Federal Reports

What We Looked AtThe Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Contract Tower (FCT) Program consists of 257 contract towers in 46 States operated by 3 contractors and the Air National Guard. Contract towers manage about 28 percent of the Nation’s air traffic control operations. The FCT Program is governed by seven contracts, based on geographical regions, which establish controller staffing for contract towers. These contracts normally cover a 5-year period and require contractors to submit controller staffing plans for each tower during the contract solicitation process. Our audit objective was to assess FAA’s approach for establishing and modifying air traffic controller staffing levels at contract towers. What We FoundFAA does not establish controller staffing levels at contract towers; instead the Agency reviews and approves staffing levels the contractors submit during the contract solicitation process. While FAA requires a program-wide staffing minimum of four controllers per tower, this minimum is not based on any Agency analysis or a study of controller staffing levels at contract towers. Also, FAA does not adequately monitor whether contractors adhere to the staffing minimum requirement. This is because FAA has not formally documented its process for establishing and reviewing contract tower staffing minimums. In addition, FAA does not proactively review staffing data to identify when staffing changes are needed; instead it relies on contractors to request and justify such changes. Further, FAA did not provide evidence that it had conducted any reviews of contractor performance relative to the labor hours stated in the approved staffing plans. As a result, the Agency may have missed key indicators of the potential need for staffing modifications. Our RecommendationsWe made four recommendations to improve FAA’s approach for staffing contract towers and monitoring performance levels. FAA concurred with recommendations 1 through 3. Thus, we consider these recommendations resolved but open pending FAA’s completion of planned actions and an Office of Inspector General (OIG) review. FAA partially concurred with recommendation 4, which we consider open and unresolved and request that the Agency reconsider its position within 30 days of the date of this report.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a risk assessment of VA’s charge card program, evaluating the three types of charge cards—purchase cards (including convenience checks), travel cards, and fleet cards—for transactions during fiscal year (FY) 2020.The OIG conducted its risk assessment from November 2020 through March 2021. The team reviewed applicable VA policies, procedures, and other controls. The team also analyzed FY 2018 and FY 2019 charge card data to identify transactions or patterns of activity that represent potentially illegal, improper, or erroneous charge card purchases.The OIG determined that the purchase card program remains at medium risk of illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases, as previously assessed for FY 2019. Data analytics of purchase card transactions identified potential misuse of purchase cards. OIG investigations and reviews continue to identify patterns of purchase card transactions that do not comply with the Federal Acquisition Regulation and VA policies and procedures.The OIG also found that VA’s Travel Card Program and Fleet Card Program both remain at low risk for illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases. The risk assessment team assigned a low risk level to both programs primarily because they had no year-end spending surges. Additionally, a low percentage of travel card transactions had potentially unauthorized third-party payers, and the Fleet Card Program benefited from VA’s practice of obtaining refunds for sales tax paid on fuel purchases. Travel card transactions represented only about 1.4 percent of the $4.9 billion spent by VA on charge card transactions during FY 2020. Fleet card transactions represented only about 0.3 percent of that amount.

The audit report includes two finding that address weaknesses in the District’s internal control processes and one condition reported as an “other matter” – a condition that does not rise to the threshold of a reportable finding. The auditors provided four recommendations to address the findings, including a recommendation that the Universal Service Administrative Company, the USF administrator, recover E-Rate program funds in the amount of $54,052.

FEMA did not use its SFM initiative to ensure that Public Assistance (PA) funds were obligated in accordance with Federal, Department, and component requirements. Specifically, FEMA obligated PA funds for 83 projects from fiscal years 2017 through 2019 that we reviewed, even though the subrecipients did not need the funding until after 180 days, which made them eligible for incremental obligation under SFM. This occurred because FEMA did not provide adequate oversight to its Regions. FEMA relied on the Regions’ decisions to determine whether subrecipients’ projects were eligible for SFM funding, without ensuring there was sufficient supporting documentation to validate the determinations. This increases the risk of projects being over obligated. As a result, FEMA is not meeting the intent of SFM, which is to better manage resources in the Disaster Relief Fund to fulfill present and future disaster funding requirements. We made two recommendations that, when implemented, should improve FEMA’s management and oversight of the Disaster Relief Fund. FEMA concurred with the recommendations.

Mark Hernandez, a psychiatrist based in Miami, Florida, Brian Dublynn, Vice President of Safe Haven Recovery Inc, and medical marketer, Jennifer Sanford, pleaded guilty in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on August 17, 2021, to conspiracy charges related to a health care fraud investigation. The defendants conspired to defraud private health companies by causing Safe Haven, a substance abuse treatment facility in Miami, along with several clinical laboratories, to submit false and fraudulent claims to health insurance plans for addiction treatment services that were not provided as billed and laboratory tests that were not medically necessary. As a result of the scheme, Amtrak’s insurance providers were fraudulently charged approximately $86,130. The three defendants will be sentenced at a future date.

This Office of Inspector General (OIG) Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection Program report provides a focused evaluation of the quality of care delivered in the inpatient and outpatient settings of the VA Western Colorado Health Care System in Grand Junction. The inspection covered key clinical and administrative processes associated with promoting quality care. It focused on Leadership and Organizational Risks; COVID -19 Pandemic Readiness and Response; Quality, Safety, and Value; Registered Nurse Credentialing; Mental Health: Emergency Department and Urgent Care Center Suicide Risk Screening and Evaluation; Care Coordination: Inter-facility Transfers; and High-Risk Processes: Examining the Management of Disruptive and Violent Behavior.When the OIG conducted the virtual review, the executive leadership team had worked together for three months. The acting Associate Director for Patient Care Services had covered the role since September 2020. Employee satisfaction survey results identified opportunities for the Associate Director for Patient Care Services to provide a safe culture at work. Patient experience survey scores generally reflected higher care ratings than the VHA average. The OIG’s review of the healthcare system’s accreditation findings, sentinel events, and disclosures did not identify any substantial organizational risk factors. Executive leaders were generally knowledgeable about selected data used in Strategic Analytics for Improvement and Learning models and should continue to take actions to sustain and improve performance.The OIG issued four recommendations for improvement in three areas:(1) Quality, Safety, and Value• Review of aggregated data• Implementation and monitoring of recommended improvement actions(2) Registered Nurse Credentialing• Primary source verification of registered nurses’ licenses(3) High-Risk Processes• Disruptive behavior committee meeting attendance