Federal Reports

With a requested fiscal year 2026 budget of about $3.5 billion for homelessness programs, the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is committed to preventing and ending veteran homelessness. VHA’s Homeless Programs Office uses a required screening process to identify veterans who are experiencing or at risk of homelessness and need assistance. Medical facilities must complete screenings for veterans under their care, have a process for positive screenings, and ensure staff respond to requests for services within seven business days. Follow-up action must occur within 30 days.

From January through June 2024, VHA screened over 2.4 million veterans and identified 31,149 who reported either experiencing or being at risk of homelessness. About 59 percent (18,250) requested to be referred to social work or homelessness program staff for further assistance. At 42 of 140 facilities, 25 to about 71 percent of veterans (depending on the facility) who wanted to be referred for additional assistance during the screening did not receive follow-up action within 30 days.

The audit team evaluated screening reminder processes at four medical facilities and found weaknesses in the referral and follow-up processes that put veterans at risk of not receiving assistance after they indicated they were experiencing or at risk of homelessness. Deficiencies in the process occurred, in part, because facilities did not establish written local policies and procedures in accordance with federal internal control standards and VHA policy. In addition, the Homeless Programs Office did not ensure facilities had an effective mechanism to monitor follow-up action. The VA Office of Inspector General made four recommendations to improve controls over referral, follow-up, and monitoring processes to ensure veterans’ needs are addressed after positive homelessness screenings. VHA’s under secretary concurred with three recommendations and concurred in principle with one recommendation.

What OIG Inspected 

OIG inspected the executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of Embassy Bridgetown, Barbados. The inspection also included Embassy St. George’s, Grenada; Consular Agency Antigua and Barbuda; and Consular Agency Martinique. 

What OIG Found 

• Embassy Bridgetown’s Front Office generally complied with Department of State standards for tone at the top and standards of conduct, execution of foreign policy goals and objectives, security and emergency planning, and equal employment opportunity. The Chargé d’Affaires, ad interim, engaged all elements of the workforce, provided useful guidance, and responded to employee concerns.
• Embassy Bridgetown did not have a clear delineation of chief of mission security responsibilities for British and French territories in the Eastern Caribbean.
• The embassy had deficiencies in consular oversight.
• Embassy Bridgetown had several safety issues related to elevator mechanical deficiencies, fire protection, and workplace safety inspections.
• The embassy’s contract file management and contracting officer’s representative program did not fully comply with Department standards.
• The embassy had deficiencies related to the security of information systems and information technology assets, the emergency communications program, and mobile device management in Bridgetown and at Embassy St. George’s.  

What OIG Recommends

OIG made 30 recommendations: 29 recommendations to Embassy Bridgetown and 1 recommendation to the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. In its comments on the draft report, the Department concurred with 24 recommendations, partially concurred with 2 recommendations, and neither agreed nor disagreed with 4 recommendations. OIG considers all 30 recommendations resolved. The Department’s formal responses are reprinted in their entirety in Appendix B. 

Our Objective(s)To evaluate DOT Operating Administrations' implementation of National Roadway Safety Strategy (NRSS) priority actions, monitoring of progress, and measurement of success. Specifically, we assessed DOT's (1) identification and implementation of NRSS priority actions and (2) procedures for monitoring progress and measuring success of those priority actions.
Why This AuditDOT set a long-term goal of reaching zero roadway fatalities through its NRSS. The NRSS emphasized a multifaceted approach to safety improvements and a collaborative effort between the Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) and relevant surface transportation Operating Administrations. We initiated this audit due to DOT's new and comprehensive approach towards traffic safety and its goal for the NRSS to help decrease fatalities.
What We FoundDOT identified and implemented priority actions that aligned with high-risk factors to decrease fatalities.

DOT identified 29 NRSS priority actions in 2022 and added 14 actions in 2023. These 43 actions targeted high-risk factors contributing to traffic fatalities, including occupant protection, alcohol-impaired driving, speeding, pedestrian safety, and motor carrier safety.
As of January 2025, DOT reported that it had completed 38 priority actions and 5 were still in progress.

DOT monitored NRSS priority actions and measured overall impact but lacked procedures to measure success of individual actions.

DOT monitored the progress of individual priority actions and measured the overall impact of the NRSS. In January 2025, the Department attributed 10 consecutive quarters of declines in traffic fatalities to the progress in implementing NRSS priority actions.
However, the NRSS Action Team had not established requirements or procedures to measure the success of individual priority actions.
DOT officials stated they would evaluate an action's success by monitoring improvements in long-term safety data, which would be difficult to attribute to any specific priority action. As a result, it is unclear how individual priority actions contributed to DOT's progress towards achieving goals to decrease fatalities.

