Federal Reports

The audit objective was to determine if the Web-Based Licensing (WBL) System effectively manages the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) materials licensing and inspection information and provides for the security, availability, and integrity of the system data. 

The OIG found that the WBL System’s inactivity controls interrupt users’ work processes; WBL users are unable to edit role-based licensing information in the Export/Import and Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs modules; the WBL User Guide lacks quality information for using certain WBL modules; WBL users are generally unfamiliar with the change control process; several WBL enhancements do not work as intended; the licensing and inspection modules do not contain quality data; and, WBL System data is not readily available for the agency to use in other applications.

The report contains 15 recommendations to increase the WBL System’s functionality, effectiveness, and users’ efficiency. 

Our objective was to assess the extent to which the company has effective processes and controls during the pre-award phase to ensure contracts it awards are in its best interest.

We found that certain pre-award contracting activities generally worked well, but we identified two areas where weaknesses place the company at greater risk of paying more than it should for goods and services. First, the company could better ensure its employees adhere to its requirements for contracts requiring cost estimates and technical evaluation committees. Second, consistent with considerations from our prior work, the company has opportunities to better identify and mitigate fraud risks that can occur during the pre-award phase of its procurement process. This includes collecting and analyzing data to detect contract and procurement fraud and identify suspicious patterns across solicitations

We recommended that the company’s Procurement department (1) develop and implement a process to assess ongoing solicitations to determine their compliance with company requirements, (2) develop additional guidance for contracting officers regarding cost estimate details, (3) collect and analyze pre-award data to identify fraud indicators, and (4) develop and implement additional recurring fraud training for employees involved in the pre-award phase.

Our Objective(s)To assess FAA's efforts to advance beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) drone operations outside the parameters of existing drone regulations.
Why This AuditNationwide interest in using unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), commonly referred to as drones, in increasingly complex operations BVLOS is expanding. FAA has efforts underway to help advance BVLOS operations, policy, and rulemaking, including through the BEYOND program. However, there are potential challenges and safety risks associated with integrating drones into the National Airspace System (NAS). We initiated this audit to continue our oversight of FAA's drone integration efforts for complex BVLOS operations due to their potential for introducing risks to the NAS and the importance of maintaining the United States as a leader in aeronautics.
What We FoundFAA approved increasingly complex BVLOS drone operations.

FAA increased approvals for BVLOS operations from 1,229 in 2020 to 26,870 in 2023. FAA used small UAS rule waivers, air carrier operating certificates, and regulatory exemptions to increase approvals.

FAA's BVLOS operational goals and metrics were difficult for most lead participants to meet.

A majority of program lead participants did not meet most of BEYOND's six operational performance metrics, and operators flew only a small percentage of flights without a visual observer.
The BEYOND program's overall effectiveness is hindered by its lack of participant and mission variety.

FAA collects and shares partnership program data but is not using comprehensive data to inform rulemaking, and its validation process can lead to errors.

FAA applied lessons learned to enhance its data collection process but does not consolidate data across offices.
While BEYOND program data is shared with participants, it has limited use informing rulemakings.
FAA's data input and validation process is vulnerable to errors.

FAA ceased collecting data on BEYOND program societal and economic benefits and community engagement.

FAA's rulemaking team decided they no longer needed societal and economic benefits data, despite program goals to collect it.

RecommendationsWe made 7 recommendations to improve FAA's efforts to advance BVLOS drone operations outside the parameters of existing drone regulations.

The OIG’s Mental Health Inspection Program (MHIP) evaluates Veterans Health Administration’s (VHA’s) continuum of mental healthcare services. This inspection focused on inpatient care delivered at the VA Philadelphia Healthcare System (facility) in Pennsylvania.

The facility met some VHA requirements for the inpatient mental health unit, such as completion of twice-yearly environment of care inspections, and had some aspects of a recovery-oriented environment. However, not all areas met VHA standards for a safe, hopeful, and healing setting. Facility leaders did not establish written processes for staff to accompany veterans on outdoor breaks.

The facility did not have an established mental health executive committee for local oversight or a plan for continued transformation to recovery-oriented services. Additionally, inpatient staff did not offer the required daily hours of interdisciplinary programming. Facility leaders did not have formal written guidance to monitor and ensure compliance with state involuntary commitment laws. 

