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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
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U.S. Agency for International Development
Closeout Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of Palestinian Wastewater Engineers Group, Green Technologies in Cooperative Date Farming Project in West Bank and Gaza, AID-294-A-16-00006, January 1, 2018, to January 31, 2019
Closeout Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of American Near East Refugee Aid, Palestinian Community Infrastructure Development Program in West Bank and Gaza, Cooperative Agreement 294-A-13-00005, June 1, 2018, to January 31, 2019
We surveyed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention facilities from April 8-20, 2020 regarding their experiences and challenges managing COVID-19 among detainees in their custody and among their staff. The facilities that responded to our survey described various actions they have taken to prevent and mitigate the pandemic’s spread among detainees. These actions include increased cleaning and disinfecting of common areas, and isolating new detainees, when possible, as a precautionary measure. However, facilities reported concerns with their inability to practice social distancing among detainees, and to isolate or quarantine individuals who may be infected with COVID-19. Regarding staffing, facilities reported decreases in current staff availability due to COVID-19, but have contingency plans in place to ensure continued operations. The facilities also expressed concerns with the availability of staff, as well as protective equipment for staff, if there were an outbreak of COVID-19 in the facility. Overall, almost all facilities stated they were prepared to address COVID-19, but expressed concerns if the pandemic continued to spread. At the time of our survey, 23 facilities reported having detainees who had tested positive for COVID-19; this number had risen to 48 facilities as of May 11, 2020.
A former Machinist based in Albany-Rensselaer, New York, violated company policies by viewing pornographic videos during work hours on his company-owned computer. The videos were stored and accessed on a USB device. He admitted to viewing the videos and resigned on June 18, 2020, following his interview by Office of Inspector General special agents. The former employee is not eligible for rehire.
This Office of Inspector General (OIG) Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection Program report provides a focused evaluation of the quality of care delivered in the inpatient and outpatient settings of the VA Eastern Kansas Health Care System and multiple outpatient clinics in Kansas and Missouri. The inspection covers key clinical and administrative processes associated with promoting quality care. The inspection focused on Leadership and Organizational Risks; Quality, Safety, and Value; Medical Staff Privileging; Environment of Care; Medication Management: Long-Term Opioid Therapy for Pain; Mental Health: Suicide Prevention Program; Care Coordination: Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisions; Women’s Health: Comprehensive Care; and High-Risk Processes: Reusable Medical Equipment. The executive leadership team had been working together for two months, although the Director had served since 2012. Survey results revealed opportunities to improve employee satisfaction; however, patients appeared satisfied. Leaders were unable to speak knowledgeably about actions taken to maintain and improve performance and were minimally knowledgeable about Strategic Analytics for Improvement and Learning and community living center data. The OIG issued 39 recommendations for improvement in these seven areas: (1) Quality, Safety, and Value • Committee activities • Peer review processes • Utilization management processes • Root cause analysis processes (2) Medical Staff Privileging • Professional practice evaluations • Provider exit review processes (3) Environment of Care • General safety • Environmental safety and cleanliness • Medical supply storage and availability • Panic alarm testing • Privacy protection (4) Medication Management • Urine drug testing • Informed consent documentation • Follow-up after therapy initiation (5) Mental Health • Outreach activities • Suicide prevention care (6) Women’s Health • Community-based outpatient clinic-designated women’s health primary care providers • Women Veterans Health Committee processes (7) High-Risk Processes • Inventory file and standard operating procedures • Annual risk analysis • Airflow testing and equipment storage • Staff training
The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this inspection to evaluate concerns related to a Virtual Pharmacy Services (VPS) pharmacist’s discontinuation of an antidepressant medication for a patient of the Minneapolis VA Health Care System, which resulted in the patient not having prescribed antidepressant medication for approximately six weeks before dying by suicide. The OIG found the VPS pharmacist did not access the patient’s electronic health record or notify the psychiatrist when discontinuing an antidepressant medication order. Although the facility granted the VPS pharmacist access to the patient’s electronic health record, the pharmacist reported not being aware of this capability. The discontinuation of the patient’s medication may have contributed to increased depressive symptoms, including suicidal ideation, in the six weeks following the patient’s scheduled completion of the medication. The OIG was unable to determine that the medication discontinuation contributed directly to the patient’s death; however, the possible worsening of the patient’s underlying depressive illness may have been a contributing factor. The OIG identified discrepancies between VPS pharmacists’ duties outlined in their functional statement and duties actually performed. VPS pharmacists’ inability to fully execute certain functions may contribute to decisions that are not fully informed and patients may not receive medications as prescribed. The VPS productivity measure of 95 prescriptions processed per hour might be an unreasonable target and may contribute to increased risk for pharmacist error. Further, Pharmacy Benefits Management leaders did not ensure VPS prescription processing was adequately monitored for accuracy. Pharmacy Benefits Management leaders failed to clearly outline program management and quality assurance monitoring objectives and processes leading to deficiencies that can contribute to adverse patient outcomes. The OIG made five recommendations to the Under Secretary for Health related to standardizing software menu options, revising functional statements and performance metrics, and establishing certain quality assurance objectives.