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In the last six months we prepared reports on the Library’s Web search strategy, collectionsdevelopment, the Open World Leadership Center’s fiscal year (FY) 2012 financial statements, andthe status of an in-progress facilities planning review. During this period, investigations focusedon falsifying time and attendance records, theft of computers, and referrals and assistance toother law enforcement agencies. One investigation resulted in a three-count criminal conviction.Finally, in the last six months, we responded to two congressional inquiries, oversaw the audit ofthe Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency’s FY 2013 financial statements,received a peer review of our audit operations, and peer reviewed the audit operations of anotherfederal Inspector General.

Based on an investigation, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) was contracted to conduct a performance audit of the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department) Dignitary Protection Division (DPD) program. The objectives of the audit were to determine if DPD (1) established adequate internal controls and processes that would ensure integrity of the program, and (2) complied with applicable laws, regulations, and guidance pertaining to the management operation of DPD. Our scope included DPD controls, processes, and operations as of October 1, 2011, through December 31, 2012.

The purpose of this evaluation was to answer the question; Is the ARC network's perimeter defense effective?

The purpose of this evaluation was to answer the question: Has ARC implemented an effective, comprehensive system maintaining patch levels

This review was initiated in follow up to a recent OIG review of TVA's project management software, PowerPlant. During that review, we identified several areas for further analysis related to timely project approvals, delegated approvals, and project charges allocated incorrectly. The objective of this review was to determine if the TVA capital project approval process was (1) efficient and timely, (2) performed in accordance with TVA policies, and (3) aligned with industry best practices.We found that although the overall TVA project approval process was completed in a reasonable time frame, the NPG approval process took 25 days longer than the TVA average. This indicated there were opportunities for improvement in the timeliness of NPG approvals.We found 31 percent of NPG projects reviewed came in more than 25 percent behind the forecasted schedule. While there were also projects that came in ahead of schedule, the degree to which the schedules were being missed indicated there was potential for more accurate planning related to forecasted schedules.We recommended management (1) evaluate the approval process for NPG capital projects to identify opportunities to improve the timeliness of project approvals, and (2) evaluate the planning and forecasting process to identify other areas for improvement.

We evaluated Arkansas State University’s (ASU) loan default prevention and management, the accuracy of selected information ASU reported to the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), its quantitative satisfactory academic progress measures, and the accuracy of selected consumer information on its Web site. We determined that for the time period reviewed, ASU’s default prevention and management to address its rising cohort default rate was reasonable, selected information it reported to IPEDS was accurate, and that it properly measured quantitative satisfactory academic progress for students. We did, however, find that ASU did not provide employment and continuing education data of students graduating from 6 of its 10 colleges in the 2008–2009 academic year and did not provide employment and continuing education data of students graduating from 8 of its 10 colleges in the 2009–2010 academic year. In addition, ASU provided unsupported job placement rates for four colleges for the 2008–2009 academic year and for two colleges for the 2009–2010 academic year on its Web site. Although ASU reported its graduation data accurately through IPEDS, we found that ASU reported inaccurate graduation data on its Web site for undergraduate students who received degrees in academic year 2008–2009 for 4 of its 10 colleges. We also identified minor graduation data inaccuracies for academic year 2009–2010. We recommended that FSA require ASU to establish policy and procedures to make available employment and continuing education data to enrolled or prospective students for all colleges; collect, maintain, and verify the accuracy of documentation to support required disclosures of employment and continuing education data, job placement rates, and graduation data reported on its Web site or by other means of dissemination; and ensure that any required job placement rate disclosures include the required disclosures of the source, time frames, and methodology associated with job placement rate.

We performed our audit work at the Texas Education Agency (TEA), La Joya Independent School District (La Joya), Lufkin Independent School District, and Marion Independent School District. We determined that both the TEA and La Joya need to improve their systems of internal controls. We found that the TEA did not use analyses of test results and erasures to identify LEAs or schools to monitor, did not ensure that LEAs tested all qualified 10th grade students, had not assessed how LEAs or schools could influence outcomes of new State tests, and did not document its recommended corrective actions to address all Statewide test administration irregularities that La Joya reported or verified that La Joya implemented all corrective actions. We recommended that the TEA (1) strengthen its risk assessment and monitoring processes by using reviews of test results and analyses of erasure data, (2) identify ways that LEAs and schools can improperly influence test results and design mitigating controls, and (3) document the corrective actions that it recommends and verify that the LEAs implement the corrective actions. We found that La Joya did not properly administer Statewide tests, did not adequately document its reviews or provide records of all reviews of potential test administration irregularities, and did not report all test administration irregularities to TEA or did not report them in a timely manner. We recommended that La Joya strengthen its system of internal control by (1) properly administering Statewide tests, (2) adequately documenting its reviews of potential test administration irregularities, (3) retaining records of all reviews of potential test administration irregularities, and (4) reporting all test administration irregularities to TEA.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) evaluated the U.S. Department of the Interior's (DOI) Offshore Renewable Energy Program to review ongoing and proposed projects, budget and resource planning, the process for establishing renewable energy fees, and inspection and enforcement program planning.

