Federal Reports

Our objective was to review cash and stamp inventory, daily reporting activities, clock ring adjustments, and employee separations at Hillcrest Station. Our audit scope was July 1, through December 31, 2022.

Our objective was to review cash and inventory, daily reporting activities, clock ring adjustments, and employee separations at the Rancho Santa Fe Post Office. The scope period was July 1 through December 31, 2022.

Our objective was to review cash and inventory, daily reporting activities, clock ring adjustments, and employee separations at the Chula Vista Post Office. The scope period was July 1, through December 31, 2022.

What We Looked AtThe Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has historically maintained an excellent safety record. However, two fatal accidents in 2018 and 2019 involving the Boeing 737 MAX 8 raised concerns about FAA's oversight and certification of civilian aircraft manufactured and operated in the United States. At the request of Secretary of Transportation Elaine L. Chao and several members of Congress, our office has undertaken a series of reviews related to FAA's certification of the MAX and its safety oversight. This is the third report in that series. It focuses on FAA's risk assessments following the accidents, as well as the recertification and return to service efforts for the MAX. Accordingly, our audit objective was to evaluate FAA's processes and procedures for grounding aircraft and implementing corrective actions, including for the MAX 8. Specifically, we evaluated FAA's risk assessment processes following the accidents, and the Agency's process for returning the airplane to service.What We FoundFAA's steps following the accidents were in line with its overall post-event risk assessment processes; however, we identified some areas that may impact the Agency's response in the future. First, FAA's processes, by design, allow for significant flexibility in order to factor in the judgment of engineers. Second, FAA has not updated the underlying order and related guidance for its post-event risk assessment processes in over a decade. Third, the Agency lacks quantifiable human factors data, such as pilot reactions to non-normal situations. Finally, FAA's engineers are not all following or receiving the same guidance or training. As a result, FAA may not be able to ensure it consistently follows the most effective risk assessment processes following a safety event.FAA completed the recertification of the 737 MAX on November 18, 2020. During the recertification process, the Agency retained regulatory compliance findings for the design changes instead of delegating them to Boeing's Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program. Numerous complex issues from multiple safety reviews prompted FAA to require Boeing to submit a document demonstrating the effects of Boeing's proposed changes on the speed trim system and how those changes affected the safe operation of the MAX. While FAA is incorporating many of the lessons learned from the MAX recertification efforts for future projects, there are still improvements and procedures currently being codified by the Agency.Our RecommendationsWe made seven recommendations to improve FAA's processes for risk assessment and determination of corrective actions. FAA concurred with all our recommendations and provided appropriate actions and planned completion dates.

This report was submitted to the Comptroller General in accordance with Section 5 of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) Act of 2008. The report summarizes the activities of GAO's Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the six-month reporting period ending March 31, 2023. During the reporting period, the OIG provided Congress with its legislative priorities which will improve transparency and enhance its independence by providing parity with other federal Inspectors General.The OIG also initiated work on one performance audit and continued work on three additional performance audits. In addition, the OIG closed nine investigations and opened 11 new investigations. The OIG processed 32 substantive hotline complaints, many of which were referred to other OIGs for action because the matters involved were within their jurisdictions.The OIG remained active in the GAO and OIG communities by briefing new GAO employees on its audit and investigative missions, briefing GAO teams on the work of the GAO OIG, and participating in committees and working groups of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, including those related to the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee.

The audit objectives were to determine whether program funds were managed in accordance with the ARC and Federal grant requirements

This evaluation focused on EPA Region 9’s oversight of authorized Hawaii state programs for underground storage tanks and drinking water quality and the response to the Red Hill drinking water contamination incident.