Federal Reports

The Office of the Inspector General previously conducted an evaluation of Bull Run Fossil Plant (BRF) (Evaluation Report 2015-15357 issued March 30, 2016) to identify strengths and risks that could impact BRF's organizational effectiveness. Our final report identified several operational and cultural areas for improvement along with recommendations for addressing those issues. The objective of this follow-up evaluation was to assess management's actions in response to our recommendations from our initial organizational effectiveness evaluation. In summary, we determined the actions taken by BRF appear to address most areas for improvement identified during our initial organizational effectiveness evaluation, and for the most part, individuals reported seeing positive changes at BRF. Some concerns remain related to specific areas in the work management process, including planning of work and communication of work order and condition report statuses. However, resolution of these concerns relies on funding decisions that are generally outside of BRF's control.

The Department of Homeland Security made progress in implementing the JTFs since their inception in 2014. According to JTF leaders, operational effectiveness and efficiency has increased; staff morale has improved; and components have successfully worked together to promote information sharing and communication.Although the JTFs are a step forward for DHS, they face challenges, including a need for dedicated funding and outcome-based performance measures. Without dedicated funding, the JTFs rely on components that may have competing or conflicting priorities. Without performance metrics, the JTFs cannot show the value they add to homeland security operations.The Department of Homeland Security made progress in implementing the JTFs since their inception in 2014. According to JTF leaders, operational effectiveness and efficiency has increased; staff morale has improved; and components have successfully worked together to promote information sharing and communication.Although the JTFs are a step forward for DHS, they face challenges, including a need for dedicated funding and outcome-based performance measures. Without dedicated funding, the JTFs rely on components that may have competing or conflicting priorities. Without performance metrics, the JTFs cannot show the value they add to homeland security operations.We made no recommendations.

In October 2016, OIG evaluated the New Orleans VARO to see how VSC staff processed disability claims, timely and accurately processed proposed rating reductions, input claim information, and responded to special controlled correspondence. Staff did not consistently process one of the two types of disability claims we reviewed. OIG reviewed 30 veterans’ TBI claims and found staff accurately processed all 30 claims. OIG reviewed 30 SMC benefits claims and found VSC staff incorrectly processed four claims because second signature reviews were ineffective. The four claims with errors had the required secondary reviews; however, the reviewers did not identify the errors. Overall, VSC staff accurately processed 56 of the 60 disability claims OIG reviewed—the four errors resulted in 25 improper payments to four veterans totaling approximately $25,500. OIG reviewed 30 rating reductions cases and found VSC staff delayed or incorrectly processed six of the cases. Delays occurred because VSC managers prioritized other workload. Delays and inaccuracies resulted in eight improper payments, representing approximately $2,800 in overpayments. OIG reviewed 30 newly established claims and found VSC staff entered inaccurate or incomplete information into the electronic systems in 21 of 30 claims because VSC staff did not complete all required training related to establishing claims, and the quality review process for this function was ineffective. OIG reviewed 30 special controlled correspondences, finding inaccuracies in 21 cases because management was unaware that staff did not follow VBA policy when processing the correspondence. Specifically, staff did not send interim responses when required or ensure consent to release records to third parties were of record prior to releasing records. Staff also used incorrect dates to establish workload controls and did not associate the correspondence with the electronic record as required. In addition, errors occurred because training for staff on processing controlled correspondence did not exist. OIG recommended the New Orleans VARO Director assess the effectiveness of secondary reviews for SMC claims; train VSC staff responsible for establishing claims to do so using accurate and complete information; and strengthen the quality review over the course of this process. The VARO Director should ensure staff comply with VBA policy when processing special controlled correspondence and ensure they are trained in processing this workload. Additionally, OIG recommended the Continental District Director ensure the timely processing of the rating reduction workload. The VARO Director and Continental District Director concurred with our recommendations; planned corrective actions are responsive.

In December 2016, we evaluated the Atlanta, Georgia, VARO to determine how well staff processed disability claims, how timely and accurately they processed proposed rating reductions, how accurately they entered claims-related information, and how well they responded to special controlled correspondence.VSC staff did not consistently process one of the two types of disability claims we examined. We reviewed 30 of 1,590 veterans’ traumatic brain injury claims and found RVSRs accurately processed 27 cases. However, RVSRs did not always process entitlement to SMC and ancillary benefits consistent with VBA policy. We reviewed 30 of 67 special SMC claims and found RVSRs inaccurately processed four cases due to lack of experience evaluating these cases and ineffective oversight for higher-level SMC cases—resulting in 61 improper monthly payments of approximately $27,600. Staff generally processed proposed rating reductions accurately but needed better oversight to ensure timely actions. We reviewed 30 of 733 benefits reduction cases and found staff delayed or inaccurately processed 12 cases. As in our 2014 inspection, staff did not prioritize rating reduction cases. These delays and processing inaccuracies resulted in 101 improper monthly payments to 12 veterans of approximately $41,000.Staff needed to improve the accuracy of claims-related information input into the electronic systems at the time of claims establishment. We reviewed 30 of 3,287 claims. Staff did not correctly input claim information in 12 cases due to incomplete training—which did not provide specific details on associating disabilities with medical classifications—and an insufficient quality review process. Staff needed to improve controls and timeliness for processing special controlled correspondence. We reviewed 30 of 1,170 cases and found staff did not accurately process all 30 due to management’s deviation from VBA policy, as well as lack of adequate oversight. We recommended the VARO Director ensure SMC cases are distributed to the most qualified personnel, monitor the effectiveness of SMC training, ensure accurate signed second-level reviews, provide oversight and prioritization of proposed rating reduction cases, implement a plan to ensure claims assistants receive systems compliance training relevant to claims establishment, and modify the quality review checklist for claims assistants. The Director should ensure that staff properly maintain control of workload and provide timely responses for special controlled correspondence. Management’s planned actions for Recommendations 1-5, 7, and 8 are responsive; however, the Director’s response did not fully address Recommendation 6. We will follow up and continue to assess compliance with VBA policy.

In November 2015, the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) received an anonymous Hotline complaint alleging that the VA National Work Queue (NWQ) did not perform in a production environment because VA did not test the system to specification. In addition, the complaint claimed that the Veterans Benefits Management System (VBMS) Release 9.1 deployment prevented the processing of 4,000 disability claims. We did not substantiate that NWQ failed to perform in a production environment. At the time of the allegation, NWQ was still in testing and was not processing claims. Moreover, we noted that seven of eight VA Regional Office (VARO) pilot sites reported that NWQ functionality worked when they first started using it to process disability claims in February 2016. One site reported that claims did not automatically route from NWQ into employee queues on the first day. We determined that VA tested NWQ functionality to specification. We reviewed applicable VBMS development artifacts that supported NWQ functionality to include system deployment requirements, configuration control records, test plans, and test cases. From February through June 2016, we noted that the average time for the actual NWQ claims distributions was one hour and 57 minutes; better than the four hour performance standard. We did not find that NWQ functionality had a negative effect upon disability claims processing. Specifically, we noted that none of the eight pilot sites reported lost disability claims resulting from the NWQ implementation. At the time of the allegation, NWQ was not yet used to process claims. We did not find that VBMS Release 9.1 had a significant adverse effect on claims processing, such as preventing the processing of 4,000 disability claims. Accordingly, we made no recommendations for improvements.