Preventive maintenance (PM) is important to the reliable operation of assets. As a result of recent issues with nuclear performance, the OIG conducted a review of Nuclear Power Group's (NPG) PM program. The objective of this review was to determine if nuclear plant PM had been performed in accordance with established schedules, and if not, what effect the deviations were having.We found that reported PM metrics may not be accurate. During our review, we identified several concerns that raised questions about the validity of reported PM metrics. For calendar year 2012, auditors were provided two sets of PM metrics for each site. There were differences in the data sets and some of the differences were significant. Additionally, the three plants were not consistently using the "Counts as Deferral" flag in Maximo, thus preventing certain deferrals from being identified and considered for the deferral count. Also, we found there was inconsistency in how the late PM metric was reported. These issues will impact the value of the NPG Equipment Reliability Index (ERI), which is part of NPG's winning performance scorecard for fiscal year (FY) 2013. We also found that deviations from the PM schedules were negatively affecting system and component health. While PM program health has historically been rated poorly, there has been recent improvement. TVA started a PM optimization (PMO) program to bring its PM program in line with industry standards. Due to slow progress at all three plants, escalations were filed to raise this concern to a higher level.We recommended the Executive Vice President and Chief Generation Officer, Generation, take steps to (1) define methods for consistent and accurate reporting of PM metrics across the nuclear fleet, including a step for verification and retention of documentation for items manually excluded; (2) address the issue with the "Counts as Deferral" flag used in PM tracking; (3) perform an analysis to determine what impact inaccurate PM data could have on the Equipment Reliability Index calculation for fiscal year 2013 winning performance measures; (4) reduce deviations from the PM schedules; (5) take necessary actions to prevent recurring PMO implementation problems resulting from lack of site support; and (6) expedite PMO efforts. TVA management agreed our recommendations.

EAC OIG, through the independent public accounting firm of Learn Snead & Co. P.C., audited EAC's compliance with OMB Circular A-130 and FISMA requirements for fiscal year 2013.

The TVA has stated its future depends on effective succession planning and faces a potential workforce challenge due to retirement within the next five years. Also, TVA has identified a risk of senior leadership attrition that could leave a gap in key positions. This review was conducted as a follow-up to a previous OIG review of TVA's succession planning. The objective of this review was to assess TVA's succession planning.This review found TVA has made improvements to succession planning; however, areas for improvement still exist. Improvements include the use of a talent grid, implementation of succession planning metrics, and a more accurate attrition prediction model. In addition, we found TVA could strengthen some best practices.While TVA has made progress in its succession planning process, we found, through interviews and review of documentation, areas for improvement still exist. Specifically, areas of improvement include: (1) follow-up on action items identified in talent reviews including the development of organizational action plans; (2) cross-pollination of talent; (3) reduction in talent review preparation time; and (4) frequent revisions of the talent review and succession planning process, which have caused frustration among TVA management. Additionally, TVA is working to address areas of concern regarding populating succession plans with realistic candidates.As part of this review, we identified succession planning best practices and compared them to processes TVA had in place. Of the ten best practices identified, we found TVA could strengthen executive ownership, onboarding of succession candidates, and transparency of the succession planning process. In addition to these findings, all TVA managers who were interviewed expressed concern with the use of forced distribution for the talent grid.We made recommendations to management to address the findings in the report.

This report is Sensitive But Unclassified. To obtain further information, please contact the OIG Office of Counsel at OIGCounsel@oig.treas.gov, (202) 927-0650, or by mail at Office of Treasury Inspector General, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington DC 20220.

TVA introduced the Valley Investment Initiative (VII) program as a means to incentivize customers to invest in the economic development of its geographic area. The OIG included a review of the VII program in its annual audit plan as the budget for this program has significantly increased since its inception in 2009. Our audit objective was to determine if TVA was exercising adequate oversight over the VII program. In summary, we found Economic Development personnel complied with TVA policies and procedures for oversight of program operations; however, TVA oversight of the VII program as a whole could be improved. For example, TVA had not established performance measures specific to the VII program nor performed an evaluation study to determine the effectiveness of the program. We also noted customer compliance audits could be improved by adding independent verification of customer reported information.We made four recommendations that pertain to improving TVA's oversight of the VII program. TVA management generally agreed with our recommendations and plans to take action to address them. Summary Only