Federal Reports

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) owns and operates more than 16,400 miles of transmission lines to deliver electricity to 10 million people in the Tennessee Valley.  TVA has delivered 99.999 percent reliability since the year 2000 and continued investment in its transmission system helps TVA meet the daily challenge of moving power to where it is needed.  Due to the importance of transmission assets to system reliability and the risk associated with the degradation of transmission assets, we performed an evaluation to determine if Transmission (1) is assessing the condition of its transmission assets and (2) has plans in place to address asset degradation. 

We determined Transmission is assessing the condition of its assets and has plans in place to address asset degradation.  However, according to the fiscal year 2024 Transmission Long-Term Asset Study, TVA faces increased risk to reliability over the next 10 years based on planned spending levels.

Co-CEO of Chinese publicly traded technology company and financial advisor indicted for over $100M securities fraud scheme

Peace Corps OIG conducted an evaluation of Peace Corps/Madagascar’s programs, operations, and activities from October 2021 to May 2024. OIG evaluation activities included: Volunteer and post staff surveys; interviews with staff, Volunteers, and stakeholders; document collection and analysis; and in-person observations and inspections. The evaluators performed on-site work at the post in May 2024, where they closely collaborated with post leadership and staff to learn more about past and present operations. During this review, OIG traveled to Volunteers’ homes and work sites for in-person observations and interviews.  

On April 26, 2024, the Office of Inspector General received a complaint alleging that Mission Support and Test Services, LLC (MSTS) management at the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) approved the transport of a supplemental pilot from Tennessee to RSL-Joint Base Andrews (RSL-Andrews) using a National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)-owned aircraft. Additionally, during a subsequent discussion, the complainant also alleged that MSTS did not list the supplemental pilot on the flight manifest.

We initiated this inspection to determine the facts and circumstances regarding the alleged flight concerns at the RSL.

We substantiated the allegation that MSTS management approved the transport of a supplemental pilot from Tennessee to RSL-Andrews using an NNSA-owned aircraft. An NNSA Nevada Field Office official verbally authorized the flight to address a pilot availability issue. However, we questioned whether the supplemental pilot’s role on the flight was needed. In addition, there were differences in understanding by MSTS aviation personnel about how readiness (availability of assets to rapidly respond to incidents) was tracked in the system. Contributing factors for the issues we identified included the lack of: (1) a documented policy on readiness scores and aircraft availability requirements; (2) documented communication between the Nevada Field Office and MSTS officials; and (3) guidance pertaining to NNSA public aircraft operations.

We also substantiated the allegation that the supplemental pilot was not added to the flight manifest. This occurred because of the lack of a formal written RSL policy to verify personnel on flights.

Improving transparency and access to information helps ensure Government aircraft are used solely for official purposes. Accurate flight manifests are also critical for timely responses in aviation emergencies.  

We have made five recommendations that, if fully implemented, should help ensure that NNSA-owned aircraft are used for Government purposes and that manifest information is accurate.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) did not properly design, implement, comply with, or manage requirements of the Cybersecurity Retention Incentive (Cyber Incentive) program, which paid more than $138 million between fiscal years 2020 through 2024.  These deficiencies resulted in CISA not using Federal funds efficiently or effectively to retain mission-critical cybersecurity employees.   • CISA did not narrowly target mission-critical cybersecurity    employees with unusually high or unique qualifications.   Ineligible employees received incentive payments, which  ranged from approximately $21,000 to $25,000 annually.  • CISA’s Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer (OCHCO) did not maintain records of Cyber Incentive recipients and  corresponding payments. • CISA did not comply with Federal regulations and multiple  program requirements, resulting in $1.41 million in unallowed back payments to 348 Cyber Incentive recipients,  which we identified as questioned costs.  

This Office of Inspector General (OIG) Healthcare Facility Inspection program report describes the results of a focused evaluation of the care provided at the VA Alexandria Healthcare System in Pineville, Louisiana. 

This evaluation focused on five key content domains:
     •    Culture
     •    Environment of care
     •    Patient safety
     •    Primary care
     •    Veteran-centered safety net

The OIG issued one recommendation for VA to correct an identified deficiency in one domain:
   1.    Patient safety
     •    Providers communicate test results to patients in a timely manner

This Office of Inspector General (OIG) Healthcare Facility Inspection program report describes the results of a focused evaluation of the care provided at the Jonathan M. Wainwright Memorial VA Medical Center in Walla Walla, Washington. 

This evaluation focused on five key content domains:
     •    Culture
     •    Environment of care
     •    Patient safety
     •    Primary care
     •    Veteran-centered safety net

The OIG issued nine recommendations for VA to correct identified deficiencies in two domains:
   1.    Environment of care
     •    Signs and maps
     •    Emergency generator and fire door inspection and testing
     •    Environment of care committee meetings
     •    Mental Health Residential Rehabilitation Treatment Program area cleanliness
     •    Hands-free sanitizer dispensers
     •    Guidance for shelter-in-place supplies
   2.    Patient safety
     •    Service-level workflows for the communication of test results
     •    Process to monitor the communication of test results
     •    Improvement actions from root cause analyses