Federal Reports

This report presents the results of our audit of Postal Service Management of Overtime Hours.

Background

The Postal Service designates overtime hours as any workhours an employee has worked in excess of a standard workday and/or workweek. The Postal Service generally categorizes overtime hours as either regular overtime or penalty overtime. Regular overtime is paid at time and a half to eligible employees, while penalty-overtime is paid to eligible employees at double the employee’s hourly rate under specific conditions spelled out in collective bargaining agreements. Facility management is required to manage overtime hours efficiently, as overtime hours represent a significant cost for the organization. During fiscal years (FY) 2021 through 2024, the Postal Service paid $24.3 billion in total overtime costs.

What We Did

Our objective was to evaluate the Postal Service’s management of overtime hours and assess whether the corrective actions taken in response to prior overtime audits sufficiently addressed the issues identified. For this audit, we analyzed nationwide overtime data and compared actual overtime to planned overtime hours during FY 2021 through FY 2024. We reviewed overtime hours of 20 judgmentally selected facilities and held interviews with headquarters, district/division, and local officials to gain an understanding of the overtime documentation process including unauthorized overtime.

What We Found

Overtime hours have declined from 172.9 million in 2021 to 117.8 million in 2024. Even with this decline, opportunities continue to exist to improve the management of unauthorized overtime in the Time and Attendance Collection System (TACS) and further reduce overtime hours. Specifically, facility management did not always properly identify, categorize, and document regular and penalty overtime transactions in TACS by the end of the pay week, as required. Additionally, although total overtime hours declined by more than 30 percent from 2021 to 2024, the Postal Service used 5.7 million overtime hours, or 5 percent more than originally planned, in FY 2024.

OIG conducted an evaluation of the Volunteer Delivery System to assess the challenges Peace Corps has recently faced in recruiting, selecting, and placing Volunteers. To perform this evaluation, OIG reviewed the agency’s strategic planning and performance documents, recruiting and hiring data, and documentation related to various recruiting strategies. OIG also conducted in-person and virtual interviews with headquarters-based and regional recruitment staff. The evaluation also included an overseas staff survey and a review of relevant documentation. The report contains seven recommendations along with a summary of the effectiveness of Peace Corps’ recruitment strategies and approaches.

The objective of our review was to determine whether the U.S. Department of Education (Department) complied with transfer of funds and reprogramming requirements under appropriations laws. To achieve our objective, we identified the Department’s transfer and reprogramming activities from November 5, 2024, through January 20, 2025, and the extent to which these activities complied with applicable appropriations laws.  We found that the Department did not fully comply with transfer of funds and reprogramming requirements under applicable appropriations laws. We identified a total of six transactions, consisting of five transfers and one reprogramming, that occurred from November 5, 2024, through January 20, 2025. We determined that two of these transactions—one of the transfers and the one reprogramming—were made using authorities granted under applicable appropriations laws. For these two transactions, we found that the transfer was compliant with applicable requirements; the reprogramming was not. Specifically, we found that the Department did not consult or notify Congress of the reprogramming as required by the appropriations laws. The remaining four transfers were appropriately made under other statutory authorities. The Department’s failure to comply with applicable statutory transfer authorities and reprogramming requirements may result in Federal funds not being used as originally intended by Congress, funds being deemed unavailable for obligation, and potential violations of the Antideficiency Act. Additionally, failure to notify Congress of transfers of funds and reprogrammings hinders congressional oversight of how agencies execute their budgets and fulfill their missions. We recommended that the Department establish appropriate controls to ensure that transfers of funds and reprogrammings comply with all applicable statutory authority requirements, including notifications to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. 

To ensure the continued operations of the International Space Station and the safety of the crew, NASA and its spacesuit support contractor must ensure the suits used for spacewalks, designed more than 50 years ago, are well-maintained and reliable. The contractor, Collins Aerospace, has struggled to ensure sufficient life support components for the suits are delivered when needed and within budget and that meet quality expectations. While Collins’ performance over the last several years has declined, NASA has limited leverage to incentivize improved performance.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a healthcare inspection to determine whether leaders and staff followed required procedures related to suspected elder abuse of a community living center (CLC) resident at the St. Albans VA Medical Center in Queens, part of the VA New York Harbor Healthcare System (system). 

The OIG determined leaders and staff failed to follow procedures to report suspected abuse. A nursing assistant witnessed another nursing assistant allegedly abuse a resident but failed to immediately notify a supervisor, due to being “scared.” Nursing leaders and staff did not immediately ensure the resident’s safety, and did not report the suspected abuse to a unit social worker, VA Police, the resident’s family, and the New York State Department of Health. A nurse practitioner evaluated bruises on the resident and did not document a complete physical exam, consider whether the bruises were related to abuse, or inform the resident’s family. Staff described a culture of silence in the CLC in which staff generally did not report, or underreported, patient safety incidents due to fear of reprisal or administrative burdens. 

Leaders conducted two factfinding investigations into the alleged abuse; however, neither factfinding was thorough, which led to inaccurate conclusions. Factfinding 2 was completed approximately five months after the alleged abuse, exceeding a 14-day completion requirement. An accurate conclusion would have indicated the allegation of patient abuse was plausible and required system leaders to conduct an administrative investigation board. 

