Federal Reports

Phong Hung Tran, a licensed physician and surgeon in the state of California, was sentenced in United States District Court, Southern District of California, on September 13, 2021, to time served, two years’ probation and 12 months of home confinement for conspiracy to commit honest services mail fraud and health care fraud.Our investigation found that Tran and other doctors arranged for and accepted kickback payments from suppliers of health care services and products. The kickback scheme involved the referral of prescriptions for medically unnecessary compounded drugs and other items that were reimbursed by health care benefit programs. As a result of the scheme, Amtrak’s insurance providers were fraudulently charged approximately $22,000. Criminal judicial proceedings for other defendants in this case are pending.

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VA must report annually to Congress on its capacity in five areas: (1) spinal cord injury and disorder, (2) traumatic brain injury, (3) blind rehabilitation, (4) prosthetics and sensory aids, and (5) mental health. This reporting requirement was established to ensure that VA’s capacity to serve disabled veterans does not fall below 1996 levels. The OIG is required to report to Congress on the accuracy of VA’s report.The OIG found some minor errors, data omissions, inaccuracies, and inconsistencies, but found nothing that caused it to believe the capacity report was not fairly stated and accurate in all material respects, with some exceptions noted. Some source data obtained by the review team differed materially or were excluded from some parts of the capacity report appendix, and some statements in the narrative were not consistent with data in accompanying tables. Limitations in data sources and reporting occurred in staffing data that included nonclinical time and in expenditure and cost data whose reliability was uncertain. VA also did not provide all required data. Still, the OIG found VA improved its reporting as a result of the OIG’s previous review.Despite these improvements, as the OIG previously noted, VA cannot compare its current mental health capacity with its 1996 capacity because of changes in diagnosis and treatment, service provision, and data collection. For example, VA must report on the number of veterans with “serious mental illness,” but VA no longer uses that term. And non-VA care, which veterans increasingly seek, must be excluded from reports on VA’s capacity to provide care. The OIG believes that by modernizing the reporting metrics, Congress would be better positioned to assess VA’s capacity to provide care for today’s disabled veterans.

This report presents the results of the System and Organization Controls 1 Type 2 examination conducted in accordance with Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements No. 18 for the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Financial Management Services (FMS) description of its financial systems used to process user entities financial transactions throughout the period October 1, 2020, to June 30, 2021.

This report presents the results of the System and Organization Controls 1 Type 2 examinationconducted in accordance with Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements No. 18 forthe United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Financial Management Services (FMS)description of its financial systems used to process user entities financial transactions throughoutthe period October 1, 2020, to June 30, 2021.

CBP did not effectively manage its aviation fleet acquisitions to meet operational mission needs. Specifically, AMO acquired and deployed 16 multi-role enforcement aircraft (MEA) that did not contain the necessary air and land interdiction capabilities to perform its mission. In addition, CBP AMO initiated the MEA and medium lift helicopter program without well-defined operational requirements and key performance parameters — critical items in the acquisition planning process. This occurred because CBP did not provide oversight and guidance to ensure acquisition personnel followed key steps required by the DHS Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. As a result, AMO expended approximately $330 million procuring multi-role enforcement aircraft that, at the time of acceptance, did not effectively respond to emergent air threats along the northern or southern borders, and experienced schedule delays deploying the medium lift helicopter. Without effective oversight and guidance, AMO risks aviation acquisitions taking longer to deliver, at a greater cost, and without the needed capabilities. We made four recommendations aimed at improving CBP’s acquisition management of aviation fleet to meet operational needs. CBP concurred with three of the four recommendations.