational requirements document. These issues occurred because TSA has not established comprehensive guidance to monitor performance of the AIT system. Without continuous monitoring and oversight, TSA cannot ensure the AIT is meeting critical system performance requirements—a consistent weakness found in prior DHS OIG reports. We made two recommendations designed to improve TSA’s monitoring of the AIT system. TSA concurred with our recommendations.

On March 27, 2020, the President signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). Among its provisions, the CARES Act provided the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) with $756 million to support the needs of DOI programs, bureaus, Indian Country, and the Insular Areas.The DOI will award most of its CARES Act funding through contracts and financial assistance agreements (such as grants and cooperative agreements). Our past work demonstrates that these awards are a vulnerable area for the DOI. Moreover, awards made as part of emergency response are riskier than normal because they are awarded quickly and often without competition and have a higher purchase threshold than other acquisitions.In this report we present lessons learned and risks identified in our prior work—both audits and investigations—that the DOI should consider as it makes awards and provides oversight under the CARES Act. We have found that the following factors are important for successful oversight:• Ensuring sufficient workforce capacity• Ensuring use of the appropriate award vehicle (contract vs. grant vs. cooperative agreement)• Maximizing competition in the source selection process• Ensuring background research and risk assessments of potential recipients• Monitoring documentation and use of funds by recipients• Reviewing recipients’ performance and financial reports

Semiannual report to congress Oct 2019 - March 2020

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