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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Investigative Summary: Findings of Misconduct by a DEA Special Agent-in-Charge for Engaging in an Unprofessional Personal Relationship with, and Showing Favoritism Toward, a Subordinate and Participating in a Wasteful Travel Assignment
This report contains information about recommendations from the OIG’s audits, evaluations, and reviews that the OIG had not closed as of the specified date because it had not determined that the Department of Justice had fully implemented them. The information omits recommendations that the Department of Justice determined to be classified or sensitive, and therefore unsuitable for public release.The status of each recommendation was accurate as of the specified date and is subject to change. Specifically, a recommendation identified as not closed as of the specified date may subsequently have been closed.
Our objective was to determine whether travel and miscellaneous expenses of the U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors, including external professional fees, were properly supported, reasonable, and in compliance with U.S. Postal Service and Board of Governors’ policies and procedures.
CBP took sufficient steps to resolve the January 2, 2017 outage on the same day it occurred. CBP’s initial actions to resolve this outage were unsuccessful for several hours. Ultimately, the CBP Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Information and Technology (OIT) decided to revert system queries from the TECS Modernization server environment to the TECS Legacy mainframe environment. As a result of this action, airports began to report that they could process passengers again. After 4 hours, airports began reporting that they were back online. The transition back to the legacy environment worked to resolve the January 2, 2017 system outage. Nevertheless, underlying causes that might result in future outages were not addressed and persist today in the CBP environment. we identified inadequate CBP software capacity testing, leaving the potential for the recurrence of processing errors; deficient software maintenance, resulting in high vulnerabilities that remain open; ineffective system status monitoring to ensure timely alerts in case of mission-business disruptions; and inadequate business continuity and disaster recovery processes and capabilities to minimize the impact of system failures on the traveling public. Until such deficiencies are addressed, CBP lacks a means to minimize the possibility and impact of similar system outages in the future.
