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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
Department of Defense
WHISTLEBLOWER REPRISAL INVESTIGATION HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC. MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA
Financial Audit of Empowering CSOs to Combat Human Trafficking in Sri Lanka Activity, Managed by Safe Foundation, Cooperative Agreement 72038321CA00001, January 1, 2023, to December 31, 2023
Our investigation determined that, between 2022 and 2023, an Amtrak Supervisor based in Philadelphia and several other employees violated company policy by not swiping out on a Time Entry Device (TED) after their shifts and, subsequently, swiping out and immediately back in when they returned to work. This resulted in the recording of significant consecutive TED hours. The employees used this swiping protocol to inaccurately claim a full eight hours of regular pay in Maximo, Amtrak’s timekeeping system, instead of correctly recording seven hours of regular pay and one hour of Code 29 pay (hours paid but not worked) to which they were actually entitled.
We also found that the supervisor collected additional Code 29 hours to which he was not entitled, in violation of the Infrastructure Management and Construction Services’ (IMCS) internal hours‐of‐service policy, which limits the number of hours an IMCS employee can work to 16 hours in a 24‐hour period. We further found that a Division Engineer, based in Philadelphia, violated the internal hours‐of‐service policy by allowing and encouraging these employees to claim Code 29 pay after working only 14 hours, which resulted in the company paying for hundreds of unnecessary Code 29 hours. The supervisor was terminated and is no longer eligible for rehire, and the Engineer was reprimanded.
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s Election and Political Mail. The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of Election and Political Mail.
Our objective was to evaluate the service performance and visibility of Election and Political Mail during the 2024 general election. For this audit, we reviewed Election and Political Mail policies and mail tracking methods, analyzed service performance data, and judgmentally selected and conducted observations at 68 mail processing facilities and 947 delivery units during the 2024 general election season.
Overall, the Postal Service significantly exceeded service performance goals for Election and most Political Mail, but opportunities existed for the Postal Service to improve tracking of Ballot Mail within its network. The Postal Service applied its “extraordinary measures” to expedite handling of Ballot Mail. In fact, we found the Postal Service provided service above rates charged for certain ballots and late arriving Political Mail. The Postal Service could have potentially received $15.4 million more in revenue if it charged rates in line with the service provided on these ballots. When we observed non-compliance with Election and Political Mail policies and procedures, we found it was caused by confusion in the field over new, electronic processes or temporary changes in the mail flow due to the election. We did not see widespread instances of delayed Election or Political Mail in delivery units before or after the election, but better controls could lead to more accurate daily reporting on the status of Election and Political Mail from delivery operations.
In addition, the Postal Service estimated that just under 40 million ballots mailed to and from voters did not have performance tracking data. The Postal Service’s inability to track ballots negatively impacts its and other interested parties’ visibility into the status of ballots in the postal network.
The Office of the Inspector General performed an audit of TVA’s transmission network cybersecurity. The audit scope was limited to a specific type of connectivity within TVA’s transmission network. The audit objective was to determine the level of cybersecurity in place for this type of connectivity.
We determined the connectivity within TVA’s transmission network had a high level of cybersecurity in place commensurate with the level of associated risk. In addition, our testing of internal controls identified process improvements related to configuration management. We recommend the Senior Vice President, Grid, update configuration management processes to improve periodic reviews.
Financial Audit of Resources Managed by Millennium Challenge Account-Senegal II under the Millennium Challenge Compact for the period April 1, 2022, to March 31, 2024