Federal Reports

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of Inspector General, audited HUD’s Office of Multifamily Housing Programs’ health and safety complaint process. We conducted this audit due to a July 2019 explosion that occurred at the Calloway Cove Apartments, a Multifamily housing property in Jacksonville, FL, which resulted in a fire that injured several people. HUD’s Real Estate Assessment Center had identified life-threatening health and safety deficiencies at the property for several years, and there had been separate concerns related to health and safety issues at this complex, which appear to have gone unaddressed and may have led to the fire. Our audit objective was to determine whether HUD ensured that health and safety complaints associated with Multifamily Section 8-assisted housing were resolved in a timely manner.HUD’s complaint process did not ensure that health and safety complaints were resolved in a timely manner. On average, it took 2.5 days to resolve the life-threatening health and safety issues reviewed, including 3 days to resolve a gas leak issue. It took an average of 17 days to resolve the non-life-threatening health and safety issues, including 175 days to resolve an infestation problem. For the purpose of this audit, we determined reasonable benchmark resolution times to be 24 hours for resolving life-threatening health and safety issues and 72 hours for non-life-threatening health and safety issues. This condition occurred because HUD did not have a standardized, effective process for monitoring, tracking, and resolving complaints in a timely manner. As a result, Multifamily housing tenants were, in some instances, faced with unhealthy and dangerous living environments for extended periods.We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Office of Multifamily Housing Programs (1) develop a comprehensive process to ensure that complaints received by the Multifamily Housing Clearinghouse are resolved in a timely manner; (2) develop agencywide policies and procedures for the intake, monitoring, and tracking of health and safety complaints; (3) develop an automated real-time system for receiving, tracking, and resolving health and safety issues; and (4) revise the annual contributions contract to more clearly define contractor and property management responsibilities and deadlines for resolving health and safety issues.

Without the required testing and an effective system of internal controls, the EPA cannot make measurable progress toward complying with statutory requirements or safeguarding human health and the environment against risks from endocrine-disrupting chemicals.

From January 1, 2020, through April 30, 2021, the West Valley, AZ, Processing and Distribution Center reported 7,034 late arriving containers, about 270.9 million pieces of delayed inventory, and 180,161 delayed dispatch containers. This site was selected based on the high number of delayed dispatch containers during this time period.

From January 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021, the Denver, CO, Processing and Distribution Center reported 6,280 late arriving containers, 2.2 billion pieces of delayed inventory, and 168,490 delayed dispatch containers. This site was judgmentally selected based on the high number of delayed dispatch containers during this time period.

In FY 2018, S&T did not always adhere to DHS and internal purchase card policies and procedures. Of 421 purchase card transactions selected for review, we identified 394 transactions that did not have required supporting documentation, separation of key transaction duties, approvals and other required signatures, or compliance with other risk-based procedures. According to S&T officials, these issues were due to shortfalls in program oversight and training, as well as outdated policy. We identified $63,213 in questionable costs associated with purchase card transactions. We made four recommendations to improve S&T’s adherence to DHS policies and procedures for its Bankcard Program. S&T concurred with the four recommendations.

FEMA did not ensure Louisiana adequately managed and provided oversight of PA grants to make certain they complied with Federal regulations. Specifically, Louisiana had a backlog of 600 incomplete projects beyond their approved completion dates. We attributed this to the State not conducting regular site visits to assess subrecipients’ ongoing projects, identify and resolve issues as they arose, or ensure prompt project completion. In addition, FEMA had a backlog of 2,150 completed grant projects it had not closed out due to inadequate oversight of its Region 6 staff to ensure they promptly carried out this responsibility. As of the fourth quarter of 2018, the combined backlog of 2,750 grant projects represented nearly $6.6 billion in obligated funds. By May 2020, FEMA had reduced the backlog, but the significant number of remaining projects could lead to delays reimbursing applicants as well as deobligating funds that could be put to better use. We made three recommendations to FEMA to strengthen its oversight of project completion and closeout processes to ensure they are timely and compliant. FEMA concurred with one recommendation and did not concur with two. However, FEMA’s responses resulted in all three recommendations being considered open and unresolved.

OIG evaluated whether APHIS’ controls over select agents adequately reduced the threat to public, animal, and plant safety, and animal and plant products.