Federal Reports

The Office of Inspector General engaged the independent public accounting firm of KPMG LLP (KPMG) to conduct the fiscal year 2024 combined financial statements audit of the Southwestern Federal Power System (SWFPS), subject to our review. As part of this audit, KPMG considered SWFPS’ internal controls over financial reporting as a basis for designing audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances for the purpose of expressing its opinion on the financial statements but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of SWFPS’ internal control.

KPMG performed the audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

During the audit, KPMG identified certain deficiencies in SWFPS’ internal control related to entity level controls, post-retirement benefits, workers’ compensation, personal protective equipment, and operation and maintenance expenses that are included in the attached management letter.  

The attached letter contains 5 findings and 17 recommendations that were issued to Southwestern Power Administration during The Southwestern Federal Power System’s Fiscal Year 2024 Combined Financial Statements Audit. Management concurred with the findings and recommendations and had taken or planned to take corrective actions. Management’s responses are included with each finding.

We found that UCRC misclassified its agreements and did not verify whether subcontractors were on an exclusions list prior to awarding funds. 

We found that BOR complied with required laws and regulations when awarding drought mitigation funds but there are opportunities for improvement. 

We found that since 2016 the company has made targeted improvements to the processes and data it uses to manage its state-of-good-repair (SOGR) work, and other improvement initiatives are underway. Despite these efforts, the company’s infrastructure asset management capabilities have not advanced significantly because it has not yet taken some foundational steps, including fully establishing a governance framework and strengthening its SOGR infrastructure asset data. Until it addresses these issues, it cannot reasonably demonstrate how the federal funds it receives will reduce its SOGR backlog or the timeline to eliminate it.

We recommended that the company fully establish a governance framework for infrastructure asset management that includes specific objectives and performance metrics, as well as defined activities and resources needed to achieve a state of good repair. Further, we recommended that the company better communicate roles and responsibilities of staff and departments involved in SOGR work. We also recommended advancing ongoing data improvement efforts and developing additional controls to help maintain a complete, accurate inventory.

On July 4, 2025, flash flooding occurred in Kerr County in central Texas when water levels along the Guadalupe River rose rapidly, causing widespread and severe property damage, injury, and loss of life. Given the catastrophic nature of the flash flood event, plus ongoing concerns about staffing levels at the National Weather Service (NWS), members of Congress asked OIG to examine NWS’s response and resources.

We reviewed the actions taken by NWS prior to and during the catastrophic flash flood. Throughout the event, NWS was responsible for coordinating with its core partners and issuing timely weather and emergency alerts. The Austin/San Antonio Weather Forecast Office (WFO) coordinated and communicated with core partners and issued multiple flood alerts on July 3 and 4. Although staffing vacancies existed at the WFO, staff asserted that the vacancies did not affect their ability to forecast, issue flood alerts, and provide support to Kerr County officials and other core partners.

This review provides a snapshot of key NWS actions and responses prior to and during the flood. It focuses on NWS staffing, coordination, forecasting, and issuance of flood alerts, with an emphasis on NWS support provided to Kerr County, Texas.

We determined whether the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet Authority) is ensuring that the Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN) is achieving service availability requirements. We found that overall, FirstNet Authority did not ensure that the NPSBN met service availability requirements. We found that FirstNet Authority did not adequately assess contractor performance to ensure that AT&T achieved service availability requirements. Specifically,

• FirstNet Authority’s approach to measuring service availability fails to provide a comprehensive assessment, covering only a fraction of cell sites and of the NPSBN’s approximately 3-million-square-mile coverage footprint.
• FirstNet Authority did not ensure that contractor-provided information was reliable and accurate and that contract requirements were met.
• FirstNet Authority did not verify that service availability requirements were met for the Pacific territories.

Background

The U.S. Postal Service needs effective and productive operations to fulfill its mission of providing prompt, reliable, and affordable mail service to the American public. It has a vast transportation network that moves mail and equipment among approximately 308 processing facilities and 31,100 post offices, stations, and branches. The Postal Service is transforming its processing and logistics networks to become more scalable, reliable, visible, efficient, automated, and digitally integrated. This includes modernizing operating plans and aligning the workforce to meet marketplace needs; leveraging emerging technologies to provide world-class visibility and tracking of mail and packages in near real time; and optimizing the surface and air transportation network. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews the efficiency of mail processing operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback to further the Postal Service’s mission.