Not all electronic health records (EHRs) reviewed included documentation of a treatment plan. Most EHRs did not have evidence of required discussions with veterans on the risks and benefits of prescribed medications. Some EHRs did not have evidence of timely suicide risk screenings. Most reviewed safety plans did not address ways to make the environment safer from potentially lethal means beyond access to firearms and opioids. 

Inpatient unit clinical staff were compliant with suicide prevention trainings, but nonclinical staff did not consistently complete the required training.

The Interdisciplinary Safety Inspection Team did not adhere to VHA requirements, including staff’s completion of annual environmental safety hazards training, and did not address safety hazards, including ligature risks.

The OIG issued 20 recommendations to the Facility Director, Chief of Staff, and Associate Chief of Staff for Behavioral Health. These recommendations, once addressed, may improve the quality and delivery of veteran-centered, recovery-oriented care on the inpatient mental health.

We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to determine whether HUD had adequate oversight of the physical condition of the public housing units that converted to non-Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured project-based vouchers (PBV) under RAD.

We found HUD needs to improve its oversight of the physical condition of converted projects.  Before the implementation of its PBV monitoring pilot program, HUD performed limited monitoring of RAD PBV projects.  HUD also did not have a standardized process for monitoring the projects for compliance with its requirements.  Additionally, for converted units that were PHA owned, HUD did not consistently receive required housing quality standards (HQS) inspection reports.

These conditions occurred because HUD did not specifically target converted projects for review.  It also did not have a system to collect and maintain information about the physical and financial condition of RAD PBV projects.  Instead, HUD relied on the contract administrators (PHAs) to oversee the converted projects.  Additionally, HUD did not have a protocol or procedures for its field offices to ensure that HQS inspection reports for PHA-owned projects had been received and reviewed, as applicable, before HUD eliminated the requirement in June 2024.  

As a result of HUD’s limited monitoring and lack of a system to collect and maintain data, HUD did not have information to assess whether the contract administrators effectively performed their oversight responsibilities of ensuring that (1) families resided in units that were decent, safe, and sanitary; (2) the converted projects’ reserve for replacement accounts were sufficiently funded to address extraordinary maintenance, repair, and replacement of capital items; and (3) project owners’ withdrawals from reserve accounts were appropriate.  When we inspected a sample of RAD PBV units from 28 converted projects associated with three PHAs, we found that more than 74 percent of the units failed to meet HQS.  Further, based on our calculations, the reserve for replacement accounts for 12 of the 28 projects were underfunded.  Therefore, unless HUD specifically selects projects for review, it is unable to adequately monitor the long-term sustainability of these projects.

We made several recommendations to HUD to improve its oversight of projects converted under RAD.  Specifically, we made recommendations related to (1) targeting projects for review and developing policies and procedures for monitoring, (2) reviewing reserve for replacement accounts to ensure sufficient account balances and compliance with applicable HUD requirements, (3) implementing a process to ensure reserve for replacement requirements in HUD’s business documents are consistent for converted projects, and (4) collecting data on projects’ reserve for replacement accounts to support the Office of Field Operations’ monitoring activities.  We also made a recommendation for HUD to provide inspection reports showing that units meet HUD’s current physical condition standards.

The Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian) relies on funding from external sponsors such as governments, foundations, and corporations to support projects that further its mission to increase and diffuse knowledge.

The Office of Sponsored Projects (OSP) provides centralized support, guidance, and training for Smithsonian units receiving sponsored project funding. Together they manage sponsored projects in compliance with Smithsonian policies and procedures and sponsors’ terms and conditions.

OSP oversaw $189 million in sponsored project funding provided during fiscal years 2022 and 2023. 

This audit determined the extent to which OSP and recipient units complied with: (1) Smithsonian policies and procedures and (2) sponsors’ terms and conditions concerning administering and overseeing sponsored projects.

OIG reviewed a sample of 25 sponsored projects totaling $33.8 million—approximately 18 percent of sponsored project funding provided through OSP in fiscal years 2022 and 2023. OIG also analyzed OSP’s sponsored project universe for balances and transactions determined to be of higher risk of noncompliance. 

During the two fiscal years under audit, OSP managed a 65 percent increase in sponsored project funding while maintaining high-quality service reported by Smithsonian units. However, OIG identified opportunities to improve the administration and oversight of projects throughout their lifecycle.