Federal Reports

In a previous audit, Performance Audit of USCP Controls over Proximity Cards, Report Number OIG-2015-05, dated April 2015, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) found the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department) did not have effective controls over the process for proximity (prox) cards.  OIG conducted a follow-up on the Department's implementation of recommendations contained within Report Number OIG-20 I 5-05.  The objectives of this follow-up were to confirm that the Department took the appropriate corrective actions and that controls the Department implemented were operating efficiently and effectively.  Our scope included existing controls over prox cards for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 through February 28, 2018, related to implementation of recommendations outlined in our previous report.

In accordance with our Annual Performance Plan Fiscal Year (FY) 2018, Report Number OIG-2018-01, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) assessed the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department) workforce diversity. Our objectives were (1) determine if the Department properly designed a diversity program that would yield desired results, (2) evaluate the accuracy and completeness of complaints and discrimination data reported to stakeholders, and (3) assess the status of recommendations made in the previous diversity audit.  Our scope included program policies in effect as of January 2, 2018, and data collected during the five previous years, calendar years 2012 through 2017.

This report provide to the appropriate congressional committees, the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from its reviews and audits performed under section 205 of the CPSIA.

The Office of the Inspector General conducted a review of Supply Chain’s Strategy and Performance (S&P) organization to identify operational and cultural strengths and risks that could impact S&P’s organizational effectiveness. Our report identified strengths within S&P related to (1) organizational alignment, (2) teamwork within departments, and (3) management support of employees. We did not identify any significant risks.

The OIG investigated allegations that a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) employee shared proprietary contract information, accepted bribes, and had improper relationships with Government contractors. We found the employee socialized with Government contractors on a regular basis, which had the appearance of a conflict of interest to some colleagues, but did not violate ethics regulations. We found no evidence that the employee shared proprietary contract information or accepted bribes from Government contractors.