Federal Reports

U.S. census data shows that the percent of the U.S. population who speak a language other than English grew annually from 19.6 to 21.1 percent between 2009 and 2016. Spanish, which represents the largest non-English language group, more than quadrupled since 1970, increasing from 9.6 million to 39.1 million in 2016 and accounted for 13 percent of the nation’s population. Other non-English languages spoken in the home include: Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese, Arabic, French, and Korean. Our objective was to evaluate the U.S. Postal Service’s customer service to non-English-speaking customers.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is conducting an investigation into allegations that the whistleblower was retaliated against for, among other things, communicating with Members of Congress regarding discrimination and retaliation against the whistleblower. The whistleblower alleged being subjected to retaliatory investigations by CGIS in violation of the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA). We recently learned that CGIS executed a search warrant against the whistleblower several months after the whistleblower retired from the Coast Guard, but soon after CGIS became aware of the OIG’s whistleblower retaliation investigation. Our information indicates that a CGIS agent obtained the search warrant in connection with a CGIS-directed investigation.

The OIG investigated allegations of misconduct and mismanagement at Southwestern Indian Polytechnic Institute (SIPI), a community college in Albuquerque, NM, operated and overseen by the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE). The complainant alleged that a SIPI manager engaged in sexual misconduct and harassment, and violated Federal travel regulations and U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) policy. The complainant also alleged that other SIPI managers and employees retaliated against her for filing complaints about the SIPI manager, failed to address employee complaints, failed to complete performance appraisals, engaged in improper hiring practices, circumvented the acquisition process, and misused a Government purchase card.We found that the SIPI manager had a sexual relationship with a SIPI student, but neither the college nor the BIE have a policy prohibiting sexual relationships between faculty and students. In addition, several of the manager’s colleagues and direct reports described the manager’s behavior in the workplace as confrontational, abrasive, and argumentative. We did not substantiate the allegations that the SIPI manager violated Federal travel regulations or DOI policy.We also found that SIPI managers did not complete performance appraisals for all employees and that the appraisal process at SIPI allowed managers to determine ratings-based cash awards for themselves. We did not substantiate the remaining allegations, including retaliation against the complainant.

In July 2012, we reported on significant management control weaknesses in the company’s background checks process for the employees it hires, which the company took actions to address. The purpose of this review was to provide an update on the company’s background checks process. Our objective was to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of this process for company employees and contractor employees working in the company.We found that the company has strengthened its background check process since 2012. However, the company’s background check vendor returned more than 54% of background checks in fiscal year 2017 for the company to complete because 1) a contract provision limited the amount of education and employers that the vendor could check, and 2) company officials did not ensure the vendor was adhering to company guidance on how to resolve minor discrepancies. We also found that the company did not comply with its policies for ensuring contractors conduct the required background checks on their employees working for the company. Additionally, the company did not conduct independent audits to verify that the contractors conducted these checks and to ensure that contractors use a company-approved vendor to ensure that checks meet company standards. We recommended that the company strengthen its oversight of the background checks process by ensuring that its vendor follows company guidance for resolving questions about the education and employment histories of prospective employees. In addition, we recommended that the company address background check vulnerabilities in its contractor workforce by clarifying which department is responsible for the following activities, and ensuring that the departments are initiating implementation:• ensuring that contractors self-certify that they completed checks of their employees working in the company • auditing contractors’ compliance with the requirement to conduct checksFinally, we recommended that the company clarify its policy requiring the company to develop a list of approved vendors that contractors can use to conduct checks and initiate implementation.