Federal Reports

OIG audited the consolidated financial statements of FNS for fiscal years 2018 and2017.

OIG audited the consolidated financial statements of Rural Development for fiscal years 2017 and 2018.

OIG audited FCIC/RMA’s financial statements for fiscal years 2018 and 2017

We reviewed the California State agency’s controls for operating under the Summer Food Service Program requirements and sponsor and site compliance with those requirements. We have reported our separate findings in an interim report dated September 2017 and this final report.

What We Looked AtUnmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) represent a substantial economic and technological opportunity for the United States. To advance the safe integration of commercial UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published a rule for small UAS in June 2016. However, the rule does not permit several operations that are highly valued by industry but considered to be higher risk, such as operating beyond line of sight or over people. To accommodate these operations, the rule allows FAA to issue waivers. Given the significant safety implications of integrating UAS into the NAS and an increase in the number of both requested and approved UAS waivers, we initiated an audit of FAA's approval and oversight processes for UAS waivers. Specifically, our objectives were to assess FAA's processes for (1) granting waivers under the rule for small UAS operations and (2) conducting risk-based oversight for UAS operators with waivers.What We FoundFAA established processes for reviewing and granting waivers but has experienced difficulties obtaining sufficient information, managing the volume of requests, and communicating with applicants, particularly in explaining reasons for denying requests. As a result, FAA's Flight Standards office has disapproved 73 percent of operational waiver requests (e.g., over people and beyond line of sight), and a significant backlog of waiver requests to operate in airspace with manned aircraft exists. Although the Agency has improved its guidance and processes, FAA may continue to experience difficulty with review timeliness and responsiveness, given the growing demand for UAS operations, which could increase the risk that operators may continue to bypass established processes and operate without Agency approval. Further, FAA is still in the early stages of developing a risk-based oversight system for UAS operations. While FAA has developed guidance for planning annual inspections, few UAS operators have received inspections to verify their compliance with regulations and the terms of their waivers. Moreover, the Agency's ability to perform meaningful risk-based surveillance is hindered by limited access to detailed UAS operator, FAA inspection, and risk data. As a result, FAA does not have assurance of operators' compliance with regulations, is not well-positioned to develop an oversight strategy, and is missing opportunities to gather information that will help shape rulemaking and policies.Our RecommendationsWe made eight recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administrator regarding strengthening the Agency's review and oversight processes for UAS waivers. FAA concurred with seven of our recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation.

What We Looked AtThe Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic controllers use the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) system to manage over 3 million high-altitude en-route aircraft a month. Because of ERAM's importance to air traffic management, system outages can significantly impact operations in the National Airspace System (NAS). Our audit objective was to assess the causes of ERAM's outages and FAA's actions to address them.What We FoundWhile FAA has taken steps to address the seven ERAM failures since 2014, some vulnerabilities remain. These seven failures included two serious incidents that significantly disrupted the NAS. During one of these incidents, in August 2015, ERAM failed when a software tool at controller workstations overloaded system memory. The incident caused flight delays and cancellations that impacted thousands of flights over several days.FAA has since taken corrective actions to resolve the causes of these two serious incidents and other issues that caused five less serious outages. However, other issues remain unresolved. For example, FAA has not implemented annual testing of ERAM's contingency plan, as called for by Federal guidelines. In addition, FAA plans to decommission ERAM's existing backup system, the Enhanced Backup Surveillance System (EBUS), due to its incompatibility with upgrades to ERAM. However, FAA has not yet determined whether ERAM's remaining backup capability--the system's redundant dual channel design--will be sufficient to prevent future outages once EBUS is removed. The lack of sufficient backup capabilities could increase ERAM's vulnerability in the event of future unanticipated incidents.RecommendationsWe made three recommendations to improve FAA's ability to mitigate future ERAM disruptions. FAA has concurred with one of our recommendations and partially concurred with the other two. We consider all three of our recommendations resolved but open pending completion of planned actions.

An Amtrak Building and Bridges Supervisor in Baltimore, Maryland, was terminated from employment following an administrative hearing on October 23, 2018, for violating company policy by claiming and receiving pay for unworked hours and instructing a subordinate employee, also based in Baltimore, to use the supervisor’s company identification card to clock the supervisor in and out for his shifts on several occasions. The subordinate employee was also found to have violated company policy for his role in assisting the supervisor and, following an administrative hearing on October 25, 2018, the subordinate employee was suspended for 30-days