RecommendationsWe made 1 recommendation to improve DOT's administration of the NRSS.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a healthcare inspection at the John D. Dingell VA Medical Center (facility) to evaluate allegations of inaccurate complete blood count (CBC) with differential results and reporting, and a laboratory supervisor not passing a proficiency test. The OIG identified concerns regarding quality assurance processes and laboratory leaders’ response, which were not in compliance with VHA Directive 1106, Pathology and Laboratory Medicine Service and VHA Directive 1050.01(1), VHA Quality and Patient Safety Programs. 

The OIG substantiated eight medical technologists (technologists) missed or under reported blast cells, leading to inaccurate CBC with differential results for a patient. The OIG did not identify adverse clinical outcomes. 

Laboratory leaders did not implement a quality assurance process to ensure the accuracy of CBC with differential results. Further, none of the technologists were informed of the inaccurate readings, precluding mitigation of errors. Pathologists completed the OIG-requested retrospective review of readings, but the OIG remains concerned that misreads may continue without sustained oversight.

Laboratory leaders, including the quality management technologist, and patient safety managers, did not ensure corrective actions were timely implemented or tracked. Factors contributing to delayed completion of corrective actions and unresolved patient safety risks included conflicting interpretations of the quality management technologist’s responsibilities and laboratory leaders not following a reporting policy. 

The OIG substantiated a supervisor did not pass a blood bank proficiency test in summer 2024, leading to the suspension of blood bank crossmatch testing services. However, laboratory leaders constructed a contingency plan and completed requirements to resume services within a week.

The Facility Director concurred with the OIG’s five recommendations related to communicating errors to technologists, patient safety staff’s monitoring of action plans, clarification of the quality management technologist’s role, oversight of accuracy for CBC results, and laboratory leaders not following a reporting policy.

The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012,as implemented by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123, Appendix B, requires the Office of Inspector General (OIG) to conduct periodic risk assessments of agency purchase and travel card programs. OIG conducts these assessments to identify and analyze the risk of illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases and payments and to determine the appropriate scope, frequency, and number of periodic audits of these programs.  

To assess risk associated with the Department of State’s (Department) purchase card program, OIG reviewed the Department’s FY 2024 purchase card data and concluded that the risk of illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases and payments within the Department purchase card program was “medium.” OIG based its conclusion on the purchase card program’s size, internal controls, training, previous audits, violation reports, and observations from OIG’s Office of Investigations (INV).  

With respect to the criterion related to previous audits, OIG audited the Department’s purchase card program and issued a report in March 2019. The five recommendations offered in that report have been implemented and closed. Therefore, OIG is not recommending that an audit of the Department’s purchase card program be included in its FY 2027 work plan. However, OIG encourages the Department’s purchase card manager to continue prudent oversight of the purchase card program to ensure that internal controls intended to safeguard taxpayer funds are fully implemented and followed by Department purchase card holders. 

The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012, as implemented by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123, Appendix B, requires the Office of Inspector General (OIG) to conduct periodic risk assessments of agency purchase and travel card programs. OIG conducts these assessments to identify and analyze the risk of illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases and payments and to determine the appropriate scope, frequency, and number of periodic audits of these programs. 

To assess risk associated with the purchase card program at the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, U.S. Section (USIBWC), OIG reviewed USIBWC’s FY 2024 purchase card data and concluded that the risk of illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases and payments within the USIBWC purchase card program was “low.” OIG based its conclusion on the USIBWC purchase card program size, internal controls, training, previous audits, and observations from OIG’s Office of Investigations (INV). Because OIG concluded that risk to the purchase card program was “low,” 

OIG is not recommending that an audit of the USIBWC purchase card program be included in OIG’s FY 2027 work plan. However, OIG encourages USIBWC officials to continue prudent oversight of the purchase card program and ensure that internal controls intended to safeguard taxpayer funds are fully implemented and followed by USIBWC purchase card holders.

The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012, as implemented by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123, Appendix B, requires the Office of Inspector General (OIG) to conduct periodic risk assessments of agency purchase and travel card programs. OIG conducts these assessments to identify and analyze the risk of illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases and payments and to determine the appropriate scope, frequency, and number of periodic audits of these programs.

To assess risk associated with the Department of State’s (Department) travel card program, OIG reviewed the Department’s FY 2024 travel card data and concluded that the risk of illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases and payments within the Department’s travel card program was “medium.” OIG based its conclusion on the travel card program’s size, internal controls, training, previous audits, and observations from OIG’s Office of Investigations (INV).  

Although OIG concluded that risk to the travel card program is “medium,” OIG plans to audit the Department’s travel card program during FY 2026. Therefore, OIG is not recommending that an audit of the Department’s travel card program be included in OIG’s FY 2027 work plan. OIG encourages Department officials to continue prudent oversight of the travel card program to ensure that internal controls intended to safeguard taxpayer funds are fully implemented and followed by Department travel card holders.