Federal Reports

Pursuant to One Big Beautiful Bill Act, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a review of OIG and Government Accountability Office (GAO) engagements related to USDA programs that received funding under the act. Through this review, we identified work that may provide USDA insight when administering these programs and disbursing funds.

At the request of the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) Supply Chain, we examined the cost proposal submitted by a contractor for (1) outage and supplemental maintenance and modification services and (2) support services at TVA’s nuclear plants.  Our examination objective was to determine if the cost proposal was fairly stated for a planned $975 million contract.

In our opinion, the contractor’s cost proposal was overstated.  Specifically, we determined the application base for the contractor’s proposed markup rate for the recovery of general and administrative (G&A) costs did not reflect TVA’s intent as provided for in the request for proposal (RFP).  We notified TVA of the inconsistencies for use in their negotiations.  Subsequently, TVA informed us the parties agreed to (1) apply the G&A markup rate to unburdened noncraft wages to more accurately reflect TVA’s intent for reimbursing G&A costs, (2) reduce the G&A rate, and (3) remove the G&A application on noncraft staff augmentation labor.  In addition, the contractor did not propose a rate for long-term temporary assignments, as requested in the request for proposal. 

VHA provides outpatient services to veterans at community-based outpatient clinics (CBOCs) nationwide. The VA OIG conducted this review to assess contract oversight of staffing and appointment cancellation performance measures at five Loma Linda Healthcare System CBOCs in California.

The OIG found that VA leaders in the Loma Linda healthcare system did not ensure contractor compliance with performance standards for staffing or for the number of appointments canceled by the clinics during FYs 2022 and 2023. Specifically, Loma Linda officials did not effectively monitor contractor-staffed primary care Patient Aligned Care Teams to ensure contract compliance. The contractor did not meet required staffing levels at any of the five contracted CBOCs for at least 22 of 24 months in FYs 2022 and 2023; two CBOCs were noncompliant 100 percent of the time, and the remaining three were noncompliant more than 90 percent of the time.

The contractor also did not consistently meet the appointment cancellation performance standard regarding appointments canceled by clinics at contracted CBOCs. In FYs 2022 and 2023, all five CBOCs under the contract were noncompliant with appointment cancellation standards at least 79 percent of the time, and two CBOCs were noncompliant 100 percent of the time. Finally, the OIG found that the contracting officer’s attempt to recover government funds associated with using VA personnel to cover shortages at the contracted clinics was insufficient.

Contract noncompliance occurred, in part, because the assistant director did not provide effective oversight of the contracting officer’s representative (COR) or the CBOC nurse coordinator. The OIG also found that the assistant director did not effectively coordinate with the COR and the contracting officer to ensure that the contractor’s contingency plan requirement was sufficiently enforced during staffing shortages. The OIG made nine recommendations for VA to improve oversight of CBOC contracts.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) does not have an adequate process for managing, tracking, and monitoring staff qualification records. The OIG found that NRC offices use inconsistent information-gathering methods, driven by changes in management’s workforce planning and individual office preferences for using separate information systems. As a result, the NRC may face reduced efficiency in retrieving qualification records and may lack full visibility into staff qualification gaps─factors that could adversely impact the agency’s ability to carry out its mission.
Additionally, the OIG found that refresher training is tracked informally, with many staff relying on personal reminders to complete mandatory requirements. This informal approach exists because the NRC lacks a structured, agency-wide system for managing refresher training. The absence of such a system could result in decreased staff productivity, non-compliance with safety and security requirements, and lower employee morale and retention. Refresher training is essential for maintaining up-to-date knowledge, skills, and safety practices, which are critical to ensuring that staff can perform their duties effectively and safely.
This report makes three recommendations to improve the NRC’s process for managing, tracking, and monitoring its qualification programs.

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) contracted with Sikich CPA LLC (Sikich) to audit the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s (DNFSB) Implementation of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 for Fiscal Year 2025. The objective was to assess the effectiveness of the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the DNFSB.  The findings and conclusions presented in this report are Sikich’s responsibility.  The OIG’s responsibility was to oversee the contractor’s work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Based on their review for the period of October 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025, Sikich found that the DNFSB has not established an effective agency-wide information security program and practices.  There are weaknesses that impact the agency’s ability to protect the DNFSB’s systems and information adequately.

As a result of the weaknesses noted in this audit, Sikich made seven new recommendations to assist the DNFSB in strengthening its information security program and practices in addition to the six prior-year recommendations that remain open.

The Office of Inspector General is issuing this report to present the results of our evaluation of the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) processes to forecast and request appropriation dollars for its disaster loans program account.

We found that SBA did not 1) adequately forecast funding needs for the disaster loan program in the annual budget request; 2) ensure that monthly reports submitted to Congress were clearly interpreted, always submitted timely, and in compliance with all the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 636k(a); or 3) notify Congress, in writing, regarding the need for supplemental funding as soon as a shortfall was anticipated.

We recommended SBA ensure 1) historical factors are considered when developing the budget request, 2) monthly reports comply with 15 U.S.C. § 636k(a), 3) monthly reports are enhanced to clearly explain the information, and 4) Congress is notified, in writing, of the need for supplemental disaster loan program funds as soon as the agency anticipates a shortfall.

SBA management agreed with all four recommendations. Management’s planned action for Recommendations 1 through 4 satisfy the intent of the recommendations and are resolved.