Federal Reports

To see our report, click on the link below

The audit objectives were to determine whether program funds were managed in accordance with the ARC and Federal grant requirements

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a review to assess implementation and use of VA Video Connect (VVC) prior to and during the COVID-19 pandemic. The OIG explored why providers used telephone communication more frequently than VVC at the onset of the pandemic and how the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) resolved technology issues. Experiences of a subset of providers who used VVC from October 2016 through July 2021 were examined to identify benefits of and barriers to VVC use.VHA leaders did not specify a pandemic in the telehealth strategic plans but identified the exigent nature of the pandemic in the March 2020 COVID-19 Response Plan, which served as the impetus for VVC utilization and sustainability.The OIG’s review of presumed in-person, telephone, and VVC encounters found VVC encounter use increased prior to the pandemic but was the least used modality of care; telephone and VVC encounter use increased as presumed in-person encounters decreased at the onset of the pandemic; and telephone encounter use decreased and presumed in-person and VVC encounters continued to increase following the initial months of the pandemic.VHA telehealth strategic plans focused on improving technology to support VVC, increasing provider capability, and identifying preparations for the provision of health care remotely. However, VHA was not readily able to support the increased demand of VVC use. During provider interviews, providers stated the pandemic served as a turning point; identified benefits of using VVC, such as convenience and increased patient engagement; and described barriers to VVC use such as patient obstacles with VVC technology, VVC appointments not emulating in-person appointments, and provider difficulty with scheduling VVC appointments.The OIG made three recommendations to the Under Secretary for Health related to provider knowledge and utilization of VVC technology, clinical and administrative support, and VVC scheduling processes.

Our objective was to review cash and stamp inventory, daily reporting activities, clock ring adjustments, and employee separations at Hillcrest Station. Our audit scope was July 1, through December 31, 2022.

Our objective was to review cash and inventory, daily reporting activities, clock ring adjustments, and employee separations at the Rancho Santa Fe Post Office. The scope period was July 1 through December 31, 2022.

Our objective was to review cash and inventory, daily reporting activities, clock ring adjustments, and employee separations at the Chula Vista Post Office. The scope period was July 1, through December 31, 2022.

What We Looked AtThe Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has historically maintained an excellent safety record. However, two fatal accidents in 2018 and 2019 involving the Boeing 737 MAX 8 raised concerns about FAA's oversight and certification of civilian aircraft manufactured and operated in the United States. At the request of Secretary of Transportation Elaine L. Chao and several members of Congress, our office has undertaken a series of reviews related to FAA's certification of the MAX and its safety oversight. This is the third report in that series. It focuses on FAA's risk assessments following the accidents, as well as the recertification and return to service efforts for the MAX. Accordingly, our audit objective was to evaluate FAA's processes and procedures for grounding aircraft and implementing corrective actions, including for the MAX 8. Specifically, we evaluated FAA's risk assessment processes following the accidents, and the Agency's process for returning the airplane to service.What We FoundFAA's steps following the accidents were in line with its overall post-event risk assessment processes; however, we identified some areas that may impact the Agency's response in the future. First, FAA's processes, by design, allow for significant flexibility in order to factor in the judgment of engineers. Second, FAA has not updated the underlying order and related guidance for its post-event risk assessment processes in over a decade. Third, the Agency lacks quantifiable human factors data, such as pilot reactions to non-normal situations. Finally, FAA's engineers are not all following or receiving the same guidance or training. As a result, FAA may not be able to ensure it consistently follows the most effective risk assessment processes following a safety event.FAA completed the recertification of the 737 MAX on November 18, 2020. During the recertification process, the Agency retained regulatory compliance findings for the design changes instead of delegating them to Boeing's Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program. Numerous complex issues from multiple safety reviews prompted FAA to require Boeing to submit a document demonstrating the effects of Boeing's proposed changes on the speed trim system and how those changes affected the safe operation of the MAX. While FAA is incorporating many of the lessons learned from the MAX recertification efforts for future projects, there are still improvements and procedures currently being codified by the Agency.Our RecommendationsWe made seven recommendations to improve FAA's processes for risk assessment and determination of corrective actions. FAA concurred with all our recommendations and provided appropriate actions and planned completion dates.