Federal Reports

This OIG final report on the results of the audit of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) acquisition planning activities. Objective: To determine if the FTC properly plans and awards contracts in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies.

The VA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed VA’s Fiduciary Program to determine whether Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) staff finalized proposed incompetency determinations timely. The OIG found VBA delays in completing final competency determinations completed from March 1 through August 31, 2017, for beneficiaries who received proposals of incompetency. Delays in completing final competency determinations can result in “incompetent” beneficiaries receiving ongoing benefits payments for extended periods without the protection of a VA-appointed fiduciary, putting these benefits at risk. The OIG estimated 13,600 unprotected beneficiaries received $62.4 million in monthly ongoing benefits payments.Also, delays in final competency determinations resulted in both competent and incompetent beneficiaries waiting longer for withheld retroactive benefits. The OIG estimated that about 12,400 beneficiaries had nearly $77.5 million in VA retroactive benefits payments withheld while awaiting final competency determinations.The OIG identified several causes for delays, including non-integrated information technology systems, the lack of prioritization of final competency determinations, National Work Queue routing rules not following VBA policy, and limited staff access to the Legacy Content Manager.The OIG made six recommendations related to entering cases requiring final competency determinations into the Beneficiary Fiduciary Field System, reminding VBA staff of their responsibility to notify Fiduciary Hubs when waivers are received, ensuring Fiduciary Hub staff have access to documents in the Legacy Content Manager, prioritizing processing of final competency determinations, meeting VBA’s established timeliness standard, and distributing final competency determinations according to VBA policy.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine VA’s compliance with the West Los Angeles Leasing Act of 2016 (Act). This Act requires that all real property leases and land sharing agreements involving the West Los Angeles (WLA) campus—part of the VA Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System (GLAHS) in California—principally benefit veterans and their families. Specifically, the OIG assessed whether such leases and other land use agreements were used for purposes allowed under the Act, comply with other federal laws, are veteran-focused and consistent with VA’s objective to revitalize its WLA campus, and were managed effectively. The OIG reviewed 40 land use agreements and determined that 11 did not comply with the WLA Leasing Act, other applicable federal laws, or the Draft Master Plan (DMP). Also, 14 non-VA entities were operating on campus with either an expired or no documented agreement. The OIG determined these noncompliant arrangements resulted from insufficient veteran input on land use, unclear VA policies on what constituted appropriate use of “out leases” and revocable licenses, and incomplete capital asset inventory land use agreement records maintained by GLAHS.Further, although WLA is making progress to implement the DMP, is not on track to meet its revised milestone to provide 484 permanent supportive housing units by September 2020. The OIG recommended VA implement a plan that puts the WLA campus in compliance with the Act, the DMP, and other federal laws. VA should also ensure all agreements are compliant with the Act, create a process to obtain input from the veteran community advisory board on campus land use, update policies and procedures, and ensure the capital asset inventory reflects all agreements.

Research consistently shows that focusing on the customer experience is a successful growth strategy, as companies with loyal customers grow more profitably through their existing customer base than do companies focusing primarily on trying to recruit new customers. Our objective was to evaluate key factors affecting the customer experience at Postal Service retail units and identify opportunities to enhance the overall customer experience.

Our objective was to determine whether the U.S. Postal Service established and implemented effective physical and environmental security controls according to Postal Service policy at the [Redacted] Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC).The Postal Service has the mail processing resources, information technology (IT) network, and transportation infrastructure to deliver mail to every residential and business address in the country. These resources include facilities, equipment, and systems used to process, transfer, and store data, which are vital for business operations. The Postal Service implements physical and environmental security controls over systems to reduce the risk of system and equipment failure, damage from environmental hazards, and unauthorized access to its facilities and assets.We recommended management:Review server room access control lists semiannually; and finalize, publish, and implement out-processing procedures, to include disabling badges for separating employees.Replace the lock on the server room entrance door and ensure it functions properly and remove all posted critical systems information from the server room.Ensure entrance gates are monitored and have traffic arms, computerized card access systems, and intercoms installed at entrance gates.Verify all dock and entrance doors are locked when not in use, entrance door locks are replaced, and employees wear and display Postal Service identification badges at all times.Complete the capital project to replace non-operational CCTV cameras and those that display unrecognizable images and install CCTV cameras in the retail area in accordance with Postal Service policy.

To see our report, click on the link below

CBP facilities we visited appeared to be operating in compliance with the 2015 National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search. With the exception of inconsistent cleanliness of the hold rooms, we observed that unaccompanied alien children had access to toilets and sinks, drinking water, beverages (including milk and juice drinks), as well as snacks and food. Unaccompanied alien children had access to hygiene items and clean bedding at all facilities we visited. We did not encounter issues with temperatures or ventilation, access to emergency medical care, inadequate supervision, or access to telephones. We also observed that CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) ports of entry had offices and storage spaces redesigned into hold rooms to be able to detain more unaccompanied alien children, family units, and other border crossers referred for processing. We made no recommendations in this report.

DHS did not complete an assessment of the security value of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program as required by law. This occurred because DHS experienced challenges identifying an office responsible for the effort. As a result, Coast Guard does not have a full understanding of the extent to which the TWIC program addresses security risks in the maritime environment. This will continue to impact the Coast Guard’s ability to properly develop and enforce regulations governing the TWIC program. For example, Coast Guard did not clearly define the applicability of facilities that have certain dangerous cargo in bulk when developing a final rule to implement the use of TWIC readers at high-risk maritime facilities. Without oversight and policy improvements in the TWIC program, high-risk facilities may continue to operate without enhanced security measures, putting these facilities at an increased security risk. In addition, Coast Guard needs to improve its oversight of the TWIC program to reduce the risk of transportation security incidents. Due to technical problems and lack of awareness of procedures, Coast Guard did not make full use of the TWIC card’s biometric features as intended by Congress to ensure only eligible individuals have unescorted access to secure areas of regulated facilities. During inspections at regulated facilities from FYs 2016 through 2017, Coast Guard only used electronic readers to verify, on average, about one in every 15 TWIC cards against TSA’s canceled card list. This occurred because the majority of the TWIC readers in the field have reached the end of their service life. Furthermore, the Coast Guard’s guidance governing oversight of the TWIC program is fragmented, which led to confusion and inconsistent inspection procedures. This resulted in fewer regulatory confiscations of TWIC cards. The Department concurred with our four recommendations, and described the corrective actions it is taking and plans to take.