Federal Reports

VA faces tremendous challenges modernizing its electronic health records system and connecting it to a similarly implemented Department of Defense (DoD) system to create a comprehensive, lifetime health record for service members. The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) examined whether infrastructure-readiness activities were on schedule to support the modernization initiative, starting with the system’s initially scheduled deployment on March 28, 2020, at the Mann-Grandstaff VA Medical Center (VAMC) in Spokane, Washington. The OIG found that critical physical and information technology infrastructure upgrades had not been completed at Mann-Grandstaff and associated facilities six months before the specified system deployment date, as guidance suggested. Even as recently as January 8, 2020, some infrastructure updates had yet to be completed, jeopardizing the then planned March 28 deployment. In April 2020, VA postponed going live without specifying a new date. The lack of important upgrades jeopardizes VA’s ability to properly deploy the new system and increases risks of delays to the overall schedule. Some needed infrastructure upgrades were not projected to be completed until months after going live. Infrastructure upgrades were not completed at Mann-Grandstaff on time primarily because VA had not completed initial comprehensive site assessments, developed specifications for infrastructure with appropriate monitoring mechanisms, and lacked adequate staffing. VA committed to the March 28 date without having the necessary information on the state of the medical center’s infrastructure. The OIG also found security vulnerabilities with some of the physical infrastructure at the Mann-Grandstaff VAMC. Damage to that infrastructure from unauthorized access could lead to loss of connectivity. The OIG made eight recommendations, including establishing an infrastructure-readiness schedule for future deployment sites that incorporates lessons learned from DoD’s experience and ensures projected milestones are realistic and achievable. The OIG also recommended ensuring the physical security of electronic health records infrastructure.

What We Looked AtThe Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) requires Federal agencies to report improper payment estimates for all programs identified as susceptible to significant improper payments. It requires agencies to limit improper payments to less than 10 percent of their total program payments, publish their results in the Agency Financial Report (AFR), and comply with regulations the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) developed to implement the act. IPERA also requires inspectors general to submit reports on IPERA compliance to their agency heads. For fiscal year 2019, the Department of Transportation (DOT) reported approximately $45 billion in payments in programs or activities susceptible to significant improper payments. DOT estimated that $396 million of those payments were improper payments. We reviewed DOT’s improper payment testing results for fiscal year 2019 to determine whether DOT complied with IPERA’s requirements as implemented by OMB. What We FoundDOT complied with IPERA and included all required reporting elements in its 2019 AFR. Specifically, DOT reported improper payment estimates for the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) Highway Planning and Construction program (HPC)—the only program the Department identified as susceptible to significant improper payments. In addition, the payment integrity information in the AFR was accurate and complete. Furthermore, DOT reported an improper payment rate of less than 10 percent and published corrective action plans for FHWA HPC. However, the corrective action plan has not helped one HPC grantee prevent improper payments for the last 3 years. In fiscal year 2019, FHWA projected the amount of improper payments to be approximately $169 million for this grantee only and categorized these funds as monetary losses or overpayments. The lack of an effective corrective action for this HPC grantee jeopardizes DOT’s efforts to prevent improper payments and remain compliant with IPERA. Our RecommendationsDOT concurred with both of our recommendations and provided an appropriate action and completion dates. Accordingly, we consider all recommendations as resolved but open pending completion of the planned actions.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this study to assess what information servicers of mortgage loans insured by Federal Housing Administration (FHA) are providing to borrowers regarding forbearance options available under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act).

UPDATE: AUD-MERO-20-26 was issued in April 2020, with redactions. OIG later determined that the redactions were appropriate but that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions associated with the redactions should be modified. The report linked to this webpage was updated to reflect the appropriate FOIA exemptions.

The $2.5 billion Acela 21 program is the largest single investment in Amtrak’s (the company) 49-year history. Through this program, the company will replace its existing Acela fleet with 28 new high-speed trainsets to upgrade service on its most profitable business line. In January 2020, we reported on management and structural weaknesses in the Acela 21 program.Our report identified five key steps—commonly called “program elements”—the company must complete to launch service by the planned date in 2021. One of these is the program’s Information Technology (IT) element, which involves the IT department developing and implementing eight different systems—or workstreams—needed for critical functions like performing trainset maintenance and federally required daily safety inspections.

Our objective was to perform the required risk assessment to determine whether an audit or review of the Department’s grant closeout process was warranted. We assessed the risk of the Department’s grant closeout process as moderate and determined that an audit or review is warranted. Specifically, we identified risks with the reliability of grant data and related GONE Act reporting, as well as the Department’sgrant closeout policies and procedures, including a policy allowing older grants to be closed in compliance without required reports being provided by the grantee. In addition, we also found that both the volume of expired grants and amount of undisbursed grant funds has significantly increased between the date of initial GONE Act reporting (September 30, 2017) and January 30, 2020, indicating that grant closeout is less of a focus now that GONE Act reporting is over.