The OIG found additional reporting deficiencies related to other incidents of suspected resident abuse; insufficient staff training; substandard documentation by staff, which hindered reviews and investigations; and omissions in Veterans Health Administration and system abuse-related policies. 

The OIG made one recommendation to the Under Secretary for Health, who concurred in principle, and six recommendations to the System Director.
 

Our Objective(s)
To evaluate the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) (1) policies and procedures for the International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) program and (2) ability to monitor foreign civil aviation authorities (CAAs) for potential safety concerns.

Why This Audit
In 2022, FAA announced changes intended to better mitigate international civil aviation risks, strengthen international relationships with CAAs, and improve effectiveness in executing the IASA process. While the changes were suspended in 2024, a new set of revisions was proposed. It remains uncertain how the Agency's proposed changes will impact the program's ability to evaluate and monitor foreign CAAs' compliance with ICAO standards.

What We Found
The IASA program's execution is hindered by inadequate milestones, lack of documentation, and fluctuating policy and guidance.
FAA's assessment times have increased overall for higher-risk CAAs, and the Agency does not have completion goals for tracking assessments, which may prevent it from promptly addressing safety issues.
In 2022, FAA issued a policy statement intended to enhance the IASA program. However, the Agency suspended it in 2024, issued a new policy statement, and requested comments on the proposed changes. These comments have not yet been finalized as of April 2025.
FAA does not consistently maintain documentation for its assessments and some in-country evaluation checklists are outdated, causing disagreements between officials and delayed assessment times.

FAA monitors CAAs for safety concerns but competing priorities and limited resources restrict the number of IASA reassessments.
In 2023, FAA updated and improved its Risk Assessment Tool-originally developed in 2006-which the Agency uses to determine which CAAs should be reassessed.
FAA is not always able to conduct recommended CAA reassessments timely, and sometimes the Agency does not conduct these reassessments at all.

Recommendations
We made 7 recommendations to improve FAA's administration of the IASA program.

Our Objective(s)
To perform a quality control review (QCR) of Sikich's fiscal year 2025 audit of the effectiveness of the Department of Transportation's (DOT) information security program and practices.

Why This Audit
The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 requires agencies to develop, implement, and document agencywide information security programs and practices. The Act also requires inspectors general to conduct annual reviews to determine the effectiveness of their agencies' information security programs and report their review results to the Office of Management and Budget. To meet this requirement, we contracted with Sikich to conduct this audit subject to our oversight. We performed a QCR of Sikich's report and related documentation.

What We Found
The independent auditor, Sikich, found that DOT's information security program and practices were not effective and made seven recommendations to improve DOT's information security program.
Establish and implement guidance for performing Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 activities through policies and procedures, including the development of current and target cybersecurity profiles which consider anticipated changes in DOT's cybersecurity posture.
Define and implement policies and procedures that utilize standard data elements and taxonomy to develop and maintain an up-to-date inventory of all software assets and associated licenses, including Executive Order critical software.
Document policies and procedures for developing and maintaining a comprehensive and accurate inventory of data and the corresponding metadata for DOT's data types.
Create and maintain a comprehensive inventory of data and corresponding metadata.
Work with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Chief Information Officer (CIO) to secure a reliable funding stream for continuous vetting.
Work with FAA CIO to initiate and complete the background investigation of FAA employees in public trust positions.
Work with FAA CIO to enroll FAA employees into continuous vetting through Trusted Workforce.

Our QCR disclosed no instances in which Sikich did not comply, in all material respects, with generally accepted Government auditing standards.

Recommendations
DOT concurs with Sikich's seven recommendations.

Our objectives were to determine whether the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (Wisconsin) designed and implemented (1) application processes that adequately assessed nonpublic schools’ eligibility for Emergency Assistance to Nonpublic Schools (EANS)-funded services or assistance and complied with other applicable requirements, and (2) oversight processes to ensure that EANS-funded services or assistance were used for allowable purposes. Although we found Wisconsin’s processes to assess nonpublic schools’ eligibility for EANS-funded services and assistance ensured that funds were obligated within 6 months of receipt and that applications for the EANS programs were generally approved or denied timely in accordance with Federal regulations, we found that Wisconsin allocated ARP EANS funds to nonpublic schools that did not meet program eligibility requirements and did not verify some information that nonpublic schools provided in their applications for EANS funds. Additionally, Wisconsin’s oversight of its contractor’s administration of EANS expenditures and inventory processes could be improved. Specifically, Wisconsin did not effectively monitor its contractor to ensure that expenditures were properly accounted for, supporting documentation was maintained, and assets purchased with EANS funds were tracked. Further, Wisconsin’s processes did not ensure that fees charged to the nonpublic schools’ EANS funds were reasonable and appropriate. However, Wisconsin’s oversight was adequate to ensure that EANS-funded services and assistance were for allowable purposes.  Wisconsin’s improper approval of ineligible nonpublic schools’ applications resulted in providing over $20 million in ARP EANS-funded services and assistance to 184 nonpublic schools. Further, because Wisconsin did not verify certain information in nonpublic schools’ applications, it provided $838,829 for EANS-funded services and assistance to one ineligible school and did not have assurance that all schools that were approved to participate in the programs had a nonprofit status. We made seven recommendations to address the issues we identified in Wisconsin’s administration and oversight of its EANS programs.