Federal Reports

This review examined how effectively Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) managers fulfilled the plan VA was required to submit to Congress for a skills certification program for claims processors. The program includes a required test to ensure staff have the skills, knowledge, and abilities needed to accurately carry out their tasks.The OIG found VBA did not meet the skills certification requirements for fiscal years (FYs) 2016 through 2019. Specifically, based on a statistical sample, the OIG estimated 4,700 of 10,800 individuals required to take the exam were not tested. The program also did not provide individual training plans to about 1,900 of the 2,500 employees who failed the test, or ensure that all staff who failed took the next scheduled test. Further, VBA did not take personnel actions against an estimated 98 percent of employees who failed consecutive tests after receiving remedial training.Several factors contributed to the identified issues, including an insufficient process for identifying and notifying those required to take the test and data limitations affecting tracking. In addition, VBA did not design tests for all employees cited in the plan. Testing was cancelled in FY 2018 because of intranet technical issues and in FY 2019 to assess the effectiveness of testing.The OIG made six recommendations regarding written guidelines for individuals required to or exempted from taking tests; a tracking mechanism for eligible test takers; updates to Congress on why not all claims-processing positions are subject to testing; plans to train staff who failed tests; an oversight plan to ensure individuals who failed consecutive tests were retrained; and notifying Congress of plans to take personnel actions against individuals who fail consecutive tests after remediation, as required by law.

This Office of Inspector General (OIG) Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection Program report provides a focused evaluation of the leadership performance and oversight by Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) 7: VA Southeast Network in Duluth, Georgia, covering leadership and organizational risks and key processes associated with promoting quality care. This inspection focused on Quality, Safety, and Value; Medical Staff Credentialing; Environment of Care; Medication Management: Long-Term Opioid Therapy for Pain; Women’s Health: Comprehensive Care; and High-Risk Processes: Reusable Medical Equipment. The OIG conducted this unannounced visit during concurrent inspections of VISN 7 facilities.In September 2019, VHA reassigned the Network Director and Chief Medical Officer, and appointed acting leaders to fill their roles following reports that a Community Living Center patient was bitten by hundreds of ants. The leadership team had worked together for almost five months at the time of the visit. Selected survey scores regarding employee satisfaction revealed opportunities for the acting Chief Medical Officer to improve attitudes toward leaders and for the Deputy Network Director and Quality Management Officer to improve feelings of moral distress at work. Patient experience survey scores were lower than VHA averages. The VISN leaders have an opportunity to improve employee and patient satisfaction. The leaders seemed to support efforts to improve and maintain patient safety, quality care, and other positive outcomes.The OIG issued seven recommendations for improvement in three areas:(1) Environment of Care• VISN comprehensive environment of care program policy• VISN Emergency Management Committee processes(2) Women’s Health• Quarterly program updates to executive leaders• Annual site visits at each facility• Staff education gap assessments(3) High-Risk Processes• VISN-led facility reusable medical equipment inspection results

We determined that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not ensure state and local law enforcement agencies expended FEMA’s grant for protection of the President’s non-governmental residences in accordance with Federal regulations and Agency guidelines. Specifically, FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) reimbursed the New York City Police Department (NYPD) for unallowable overtime fringe benefits. Additionally, GPD did not provide effective oversight to manage the PRPA grant during its application review and verification process by assigning limited, inexperienced staff whose work received minimal supervisory review. We made four recommendations to FEMA that should improve the management of the program. FEMA concurred with three recommendations and nonconcurred with one recommendation.

This report provides a summary of our previous findings and recommendations, which may inform future disaster response efforts. Based on our prior work, we identified a pattern of internal control vulnerabilities that negatively affect both disaster survivors and disaster program effectiveness that may hinder future response efforts, including shortcomings in acquisition and contracting controls, interagency coordination challenges, and insufficient privacy safeguards that affect disaster survivors. Additionally, FEMA did not adequately oversee disaster grant recipients and subrecipients, manage disaster assistance funds, or oversee its information technology environment. This report discusses these vulnerabilities and the correlating recommendations we previously made that, if implemented, would better prepare FEMA to respond to future disasters. We made no new recommendations.

The objectives of our inspection were to determine (1) the U.S. Department of Education’s (Department) process for assessing the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and School’s (ACICS) compliance with Federal regulatory criteria for recognition, and (2) what evidence the Department considered in its review of selected recognition criteria and whether the Department’s conclusions were supported by evidence.We determined that the Department’s process for assessing ACICS’ compliance with Federal regulatory criteria for recognition followed applicable policies and regulations except during the 2016 recognition review. We determined that the Department did not comply with all regulatory requirements during its 2016 review of ACICS’ petition for recognition renewal because its process did not consider all available relevant information during its review as required.We determined that the Department implemented a process for assessing ACICS’ compliance with recognition criteria following a court remand in 2018 that was permitted under applicable policies and regulations as well as the court’s remand order.We determined that the conclusions of the SDO (DeVos) in the 2018 review regarding ACICS’ compliance with each of the six recognition criteria we reviewed were supported by the evidence cited.However, we found that the Office of Postsecondary Education’s (OPE) “Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Petitions and Compliance Reports” (Guidelines) allowed for areas of reviewer subjectivity.