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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Management Alert: HUD Should Take Additional Steps to Protect Contractor Employees Who Disclose Wrongdoing
The OIG has learned that employees of thousands of contractors who receive funds from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) are not protected against retaliation for blowing the whistle on wrongdoing. The gap in protections exists because (1) the contracts pre-date July 1, 2013, the date on which the anti-retaliation law codified at 41 U.S.C. § 4712 (Section 4712) became effective; and (2) HUD has not modified the contracts to include Section 4712 anti-retaliation provisions that would protect the employees.1 The OIG identified this problem following recent investigations of allegations of whistleblower retaliation against several employees of contractors. Although the investigations revealed this problem with respect to Housing Assistance Payments (HAP) contracts, as discussed below, we believe that the same risk is present in many other HUD contracts.2 The OIG recommends that HUD address this serious risk by undertaking a comprehensive review of all contracts to determine whether they include Section 4712 anti-retaliation provisions. We also recommend that HUD be proactive in seeking to modify any HUD contracts that do not include Section 4712 anti-retaliation language to confer whistleblower protections on contractor employees.
What We Looked AtAs part of its oversight responsibilities, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) conducts pipeline inspections, including integrated inspections that combine elements of various safety inspections. We conducted this audit because integrated inspections make up the majority of OPS' inspections and can identify possible impacts on pipeline safety. Our audit objective was to assess PHMSA's implementation of integrated inspections, specifically to assess the Agency's policies and procedures, risk-based approach, and conduct of integrated inspections.What We FoundPHMSA has established procedures and information systems to plan and conduct integrated inspections and document results. The integrated inspections we reviewed followed these procedures, were prioritized by risk, and resolved unsatisfactory conditions. In developing PHMSA's annual inspection plans, PHMSA's Risk Ranking Index Model (RRIM) uses risk factors to code high, medium, and low scores for when pipeline systems should be inspected. OPS also verifies that, to the extent possible, no system goes without inspection for more than 7 years and unsatisfactory conditions found in inspections are addressed. Nevertheless, PHMSA's guidelines for integrated inspections have control weaknesses. Specifically, while the manual covers most of the integrated inspection process, some sections are out of date and others do not reflect actual practices. Furthermore, 7 of 18 inspections we analyzed had missing or draft system profiles even though these profiles are integral to the inspection planning process. Finally, the risk factors that RRIM uses to calculate pipeline system risk scores inadequately considered several statutorily required factors for PHMSA's decisions on how frequently to inspect pipeline systems.RecommendationsWe made three recommendations to help PHMSA improve its integrated inspection program and the Agency concurs with all three recommendations.
What We Looked AtThe impacts of a motor vehicle safety defect can be significant. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act authorizes the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to investigate motor vehicle safety issues and requires manufacturers to notify the Agency of all safety-related defects involving unreasonable risk of accident, death, or injury. NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) plays a key role by gathering and analyzing relevant information, investigating potential defects, identifying unsafe motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment, and managing the recall process. Given the impact NHTSA’s efforts to adequately address safety defects have on the traveling public, we initiated this audit to assess ODI’s current processes for investigating and identifying safety defects. Specifically, we analyzed ODI’s risk-based oversight procedures for prioritizing its work, determining which issues were appropriate for investigation, and evaluating potential risks of harm posed by potential safety defects. What We FoundNHTSA’s ODI has made progress promoting a safer transportation system for the traveling public by restructuring its office, modernizing its data repository and analysis systems, and enhancing its risk-based investigative processes to assess safety-related defects. However, ODI did not meet its timeliness goals for the five types of investigations we examined, and the Agency did not upload investigation documentation to its public website in a timely manner. ODI does not have an integrated information system to facilitate the safety defect investigation and recall processes. Furthermore, ODI does not consistently document information used for investigating and identifying potential defects and unsafe motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment in the Agency’s internal and external files. In addition, ODI does not consistently follow its procedures for issue escalation and lacks guidance for other pre-investigative efforts. Our RecommendationsWe made 12 recommendations to help NHTSA improve its risk-based processes for investigating and identifying potential motor vehicle and equipment safety defects. NHTSA concurred with 10 of our 12 recommendations, partially concurred with 1 recommendation, and did not concur with 1 recommendation. NHTSA proposed alternate action for the recommendation with which it did not concur. We consider all 12 recommendations resolved but open pending implementation.
This Office of Inspector General Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection Program report describes the results of a focused evaluation of the inpatient and outpatient care provided at the VA San Diego Healthcare System, which includes the main medical center and multiple outpatient clinics in Southern California. This evaluation focused on five key operational areas:• Leadership and organizational risks• Quality, safety, and value• Medical staff privileging• Environment of care• Mental health (focusing on emergency department and urgent care center suicide prevention initiatives)The OIG issued one recommendation for improvement in the Leadership and Organizational Risks review area regarding conducting institutional disclosures.
The Denali Commission Office of Inspector General issues its Semiannual Report to Congress summarizing the OIG’s activities and accomplishments from October 1, 2022 to March 31, 2023.
This report highlights the work of the Office of the Inspector General for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) from October 1, 2022, to March 31, 2023. During this reporting period, we initiated thirteen audit reports and issued four. We also opened ten investigative cases and completed twelve, six of which were referred to the Department of Justice, and six of which were referred to NRC or DNFSB management for action.