Federal Reports

What We Looked AtThe National Airspace System (NAS) serves over 44,000 flights a day with over 5,000 aircraft in the sky at peak times. Critical to the NAS's operations are the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) 20 Air Route Traffic Control Centers (Centers) that manage high-altitude air traffic. These Centers are equipped with the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) system to manage and control high-altitude operations and provide infrastructure for new systems such as high-altitude data link communications for FAA's Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). In response to requests from the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and its Aviation Subcommittee, we conducted this audit. Our objectives were to (1) evaluate FAA's planned upgrades to ERAM and (2) assess ERAM's ability to support key NextGen capabilities.What We FoundFAA is making a significant investment to sustain and enhance ERAM's hardware and software at the Centers. Over 6 years, the Agency will replace ERAM's original computer hardware and modernize ERAM's software to allow system improvements and new capabilities. Once these upgrades are complete, ERAM will essentially be a new system with enhanced capabilities. FAA plans to continue to add capabilities and keep the system up to date. FAA has re-categorized ERAM from a moderate to a high-impact system but has not yet determined what security controls the system will require as a high-impact system.FAA has integrated NextGen capabilities into ERAM but faces challenges realizing full benefits for airspace users. FAA considers ERAM foundational to many NextGen systems, including the Automatic Dependent Surveillance--Broadcast (ADS-B) system, performance based navigation (PBN), and data communications (DataComm). The Agency has integrated ADS-B and PBN with ERAM but has encountered delays implementing DataComm's high-altitude services due to the impact of the Federal Government shutdown in late 2018 and early 2019, air-to-ground network problems, and other issues. Because FAA will develop new procedures and training for controllers and pilots for these capabilities, it is uncertain when these enhancements and NextGen capabilities will provide full benefits for airspace users.RecommendationsWe made one recommendation to help FAA improve its efforts to upgrade ERAM to support NextGen capabilities. FAA concurred with our recommendation.

This audit report is one of a series of OIG reports addressing the identification, reporting, and investigation of incidents of potential abuse or neglect of our Nation's most vulnerable populations, including the elderly and individuals with developmental disabilities. Our objectives were to determine whether North Carolina (1) ensured that nursing facilities reported potential abuse or neglect of Medicaid beneficiaries transferred from nursing facilities to hospital emergency departments; (2) complied with Federal and State requirements for assigning a priority level, investigating, and recording allegations of potential abuse and neglect; and (3) operated its complaint and incident report program effectively.

o U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not comprehensively plan and conduct its covert testing, use test results to address vulnerability, or widely share lessons learned. CBP’s two covert testing groups do not use risk assessments or intelligence to plan and conduct covert tests at ports of entry and U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints, do not plan coordinated tests, and do not design system-wide tests. This occurred because CBP has not provided adequate guidance on risk- and intelligence-based test planning, directed the groups to coordinate, given them the required authority, or established performance goals and measures for covert testing. Following testing, CBP does not widely share covert test results, consistently make recommendations, or ensure corrective actions are taken. Results are not widely shared because CBP has not defined roles and responsibilities for such sharing. Covert testing groups do not make recommendations or ensure corrective actions are implemented due to insufficient authority and policies directing these actions. Finally, CBP does not effectively manage covert testing groups to ensure data reliability, completeness, and compliance with security requirements due to leadership changes and limited staff. Without comprehensive planning, incorporating lessons learned from test results, and program management accountability, CBP cannot ensure it addresses vulnerabilities, which may be exploited and threaten national security. We recommended CBP develop policies and procedures for conducting covert testing and assign roles and responsibilities for oversight of covert testing groups. We made seven recommendations that will strengthen its covert testing program. CBP concurred with all seven recommendations.

The Office of Special Reviews investigated allegations that a GS-14 employee in VA’s Office of Information and Technology misused his government email by sending personal emails during work hours, and also took advantage of his telework arrangement to handle personal matters during his duty hours. The OIG could not substantiate the misuse of official time or improper use of VA resources because the employee routinely worked outside of his regular duty hours with his supervisor’s approval, and VA has not established criteria defining how much personal use of VA email is excessive. While investigating these issues, the OIG became aware that the employee had referred staff who were planning conferences for his group to his wife, a sales manager for a large hotel chain, and sent emails providing direction about the arrangements for these conferences. The staff subsequently booked rooms for these events at hotels for which the employee’s wife had sales responsibility. Although the staff made the decision and the arrangements were advantageous to VA, the OIG determined that the employee’s conduct appeared contrary to ethical rules prohibiting an employee from using his public office for “his own private gain, for the endorsement of any product, service or enterprise, or for the private gain of friends, relatives, or persons with whom the employee is affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity….” The OIG made one recommendation relating to a supervisory review of the employee’s conduct and consideration of appropriate administrative action, if any. VA concurred with this recommendation.

Following the death of a Peace Corps/Ghana Volunteer, we conducted a review to assess the sufficiency of Volunteer training and Volunteer housing procedures to mitigate the risk of future accidents involving gas tanks used for cooking. Our report contains 4 recommendations to improve the agency's actions regarding gas cooking safety.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigated a non-specific allegation that chief nurses within the Miami VA Health Care System (Miami HCS) violated the federal anti-nepotism statute by arranging to have their spouses hired for positions for which the spouses were not qualified. This allegation could not be substantiated. In addition, a specific allegation of nepotism was made pertaining to the conduct of a particular chief nurse. The OIG substantiated the allegation that the chief nurse violated the anti-nepotism statute by recommending the chief nurse’s spouse for a position at the Miami HCS. The chief nurse falls under the statutory definition of a public official and was prohibited from advocating for the employment by VA of the chief nurse’s spouse. The chief nurse was involved in two communications relating to the spouse’s possible employment at VA, one of which the OIG considered advocacy contrary to the federal anti-nepotism statute. The spouse withdrew his/her application without providing an explanation and was not hired by VA. The OIG made one recommendation relating to administrative action against the chief nurse if the Miami HCS Director deems it appropriate. VA concurred with the OIG’s finding and determined administrative action at this time is unwarranted. The OIG considers the recommendation closed.