Federal Reports

We discuss DOI’s progress in implementing Government charge card recommendations in FY 2024 and other DOI-related charge card activities. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) obligated $267.7 billion (95.3 percent) of disaster relief funding available between fiscal years 2017 and 2023 for disaster-related activities, as authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, 42 United States Code 5121 et seq. (Stafford Act). Approximately $8.1 billion (2.9 percent of the disaster relief funding available) was set aside or transferred to other programs in accordance with applicable laws. Specifically, FEMA set aside $4.6 billion for pre-disaster mitigation and transferred $3.5 billion out of the Disaster Relief Fund to other appropriations.

A train director based in Chicago, Illinois, pleaded guilty on January 27, 2025, in Marion Superior Court, Indiana, to felony theft. The same day, the employee was sentenced to a 545-day suspended sentence and 545 days of probation. The employee was ordered to take an anti-theft class and pay restitution in the amount of $8,978 to the Indiana Department of Workforce Development. Our investigation found that the employee fraudulently applied for and received pandemic unemployment related funds to which she was not entitled.

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) contracted with Sikich to conduct this performance audit.  The objective was to assess the effectiveness of the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Technical Training Center (TTC).  The findings and conclusions presented in this report are the responsibility of Sikich.  The OIG’s responsibility is to provide oversight of the contractor’s work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Based on its assessment period from March 2024 through October 2024, Sikich found that although the NRC generally implemented effective information security policies, procedures, and practices for the TTC, the agency’s implementation of a subset of selected controls was not fully effective.  There were weaknesses in the TTC’s information security program and practices.  As a result, six recommendations were made to assist the TTC in strengthening its information security program.

An Amtrak passenger engineer based in Miami, Florida, was terminated from employment on January 24, 2025, following an administrative hearing. Our investigation found that the employee violated company policies by engaging in outside employment for another company while on a medical leave of absence from Amtrak. The former employee is not eligible for rehire.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a healthcare inspection to assess facility leaders’ responses to a dermatologist’s deficiencies in quality of care and documentation. The OIG found supervisory staff and senior leaders failed to adequately address patient care concerns outlined by staff in 48 patient safety reports and two consecutive unsatisfactory proficiency reports. Specifically, supervisory staff failed to correct the dermatologist’s delays in performing biopsies and misuse of copy and paste in electronic health records, and did not comprehensively review whether the dermatologist documented procedures not performed. 

The Chief of Staff (COS) reported being unaware of the extent of the dermatologist’s deficiencies, despite attending meetings where the information was shared. The Facility Director did not ensure timely initiation of the State Licensing Board (SLB) reporting process after facility leaders had evidence to support the dermatologist’s failure to meet standards of clinical practice and the Medical Executive Board’s recommendation to not renew clinical privileges.

The COS told the OIG that reviews of the dermatologist’s care were completed, and disclosures were not warranted because no patient harm was identified. However, the OIG found that the reviews were neither comprehensive nor conducted by a dermatologist. Additionally, after the OIG site visit, the chief of dermatology reviewed electronic health records and identified that two patients should have received alternative treatments, one patient did not have all identified lesions addressed, and four patients experienced biopsy delays. Therefore, the OIG concluded that further reviews of the care provided by the dermatologist and reconsiderations for disclosures are warranted. 

The OIG made eight recommendations related to delays in the SLB reporting process, and leaders not adequately addressing clinical deficiencies, misuse of copy and paste, documentation of procedures, and the need for follow-up care and disclosure.