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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
U.S. Agency for International Development
Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Strategy for Monitoring and Evaluating Programs Throughout Afghanistan
Audit of Community Service Grants at Commonwealth Public Broadcasting Corporation, WCVE-TV/FM, Richmond, VA for the Period July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2014, Report No. ASJ1505-1602
Nebraska Methodist Hospital (the Hospital) (operating in Omaha, Nebraska) complied with Medicare billing requirements for 119 of the 138 inpatient and outpatient claims we reviewed. However, the Hospital did not fully comply with Medicare billing requirements for the remaining 19 claims, resulting in net overpayments of $111,000 for calendar years 2012 and 2013. Specifically, 17 inpatient claims had billing errors, resulting in net overpayments of $86,000, and 2 outpatient claims had billing errors, resulting in overpayments of $25,000. These errors occurred primarily because the Hospital did not have adequate controls to prevent the incorrect billing of Medicare claims within the selected risk areas that contained errors.
The OIG audited corporate card transactions totaling $17.3 million for the period March 1, 2014, through August 31, 2014, to determine if appropriate policies and controls were in place to mitigate the risk of charge card fraud and abuse. We found policies could be strengthened and appropriate controls put in place to mitigate the risk of charge card fraud and abuse. We also found there was no documentation to explain the various database tables or the contents of corporate card data fields in the Employee Reimbursement System (ERS). Additionally, potential cost savings may not be achieved due to insufficient tax-related data and confusion within the organization and among vendors regarding TVA's tax status. Our recommendations to TVA management included: (1) requiring annual training for approvers, (2) implementing multiple ERS modifications to strengthen automated controls and enhance compliance with policies, (3) reviewing potentially duplicate and ineligible transactions identified to determine if TVA was due reimbursement, (4) performing periodic review of ERS data to identify potentially ineligible charges, (5) evaluating the appropriateness of delegation of supervisory approval, (6) formally documenting ERS, and (7) determining which corporate card transactions are exempt from state and local taxes. TVA management agreed to or has taken actions to address some, but not all of our recommendations to mitigate the risk of charge card fraud and abuse.
We found that the Office of Civil Rights generally resolves complaints in a timely and efficient manner and in accordance with applicable policies and procedures. However, we noted that increasing workload and decreasing resources could have a negative impact on complaint resolution over time, and staff may not be able to maintain current levels of productivity if these trends continue.
At the request of the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Supply Chain, the OIG examined a cost proposal submitted for construction/modification services. Our objective was to determine if the vendor's cost proposal was fairly stated for a planned $100 million contract. In our opinion, the cost proposal (1) overstated the other direct cost (ODC) markup rate in the Gallatin Fossil Plant and Paradise Fossil Plant baseline project prices, (2) overstated the payroll tax rate in the craft labor rate schedule, and (3) included non-manual hourly wage ranges that were not reflective of actual salary costs. We estimated TVA could save about $1.2 million on the planned $100 million contract by negotiating reductions to the proposed ODC markup rate and craft labor payroll tax rate. In addition, we found the contract's compensation terms and related attachments were inconsistent with the methodology TVA intends to use to compensate the contractor.(Summary Only)
We found that the California Department of Rehabilitation did not have adequate data quality controls to ensure that information it reported to Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA) was accurate, complete, and adequately supported. Specific control weaknesses we identified were (1) lack of an adequate control to prevent staff from changing the date that a participant’s case was closed in its case management system; (2) insufficient requirements that personnel maintain documentation to corroborate key dates for application, eligibility, case closure, and employment data; (3) lack of guidance for determining effective dates for participants’ plans; and (4) insufficient manager oversight to provide assurances that data were accurate and required documentation was maintained. Our testing of data that California Department of Rehabilitation reported to RSA showed that most of the data elements in our review contained significant data errors that could undermine RSA’s ability to effectively evaluate the California Department of Rehabilitation’s performance or a significant unverifiable data rate that would raise questions about the reliability of data that it reported.