Federal Reports

VA is responsible for securing its 171 nationwide medical facilities. Persistent police staffing shortages and growing concerns about incidents that put VA staff, patients, and visitors at risk led the OIG to conduct this review to provide VA leaders with a snapshot of observed conditions. OIG teams visited 70 VA medical facilities in September 2022 and assessed whether each had established minimum security plans and taken required actions in accordance with VA policy.The OIG identified multiple security vulnerabilities and deficiencies, most notably staffing shortages that contributed to the lack of a visible and active police presence. To meet VA’s established security requirements, facilities will need to fill police officer vacancies, as employing sufficient security personnel and correcting security weaknesses are inextricably linked. Other measures facilities can take to improve campus security include increasing security personnel resources, such as suitable police operations rooms, operable surveillance cameras with consistent monitoring, and adequate equipment, as well as securing doors and restricting public access to high-risk areas. Facilities could also improve communication with local law enforcement and incident readiness trainings. VA concurred with the OIG’s six recommendations: (1) delegating a responsible official to monitor and report monthly on facilities’ security-related vacancies; (2) authorizing sufficient staff to inspect VA police forces per the OIG’s 2018 unimplemented recommendation; (3) ensuring medical facility directors appropriately assess VA police staffing needs, authorize associated positions, and leverage available mechanisms to fill vacancies; (4) committing sufficient resources to ensure that facility security measures are adequate, current, and operational; (5) directing VISN police chiefs, in coordination with medical facility directors, facility police chiefs, and facility emergency management leaders, to present a plan to remedy identified security weaknesses; and (6) establishing policy that standardizes the review and retention requirements for facility security camera footage.

Ketrick Barron, a former Amtrak General Foreman, based in Washington, D.C., pleaded guilty on February 21, 2023, in U.S. District Court, District of Maryland, to one misdemeanor count of theft of government property after our investigation found that he misused an Amtrak-issued General Services Administration fuel card to fuel his personal vehicles. The total fuel purchase amounted to $6,580.20. His sentencing is pending.

OIG Investigations initiated this Special Inquiry in response to concerns that “Region II acted inappropriately and without authority with respect to performing independent spent fuel storage installation inspections,” that Region II failed to adhere to NRC policy by allowing resident inspectors who were not qualified the agency’s ISFSI inspection program to inspect ISFSIs, and that Region II deviated from the requirements in agency procedures for inspecting campaigns during which NRC licensees loaded spent fuel to dry cask storage. The OIG found that Region II improperly deviated from NRC policies when it authorized resident inspectors who were not qualified to inspect ISFSIs to inspect repeat spent fuel loading campaigns to dry cask storage. Furthermore, data from 2018 and 2019 show that collectively Region II’s resident inspectors spent only about 20 percent of the number of hours anticipated for ISFSI inspections stated in the applicable inspection procedure. The limited inspection hours charged appear to show that Region II did not accomplish all inspection requirements identified in the procedure. Region II’s actions potentially resulted in missed opportunities to adequately evaluate whether licensees met the NRC’s regulatory requirements. For example, from January 2021 to December 2022, after Region II began using properly qualified inspectors and following all the requirements in the applicable inspection procedure, those qualified inspectors identified numerous violations and other non-compliances during ISFSI inspections that could have been identified earlier. The OIG did not identify an immediate safety concern related to ISFSIs. The OIG did find, however, that Region II’s deviation from NRC policies resulted in licensees loading significant numbers of casks during repeat loading campaigns, from 2012 through 2020, that did not receive—and still have not received—adequate NRC inspections to ensure the licensees met regulatory requirements for long-term storage and retrievability.