Federal Reports

Our objectives for this report were to assess (1) the extent to which the company’s employees who perform safety-related work are at risk for prescription opioid impairment and misuse and (2) the company’s efforts to detect and deter this risk.After examining de-identified prescription and medical claims data from fiscal year 2019 for 11,356 employees who performed safety-related work, we found that some employees are potentially at risk for prescription opioid misuse, overdose, and impairment. This includes 113 employees who met one or more of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention indicators for potential opioid use disorder or overdose. We also found that the company’s random drug testing program excludes safety-related positions and common prescription opioids because the company limits its program to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s minimum requirements. Finally, we found that the company’s Benefits group does not require the company’s benefit administrators—CVS/Caremark and Aetna—to report key information from their opioid monitoring tools to the company, such as prescription patterns they detect, trends in specific opioid risk factors, and the number and status of interventions the administrators have taken.To address the findings, we recommended that the company assess its workforce and identify all positions in which employees’ use of prescription opioids could impair their ability to safely perform job-related tasks. We also recommend that the company identify whether additional prescription opioids are of substantial concern for safety-related work. We recommend that the company then develop a strategy to negotiate with unions to expand its random drug testing program to cover these additional positions and any additional opioids. In addition, we recommend that the Benefits group identify and require benefit administrators to provide additional data, subject to U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 requirements, that would help support effective decision-making.

To examine the readiness of NASA’s acquisition workforce to respond to current and future contracting needs.

We audited the City of Compton’s Neighborhood Stabilization Programs (NSP) 1 and 3 due to a referral made by our Office of Investigation because of concerns related to ongoing issues at the City and complaints received about the City’s administration of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funds.  In addition, HUD’s Office of Community Planning and Development rated the City as high risk for administering program funds in fiscal year 2018.  Our audit objective was to determine whether the City administered NSP1 and NSP3 funds in compliance with its own procedures and HUD regulations.The City did not (1) maintain procurement documents for acquisition and rehabilitation services and consultant services to show fair and open competition at a reasonable price, (2) always disburse program expenses in compliance with its own procedures and HUD regulations, and (3) submit the required reports to HUD on time and post HUD quarterly performance reports on its website.  These issues occurred because the City did not implement its procurement controls.  In addition, the City experienced high staff turnover, which did not allow it to administer these programs in compliance with HUD regulations.  As a result, the City did not give vendors the opportunity to bid in fair and open competition for the services needed in the targeted areas.  Also, the City disbursed a total of $272,206 in questioned program expenses.  In addition, the City’s late submission of required reports to HUD and lack of posting performance reports on its website prevented HUD, the general public, government entities, and other stakeholders from knowing the progress of its program-funded projects and activities.We recommend that HUD require the City to (1) implement procurement controls to maintain complete procurement documents, (2) provide adequate documents to support $270,656 in program expenses, and (3) submit future required reports to HUD on time and post the missing and future HUD quarterly performance reports on its website.

We investigated an allegation that U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Director James Reilly retaliated against a USGS employee after the employee filed a complaint with our office about Reilly’s conduct. We substantiated the allegation. We issued a report on our investigation to the Secretary of the Interior for any action deemed appropriate.

Michael Hollingsworth, a resident of New York, was sentenced on October 26, 2020, in U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, to 36 months of probation and forfeiture of $200 for falsifying an Amtrak pre-employment drug test. Hollingsworth received cash from an Amtrak job applicant to submit a fraudulent drug test sample so the applicant would pass Amtrak’s drug screening requirement. At the time, Hollingsworth was the owner and operator of DDW Drug Testing Services, a subcontractor that conducts pre-employment drug-test collections for Amtrak’s prime contractor. His company served as the primary drug test sample collector for Amtrak in the New York City area since 2016. He previously pleaded guilty for his role in the scheme on November 19, 2019.In addition to our investigation into Hollingsworth’s activities, we issued a management information report to the company presenting our observations regarding Amtrak’s prime contractor. Our report identified a disturbing lack of due diligence by the contractor regarding their subcontractors involved in the pre-employment drug testing process. We also found that the prime contractor was less than candid with Amtrak officials and us about prior problems with Hollingsworth. The company concurred with our observations and took corrective action to address them.

What We Looked AtThis report presents the results of our quality control review (QCR) of an audit of the Department of Transportation's (DOT) information security program and practices. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) requires agencies to develop, implement, and document agency-wide information security programs and practices. FISMA also requires inspectors general to conduct annual reviews of their agencies' information security programs and report the results to the Office of Management and Budget.To meet this requirement, we contracted with CliftonLarsonAllen LLP (CLA) to conduct this audit subject to our oversight. The audit objective was to determine the effectiveness of DOT's information security program and practices in five function areas--Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.What We FoundWe performed a QCR of CLA's report and related documentation. Our QCR disclosed no instances in which CLA did not comply, in all material respects, with generally accepted Government auditing standards.RecommendationsCLA made 18 recommendations. DOT concurs with recommendations 1, 3 through 15, and 17 and 18 and partially concurs with recommendations 2 and 16. CLA considers all 18 recommendations resolved but open pending completion of planned actions.