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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
The Board Can Strengthen Its Process to Monitor and Mitigate International Travel Risks
The Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) three nuclear plants, Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, and Watts Bar, are capable of generating an average of 8,275 megawatts of electricity, making TVA the third-largest nuclear fleet in the United States. In fiscal year 2025, TVA generated 56,157 million kilowatt hours of nuclear power, accounting for 33 percent of TVA’s total fleet power generation. To maintain the nuclear fleet, TVA is making significant investment. For fiscal year 2025, the TVA Board of Directors approved $257 million to support reliable operation of the seven units across TVA’s three nuclear plants.
Due to potential risks to cost and schedule from rework, we performed an evaluation of contractor rework for nuclear projects at TVA. The objectives were to evaluate TVA’s oversight of contractor rework and determine if rework was being handled in accordance with contract terms and conditions. Our scope included active nuclear projects in the implementation phase.
We reviewed nine contracts associated with our sample of projects and identified rework was required for one. We could not determine if all rework identified was handled in accordance with contract terms and conditions due to a lack of formal documentation and tracking of rework. In addition, we identified a lack of guidance for oversight of rework. Specifically, TVA and Nuclear’s project management Standard Programs and Processes do not define rework or provide any information on how rework should be documented and tracked, which contributed to the inability to determine if all rework was handled in accordance with contract terms and conditions.
We identified a significant increase in the amount of funds drawn by HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME) and HOME American Rescue Plan (ARP) grantees near the time of the January 2025, hold in Federal funds, which increased the risk that the funds may have been drawn prematurely, without support, or used improperly. Therefore, our audit objective was to identify if HOME and HOME ARP draws made near the time of the hold in federal funds were in accordance with program requirements.
Out of eight grantees selected for review, two (New York City and the City of Anaheim) violated program requirements when they prematurely drew HOME and HOME ARP funds near the time of the hold in federal funds and made improper payments. New York City and its subrecipient, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), could not adequately support how $81.9 million in HOME ARP funds were used for a tenant arrears program, of which, over $6 million was used for ineligible tenants that were over the allowable income limit. Both grantees drew a combined total of over $87 million in HOME and HOME ARP funds in advance of their immediate needs, in violation of program requirements. Further, the City of Anaheim admitted to drawing an additional $404,630 in HOME and HOME ARP funds prematurely. Both grantees earned interest income while holding the funds from their premature draws that they did not report to HUD and had not remitted to the U.S. Treasury. Each grantee had different reasons for why these issues occurred including over-reliance on NYCHA, delays transferring and applying the funds, and concerns the hold in funds would jeopardize ongoing housing development. The funds used for the ineligible tenants could have been used for other eligible and supported program activities to reduce homelessness and increase housing stability. In addition, the combined premature draws of over $87 million misled HUD about the need for the funds and the resulting accumulated interest must be remitted to the U.S. Treasury.
We recommend that the Directors of HUD’s New York and Los Angeles Offices of Community Planning and Development, (1) require New York City to provide documentation to support its $81,913,050 draw of HOME ARP funds or repay its HOME Investment Trust Fund Treasury Account, (2) require both grantees to support the amount of interest earned while holding the funds and remit the funds to the U.S. Treasury, (3) review additional premature draws to determine eligibility, and (4) assess the adequacy of both grantees procedures and controls to ensure draws are made in accordance with program requirements. We also recommend that HUD collaborate with its Office of Program Enforcement to consider potential administrative actions against both grantees for violating program requirements.
During the week of January 5, 2026, we performed a self-initiated audit at the Shreveport Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC) and Package Support Annex (PSA), and three delivery units serviced by the P&DC and PSA. The delivery units included Huntington Station and Southfield Station in Shreveport, LA and Plantation Station in Bossier City, LA.
We issued individual reports for the three delivery units and one report for the P&DC and PSA. We also issued another report summarizing the results of our audits at all three delivery units with specific recommendations for management to address.
The VA Office of Inspector General conducted a healthcare inspection of the Martinsburg VA Medical Center (facility) to assess leaders’ response to clinical care and behavioral concerns involving two surgeons. The inspection was initiated after staff raised concerns about the two surgeons’ surgical competency, outcomes, and behavior.
The OIG found that leaders generally followed required procedures when clinical care concerns were raised about both surgeons. Leaders initiated privileging action, conducted quality and clinical reviews, and restored privileges when indicated. One surgeon underwent a focused clinical care review that identified substandard care and resulted in a focused professional practice evaluation. That surgeon later completed the evaluation and moved to ongoing monitoring.
Although leaders carried out required privileging actions, the OIG found delays in the peer review process. Veterans Health Administration policy requires timely designation of peer reviews as confidential quality management activities, but the time between identifying cases and completing the necessary documentation by the facility exceeded required limits. These delays reduced opportunities for timely assessment and improving the quality of patient care.
Leaders complied with requirements for institutional disclosures. They conducted an electronic health record lookback of hundreds of surgeries performed by one surgeon, identified cases involving serious adverse events, and completed institutional disclosures when required.
The OIG also reviewed the two surgeons’ behavior concerns. The chief of surgery addressed disruptive behavior associated with one surgeon but did not assess an allegation involving the second surgeon, contrary to VA policy and facility bylaws.
The OIG made two recommendations, and the Facility Director concurred with both. The Facility Director reported a process to ensure timely initiation of peer reviews will be implemented and stated that appropriate action was taken after assessing the allegations regarding the second surgeon’s behavior.
Family Planning Commodities: USAID Must Provide Final Disposition Instructions to Stop Accruing Storage Costs for $8 Million in Unusable Items and $1.7 Million in Nearly Expired Items in Belgium