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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
Railroad Retirement Board
Audit of Railroad Retirement Board's Compliance with Improper Payments Reporting in the Fiscal Year 2019 Performance and Accountability Report
What We Looked AtAfter the fatal collapse of a pedestrian bridge at Florida International University (FIU) on March 15, 2018, the Secretary of Transportation and the Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation asked us to review DOT’s oversight role in the FIU project. In July 2018, citing safety concerns, three Florida members of the House of Representatives asked us to examine DOT’s role in a project to improve Interstate 4 in Orlando. Within DOT, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) had primary responsibility for both projects and designated them for greater oversight under its risk-based stewardship and oversight framework. Thus, we initiated this audit to assess FHWA’s oversight of transportation projects in Florida, with a focus on the FIU and I-4 projects. What We FoundWhile FHWA has general guidance for implementing its framework for risk-based project involvement Agency-wide, it does not clearly explain how FHWA Divisions should assess and document project risks, use experts to evaluate technical risks, or help Division staff determine when greater oversight is warranted. The lack of a fully developed process could reduce the effectiveness of FHWA’s risk-based oversight for Florida projects. In addition, FHWA’s guidance and the Florida Division’s process lack details to help staff develop effective risk-based project oversight plans. For example, the Florida Division does not always clearly define its role in the plans or their associated documentation. As a result, FHWA’s risk-based project oversight plans do not provide a complete record of the Agency’s involvement or help management determine if that involvement is adding value—a core principle of the FHWA framework. Finally, FHWA Headquarters lacks a process for monitoring and evaluating the impact of its risk-based project involvement, which limits the Agency’s ability to determine if it is achieving its goal—to improve projects and make efficient and targeted use of its limited resources. Our RecommendationsWe made eight recommendations to improve FHWA’s guidance and the Florida Division’s process for risk-based project involvement. FHWA concurred with six recommendations and partially concurred with two. We consider all eight recommendations resolved but open pending completion of planned actions.
Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of Kids4Peace International Ltd., Interfaith Constituency for Peace in Jerusalem in West Bank and Gaza, Cooperative Agreement AID-294-A-16-00010, September 16, 2016 to December 31, 2017
Closeout Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement on Kids Creating Peace, Wings of Peace Project in West Bank and Gaza, Cooperative Agreement AID-294-A-14-00011, October 1, 2015 to September 23, 2016
One Amtrak electrician in Beech Grove, Indiana, resigned from his position on May 4, 2020, and a second was terminated from employment on May 11, 2020, following his administrative hearing. Our investigation found that both employees entered a supply area without authorization and stole company materials. Both employees admitted to the unauthorized entry and to stealing gloves and batteries.
Department of Homeland Security's FY 2019 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments
DHS complied with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) in fiscal year 2019 by meeting all six of the IPERA requirements. DHS also complied with Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments. Additionally, we reviewed DHS’ processes and procedures for estimating its annual improper payment rates. Based on our review, we determined DHS did not provide adequate oversight of the components’ improper payment testing and reporting. We made one recommendation to DHS’ Risk Management and Assurance Division to properly follow the requirements in the DHS Improper Payment Reduction Guidebook.
We determined that although U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) identified and targeted high-risk cargo shipments, CBP did not always prevent air carriers from transporting high-risk air cargo from foreign airports into the United States. This occurred because neither CBP nor the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) developed adequate policies and procedures to ensure air carriers resolved referrals timely or appropriately. We made four recommendations to CBP and TSA to mitigate a number of vulnerabilities in the Air Cargo Advance Screening Program. CBP and TSA concurred with all four recommendations.