Federal Reports

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed an allegation that a patient experienced a delay in receiving basic life support (BLS) during a medical emergency on the grounds of the Carl T. Hayden VA Medical Center (facility) in Phoenix, Arizona, and later died at a community hospital.The OIG determined the patient experienced a delay in receiving BLS. The OIG learned of deficiencies related to the initiation of emergency medical care, including (1) conflicting facility policies that were inconsistent with Veterans Health Administration (VHA) requirements, (2) lack of layperson cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training, and (3) lack of an automatic external defibrillator (AED).Quality of care concerns were also identified, which included a discrepancy between the documented plan for a wearable cardioverter defibrillator (WCD) and the absence of an order for the device, and a failure to assess vital signs at an appointment preceding the medical emergency. The OIG was unable to determine whether a change in care would have resulted in a different outcome for the patient.Facility leaders’ lack of response upon awareness of the event did not align with high reliability organization (HRO) principles and I CARE values. The OIG identified the patient safety manager did not facilitate a thorough investigation of the related patient safety report, which resulted in an inaccurate harm assessment. Additionally, the patient safety manager and Facility Director failed to ensure a timely review of the report and investigation.The OIG made 10 recommendations to the Facility Director related to congruence of facility policies and their alignment with VHA Directives, layperson CPR training, placement of AEDs at the facility, outpatient clinic compliance with vital signs completion, complaint review processes, communicating in alignment with HRO and I CARE values, training on patient safety reporting, and investigation and closure of patient safety reports.

We conducted a review to determine the Federal Student Aid office’s (FSA) actions to mitigate risks associated with the verification of identities in the FSA ID account creation process. Although we found that FSA had implemented controls to address identity verification risks associated with FSA ID account creation, it could take further actions by implementing preventive controls to better protect Title IV funds and the public from fraudulent activity. We found that approximately $27.3 million in Title IV funds was disbursed to suspected fraudulent FSA ID accounts. Further, although FSA has taken several steps to mitigate other risks to FSA ID accounts, these controls mitigate risks after the FSA ID account has been created and do not mitigate risk associated with the creation of the FSA ID account. We also identified a data reliability issue with the National Student Loan Data System data.

Peer Review: System Review Report on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's Office of Inspector General Audit Organization

The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), enacted in August 2022 as Public Law 117-169, appropriated $3 billion to the U.S. Postal Service to assist with its delivery fleet modernization. The Act provides the Postal Service $1.29 billion in funding for the procurement of zero-emission delivery vehicles (electric vehicles) and $1.71 billion in funding for the purchase, design, and installation of the necessary charging infrastructure at Postal Service facilities.

The Clean Air Act requires delegated agencies to work with the EPA to reduce air pollution from stationary sources. From at least 2006, the EPA did not ensure that two large, delegated agencies, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, or the TCEQ, and California's South Coast Air Quality Management District, identified a subset of synthetic-minor sources of air pollution, or SM-80s. The permit limitations on SM-80s need to be clear and enforceable because, if the limitations are not adhered to, the source may operate at major source levels and should be subject to more stringent requirements. The EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance's lack of in-depth evaluations of Regions 6 and 9, lack of SM-80 requirements, and reliance on unenforceable guidance contributed to deficiencies we identified in the regional offices' oversight.